Conditions of Education in California 1994-95

Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE)

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Policy Analysis for California Education

Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE) is a university-based research center focusing on issues of state education policy and practice. PACE is located in the Schools of Education at the University of California, Berkeley and Stanford University and has an office in Sacramento. *Conditions of Education 1994-95* is made possible with funding from the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation.

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FOREWORD

This is the ninth edition of *Conditions of Education in California*. In this volume PACE has compiled information on current critical issues in state education policy and presented them within the context of major policy developments. The Evolving Context introduces the current issues in the state and sets the stage for the remaining chapters. They are: Assessment and Achievement, Finance, Teachers and Teaching, Integrated Children's Services, Child Care and Development Services, and School-to-Work.

We hope you find this version of *Conditions of Education* useful. As always, we welcome your comments and suggestions.

Michael Kirst Gerald Hayward Julia Koppich

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 4: TEACHERS AND TEACHING (CONT.)

List of Figures

Chapter 1: The Evolving Context

Chapter 2: Assessment and Achievement

Chapter 3: Finance

CHAPTER 3: FINANCE (CONT.)

CHAPTER 4: TEACHERS AND TEACHING

CHAPTER 5: INTEGRATED CHILDREN'S SERVICES

CHAPTER 6: CHILD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

CHAPTER 7: SCHOOL-TO-WORK

CHAPTER 1:

THE EVOLVING CONTEXT

HIGHLIGHTS:

- Political support for education in California has been steadily eroding for two decades.
- Public commitment to the state's schools, which historically has been strong and consistent, has ebbed and flowed in unpredictable ways in recent years.
- California's precarious fiscal condition has exacerbated political and policy competition among key social service sectors—health and welfare, corrections, higher education, and K-12 education.
- The state and it's elected leaders currently are reluctant to raise taxes despite increasing demands for services.
- If current attitudes about taxation prevail, schools cannot realistically expect to receive additional revenues to undertake any of the changes and innovations required to substantially improve the state's education system.

CHAPTER 1:

THE EVOLVING CONTEXT

There have been many changes in the California education context since PACE last published *Conditions of Education* in 1993. For example, California pupil enrollment and diversity have grown significantly, and there are major changes in federal education politics. But this chapter highlights two fundamental contextual factors that influence most of the other major contextual changes—politics and economics. We start with the underlying trends in California politics because education policy is so dependent upon political support and influences. We then turn to economics, because the education finance system depends upon political decision-making and priorities.

Political support for California public education has been eroding for several decades, and the last two years reveal serious negative events. These events may portend long-term trends or may be reversed. They are presented here to highlight changes that could have serious long-term consequences for California education. The past political trends can be summarized by a single statistic. In 1965, California ranked 5th in the nation in per pupil spending and by 1994 had dropped to 40th.

Until the 1970's, California's local schools were substantially insulated from state economic recessions because local voters could approve local property tax increases and gain additional dollars as property values increased. However, local fiscal discretion has been almost eliminated (except for local elections requiring a two-thirds majority) and political control over finance levels has shifted to the state. State politics, however, have been hamstrung by Proposition 13, spending limits, and other constitutional provisions that constrain the state's ability to fund schools adequately. By reducing the number of governmental bodies that are politically involved in raising revenues from more than 1,000 essentially to the state and a handful of districts that are able to pass a small two-thirds vote parcel tax, California eliminated political competition among districts for better funded programs. Statewide rather than local politics became the key to political support for education.

Public attitudes toward education seem to be shifting as education competes with other public concerns like safety and immigration policy. Further, we are concerned that communities be able to meet their aspirations for public education. Recent trends in state and federal politics have not made it easier to reach this objective.

For example, the 1994 gubernatorial campaigns did not speak clearly to the demands of the public education system. Neither of

the candidates provided a vision for a coherent system of public education that grabbed the attention of the voters, much less the media. In stark contrast to 1993 when the issue of school vouchers dominated the election season, 1994 was a year when immigration issues, welfare reform, and crime prevention monopolized campaigns, media coverage, and voter attention.

What does this mean about the public's views toward education? In some past years, the public education system in California was without question the most important concern of the voters, as shown by a number of public opinion polls. But this year, have the public's priorities shifted?

First, voters had the opportunity in 1994 to elect a new Superintendent of Public Instruction. The victory by Delaine Eastin, a former assemblywoman, is an opportunity for education policy in the state to move forward under her leadership. But the campaigns for this high-ranking public office were not highly visible to the voters. One explanation is that the two competing candidates, in many areas, represented similar ideals about the office and the direction of public education in the state. Another explanation is that the public simply did not demand a heightened level of discourse and debate for the position.

