

Salary Incentives and Teacher Quality: The role of compensation in teacher recruitment and retention

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
PPIC

The problem: Salary disparities across districts cause inequality

- Variations in salary exist between districts
 - In CA, district salaries range from \$42,000 to over \$110,000 for teachers with 10 years of experience and 60 additional education credits
- Districts with high-need students have lowest salaries

The problem: Salary disparities across districts cause inequality

- Variations in district salaries
 - In California, average district salaries range from \$110,000 to \$150,000 and
- Districts with lower salaries have higher percentages of minority students and English language learners and larger average district class sizes




The problem: Salary disparities across districts cause inequality

- Variations in salary exist between districts
 - In CA, district salaries range from \$42,000 to over \$110,000 for teachers with 10 years of experience and 60 additional education credits
- Districts with high-need students have lowest salaries
- Lower salary + difficult working conditions
➔ difficulty recruiting and retaining teachers
- This leads to disparities in teacher quality

The problem: Salary disparities across districts cause inequality

- Variations in salary
 - In \$10,000 and more
- Districts with lower salaries
 - disproportionately high minority enrollment
- This is a problem because
 - It causes inequality
 - It causes lower quality of education



A solution: Compensation?

- Districts often use compensation to attract and retain teachers
- Will wages help attract teachers?
 - Research literature suggests teachers respond to wage changes in their decisions to become teachers
 - Little research on how relative salary increases improve teacher recruitment or retention in a particular district
 - Existing research in recruitment looks at teachers' ultimate placement, not changes in teachers' application preferences

The Quality Teacher and Education Act (QTEA) in the San Francisco Unified School District

- Parcel tax passed by SF voters in June 2008
- \$500/student for 20 years
- Policy elements
 - Master Teacher program
 - Professional development hours
 - Expansion of Peer Assistance and Review (PAR)
 - Whole school rewards
 - Compensation
 - Salary increases ranging from \$500-\$6,300
 - Hard-to-staff school bonus: \$2,000
 - Hard-to-fill subject bonus: \$1,000
 - Retention bonuses: \$2,500 after 4 years, \$3,000 after 8 years

Data collection

	2007-08	2007-08	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Administrative Data (from 2002)	X	X	X	X	X
Surveys of teachers and principals	X		X	X	X
Surveys of teacher applicants	X		X		
Interviews with district staff and stakeholders	X	X	X	X	X
School case studies			X		

Presentation contents

- The effect of QTEA's compensation increases on:
 - Teacher recruitment
 - Teacher retention


Presentation contents

- The effect of QTEA's compensation increases on:
 - – Teacher recruitment
 - Teacher retention

Focus of research

QTEA's overall salary increase

Salaries of Local School Districts Before and After QTEA, for Teachers with 2 Prior Years of Experience



How could QTEA affect recruitment?


- If QTEA was effective in attracting teacher applicants:
 - More teachers would apply to SFUSD after QTEA
 - Teachers who would only have applied to districts with higher salaries now apply to SFUSD as well
 - New teacher applicants attracted from other districts could be higher quality

Teachers who apply to
higher-paying districts

--proxies for--

“Higher-quality”
applicants


How could QTEA affect recruitment?



QTEA's impact on teacher recruitment

Principal reports

Satisfaction with Quality of External Hires, by Year




Source:
 2008 TNTP Principal Survey (N=67)
 2010 Stanford P Principal Survey (N=88)
 Chi-square = 16.45, p = 0.01

QTEA's impact on teacher recruitment

Principal reports

Satisfaction with Quality of External Hires, by Year



This year...there's just a lot of stronger teachers coming in to interview. (Principal, 2010)

I used to [have a hard time recruiting teachers in hard-to-fill areas], but last year because of the economy – and it is going to be the same this year – there are a lot of candidates out there. (Principal, 2010)

Source:
 2008 TNTP Principal Survey (N=67)
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
QTEA implementation period

Why a causal approach is needed


GOAL: Need an approach that allows us to compare teachers who are similarly affected by the economy, but who are differently affected by QTEA

June 2008: QTEA Passed

March 2009: Salary increases in effect



General approach: Exploit natural variation in salary increases



Research questions

1. Changes to the applicant pool
 - Did QTEA attract more applicants in targeted areas?
 - Did QTEA attract applicants from higher-paying school districts?

2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires
 - Did SFUSD hire more teachers in areas targeted by QTEA?
 - Did QTEA improve the quality of new-hires in SFUSD?

Data

- Changes to the applicant pool
 - Surveys of teachers and applicants
 - Applicant cohorts from 2005-2011
 - Contains:
 - Estimated placement on SFUSD salary schedule
 - Other local districts applied to
- Changes to the cohorts of new-hires
 - SFUSD administrative data
 - Cohorts of new-hires (and all other teachers) from 2005-2011
 - Contains:
 - Placement on SFUSD salary schedule
 - Teacher-by-year estimations of contribution to student achievement

Q1: Changes to the applicant pool


Did QTEA attract more applicants in targeted areas?

- Approach: Compare the proportion of targeted applicants before and after QTEA
 - An increase in proportion of targeted applicants after QTEA would indicate there were more applicants in the “targeted” group after QTEA
 - Would provide an indication that the size of the applicant pool increased
- Limit sample to applicants with only with 2-15 years of prior experience
 - Compare teachers who are similarly affected by economic changes but differently affected by QTEA

Q1: Changes to the applicant pool

Did QTEA attract more applicants in targeted areas?