Another example of voter sentiment on public education came in the primary election season in June 1994. Voters defeated a school construction bond measure that would have provided facilities construction and maintenance that is essential to handle expected K-12 enrollment growth. A defeat of a bond measure of this type had not occurred in California in 15 years. Further, the legislature, because of partisan disagreements, did not place a measure on the ballot in November 1994 to respond to the earlier defeat by the voters. The result is that state capital investment in public education—something that voters had systematically supported for 40 years—has come to a virtual halt with a backlog of $6 billion of state-approved projects.

One could argue that voter reaction to the bond initiative is a response to the current tax burden in California. To this point, a comparison with other states is necessary. In 1992, state and local tax collections, per $100 of personal income, totaled $11.37. This is less than the national average of $11.49.[1] At the same time, the voters supported by a wide margin the "Three Strikes You're Out" initiative that mandates life sentences for third-time convicted felons. It is estimated that this initiative will cost California an additional $4.5 to $6.5 billion annually when implemented.[2] The resulting question is where public education fits within the priorities of the voting public.



In the 1960's the California Master Plan for Higher Education was symbolic of the public commitment. But recently, significant policy decisions have flown in the face of the Master Plan with no apparent outcry from the voters. By the year 2004, California anticipates a 23 percent increase in the number of high school graduates. For the past few years, enrollments in all three of the higher education segments have been dropping. There simply is no current strategic plan to accommodate the increasing enrollment growth yet this lack of higher education capacity is not generating any great public discussion or outcry. The irony of this issue is already being noticed. Despite more high school students successfully completing the University of California's A to F requirements for college admission, there has been an actual decrease of 20.2 percent in those California public high school graduates who attended either the UC or CSU system. The state is preparing many more students for postsecondary education in California, and at the same time is denying them access through increases in fees, lagging student financial aid programs, and the elimination of some classes that allow timely degree completion.[3]

The commitment of past years was demonstrated by a constant investment in the infrastructure of our public education institutions. During the 1950's, California was known for education innovations in classroom teaching, such as flexible student schedules and team teaching, and became a magnet for school teachers from all over the United States. In the 1960's and 1970's improvements included child development programs in state preschools, separate state funds earmarked for disadvantaged pupils, and regional vocational centers. No state could match the scope and intensity of California's community colleges.

Even after Proposition 13 in 1978, California continued to provide new education visions for the United States. The K-12 curriculum revisions and textbooks at the state and local level were nationally studied and praised. Networks of teachers worked throughout the state to implement more challenging and complex curricula. And the universities maintained world class status to educate impressive numbers of students for a rapidly changing economy.

What might explain the reduced political support for public education in recent years? The underlying causes are not completely clear, but there are several crucial factors. First, if there is support for public education in the state, perhaps the supporters are not voting. Primary elections drew just 26 percent of adults over age 18 in June 1994. In the November 1994 elections, voters were more white, more wealthy, more conservative, and better educated than the general California population. Information

reported by the Field Institute showed that more than 40 percent of voters were older than 50, compared to 33 percent in the state. Adults between the ages of 18 and 30 accounted for 14 percent of the voters, but they are more than one-quarter of the general population. Further, more than one-third of the voting public reported an annual salary greater than $60,000.

There is a mismatch among those who cannot vote, those who can vote, and those who do vote that has tended to send conflicting signals to state policymakers about the priority for public schools in the state. For example, Hispanic children represent about 36 percent of the school age population. This is in contrast to 15 percent of adults who are Hispanic and eligible to vote, and 9 percent who did vote in November 1994.

Second, the public receives most of its information about public issues from radio and television. Issues relating to crime, immigration, and the social tensions of urban areas have monopolized media coverage and provided viewers and listeners with views of local communities. Further, these televised issues may have overwhelmed the public and prevented them from concentrating on other issues, including schools. For example, the 1994 race for California Senator between Michael Huffington and Diane Feinstein resulted in spending above $50 million. Much of this expenditure was in the form of sound bytes on radio and television that provided the public with little information. In 1994, attention to complex issues about public education did not seem to attract the same attention as other issues, and as a result, fell out of the media spotlight.

As 1995 began, the Governor indicated his support for the public schools both ideologically and with increased financial support in some areas. Notably, 1994 started in the same way with little to show by the year's end. For example, after the November, 1993, defeat of the school voucher initiative, Governor Wilson responded to the keen interest of the voters by commissioning a report on new directions for education reform in the state. The report was released in March, 1995. Whether the Governor will use this report to promote education reform remains to be seen.

Similarly, leadership was shown by Speaker Willie Brown in hosting an Education Summit in February 1994. The purpose was to bring together educators, parents, and policymakers to discuss new directions for public education and reinvigorate the kind of school improvement initiative that California had demonstrated in past years. While the Summit was well attended, there have been no notable legislative initiatives or results consistent with the dozens of recommendations that emerged during those two days. A majority of the Assembly Republican Caucus supports a voucher

initiative that would change public education as we know it. Fewer Republican Senators than in the past were willing to serve on the Senate Education Committee (the committee is now composed of 7 Democrats and 2 Republicans). A deeper partisan split seems to be developing towards public education—an issue that for most of the state's history has been bipartisan.