YES



Q1: Changes to the applicant pool

Did QTEA attract applicants from higher-paying districts?


- Approach: Compare the average salary of other districts applicants applied to before/after QTEA
 - An increase in the average salary of other districts after QTEA would indicate applicants were drawn by the salary, or that they have a “preference for higher salary”
- Again, limit sample to applicants with only with 2-15 years of prior experience
 - Compare teachers who are similarly affected by economic changes but differently affected by QTEA

Q1: Changes to the applicant pool

Did QTEA attract applicants from higher-paying districts?

YES

Difference-in-Difference Results



Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did SFUSD hire more teachers in areas targeted by QTEA?


- Approach: Compare the proportion of “targeted” new-hires before and after QTEA
 - More new-hires in the targeted group provides an indication that:
 - There were more of them in the pool
 - That they may be higher quality candidates, since they were ultimately hired

Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did SFUSD hire more teachers in areas targeted by QTEA?

YES

Proportion of New-Hires in Targeted Group Before and After QTEA



Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did QTEA improve the quality of new-hires in SFUSD?

- Approach: Compare the “quality” of new-hires before/after QTEA
 - “Quality”: A quantitative measure of a teacher’s contribution to student achievement

A teacher-by-year score in ELA and Mathematics, controlling for student background characteristics and prior achievement

Includes teachers in grades 3-8


Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did QTEA improve the quality of new-hires in SFUSD?

- Approach: Compare the “quality” of new-hires before/after QTEA
 - “Quality”: A quantitative measure of a teacher’s contribution to student achievement
 - An increase in the overall quality of new-hires provides confirmation that QTEA has been effective in improving teacher recruitment

Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did QTEA improve the quality of new-hires in SFUSD?




Q2. Changes to the cohorts of new-hires

Did QTEA improve the quality of new-hires in SFUSD?

YES!

- Results: The quality of new-hires increased after QTEA in ELA but not Mathematics
 - For teachers hired in 2009-10, their value-added scores were 0.34 of a standard deviation higher than teachers hired in the time period 2004-05 through 2007-08

In sum:



Presentation contents

- The effect of QTEA's compensation increases on:
 - Teacher recruitment
 - – Teacher retention

Research questions


1. To what extent did teacher retention improve for teachers “targeted” by QTEA’s:

- Overall salary increases?
- Retention bonuses?
- Hard-to-staff school bonuses?

- Salary increase: \$500-\$6,300
- Retention bonuses: \$2,500 after 4 years, \$3,000 after 8 years
- Hard-to-staff school bonus: \$2,000

2. Did the retention of highly-effective teachers improve after QTEA?

Retention improved after QTEA




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Why a causal approach is needed


Again, the goal is to compare teachers who are similarly affected by the economy but differently affected by QTEA

June 2008:
QTEA
Passed

March 2009:
Salary
increases in
effect



Again, difference-in-differences



Research approach

- In each question, to ensure that “targeted” teachers are similar to non-targeted teachers:
 - Overall salary increase – compare teachers with 3-16 years of experience
 - Retention bonus – compare teachers with 3-5 years of service (4th year targeted)
 - Hard-to-staff school bonus – compare teachers in HTS schools with a matched comparison group (also limit by teacher experience)

Data

- SFUSD administrative data
 - All teachers from 2002-2011
- Contains:
 - Receipt of QTEA salary and bonuses
 - Placement on SFUSD salary schedule
 - Years of total teaching experience
 - Years of service in SFUSD
 - Teacher-by-year estimations of contribution to student achievement
 - Teaching placement each year

Q1. Did teacher retention improve for teachers “targeted” by QTEA?

NO



- The pattern of results in this causal analysis shows that QTEA had no effect
 - Teachers targeted by QTEA’s salary increases did not have a differential increase in retention rates above the overall trend

Q2. Did the retention of highly-effective teachers improve after QTEA?

- Approach: compare the retention rates of teachers with high estimates of contribution to student achievement to those with lower estimates
 - A positive finding here would suggest that QTEA has been effective in retaining highly-effective teachers

Q2. Did the retention of highly-effective teachers improve after QTEA?

NO



The retention of highly-effective teachers is higher both before and after QTEA

However, their retention rates are not higher than the trend for teachers overall

Summary of findings

- This study is first to show that salary can improve the attractiveness of an urban school district in California
 - QTEA increased the size and quality of the applicant pool
 - Led to higher quality new-hires overall
 - Important policy goal given substantially unequal sorting
- QTEA had no effect on teacher retention
 - Economic downturn limited the policy's possible effect
 - Retention rates were too high for a differential "QTEA effect"

Implications

- Compensation is only part of what motivates teachers
 - Working conditions are important
 - Teacher salary increases may need to be higher to affect retention than to improve recruitment

Implications

- District personnel practices are important
 - District ability to hire best candidates from improving pool
 - In order for improvements in the applicant pool to be effective, there need to be available positions
 - Points to the need for “strategic retention”

Implications

- Long-run and system-wide implications
 - What happens if other districts respond by raising salaries?
 - Could district salary increases improve teacher quality in the entire labor market?
 - Salary can be used to achieve better distribution of teachers
 - Districts can raise funds themselves
 - State can play a role

For more information

- Visit: <http://cepa.stanford.edu/qtea/publications>
- Contact: Heather Hough, hough@ppic.org

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