The concern is that in some fundamental way the public has either less interest in public education or has lost the ability to communicate clearly the urgency of their views clearly to elected officials. The metaphor of the California Dream has been part of the state's history. What aspirations do the public and its elected officials have now for public education? The answer is, at best, unclear.

Political leadership and a strong commitment from the public are critical in redirecting attention toward public education as a priority. But there is no denying that California has had a long and slow recovery from a multi-year economic recession. The difficult economic climate in California has stunted education reform efforts and resulted in funding levels well below the national average. The fiscal realities of California are stark and are significant in understanding how education spending can be sustained or improved in the coming years.

In the next section, we present the economic context within which all allocation decisions are made—for higher education, senior citizens, the penal system, and entitlement programs. As much as the economy continues to improve in California, there is no question that the challenges that remain for the state are enormous.

THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

Although the current projections from the Department of Finance paint a rosier picture of the economic climate in California than in recent years, the California economy is by no means out of the woods. California's economic problems are systemic and will not be resolved by short term economic upturns. Quite simply, California lacks both the resources to pay for its current obligations and the prospects for paying for its long term obligations. One dramatic indicator of the catastrophic nature of the state's fiscal condition was revealed in July 1994 when the Legislature and the Governor, with the passage of the 1994-95 budget bill, entered into a two-year plan to eliminate the state's budget deficit by July 1, 1996. In order to finance that plan California was forced to borrow some $7 billion (California's annual general fund bud-

get is $41 billion[4]), of which $4 billion was raised by issuing revenue anticipation warrants, due to be repaid in April 1996. To obtain $7 billion in loans, the Governor and Legislature had to agree to bankers' demands for a law authorizing automatic spending cuts in the event of a deficit during the next two years. "Surrendering its budget authority may be the most difficult decision the legislature has ever made," said Controller Gray Davis. "Now they fully appreciate how much peril California is in." Fortunately, California's revenues have been slightly higher than projected in 1994 and the cuts have been avoided for one year. But as Davis suggests, "California has dodged the fiscal bullet for this year, but we will be back in the line of fire for next year."

How does a state with such a large, diversified and historically strong economy find itself in such a precarious position that it is forced to be bailed out by the banking industry? The reasons are deceptively simple: general fund revenues have failed to keep pace with expenditures. In the next sections we explore the state's revenue and expenditure patterns. As will be shown, support for public education finds itself in direct competition with other essential publicly provided services.

Revenue and Expenditure Patterns in California

Tax Relief

Since 1978, California has engaged in a gigantic tax-relief program. These reductions, coupled with longstanding tax exemptions like the homeowners exemption, represent foregone revenue (or "tax expenditures"). The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities reports that "tax expenditures" are equal to almost one-half the total general fund expenditures in 1994-95 and exceed the total combined spending by the state for the current K-12 education and corrections portions of the budget. If it were an item unto itself, "tax expenditures" would represent the single largest state program. The major sources of the reduction in revenue are well known: Proposition 13, the repeal of the inheritance tax, the elimination of the state business inventory tax, and the indexing of the state income tax.

THE RECESSION

The economic recession of the late 1980's and early 1990's has had an even greater impact on California than on other states because of the large number of firms that have left California. This has resulted in significant job losses, income and sales tax losses, and related increases in the cost of public assistance. Much of the negative impact can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the consequent spending reductions in the defense industry. In addition, declining construction led to decreased property sales and the bottom fell out of the booming real estate speculation market that characterized the 1980's.[5] Finally, sales to foreign trading partners have lagged because of weakened foreign economies.

The magnitude of the revenue decline is highlighted by examining Department of Finance budget projections. In 1990 the Department projected, based on baseline data, that the California general fund budget would approach $60 billion. It is currently slightly less than $41 billion. That is below the 1990-91 actual budget in nominal dollars. This represents a loss of 6 percent in actual dollars at a time when the population was growing by 3 million people (10 percent). Inflation during this period was ten percent. The actual general fund budget is 17 percent less than the state general fund budget in 1990-91.

Figure 1.1: California General Fund Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1995



Source: RAND Research Review, "Focus on California," Fall 1994, Volume xviii, Number 2

For the 1995-96 budget year, the Department of Finance projects growth in each of the state's major revenue sources. Income, sales, and bank and corporation taxes are projected to generate additional revenue, however the Governor is proposing to reduce the latter two taxes as part of his stimulus package.

While the state has undergone a significant reduction in its ability to pay for governmental services, the demands for those services are increasing dramatically. Much of the demand is demographic and occurs because populations are growing at both ends of the age spectrum. Figure 1.1 illustrates the major expenditure categories for fiscal year 1995.

K-12 Education

Growth in the numbers of women of child-bearing age and higher numbers of women from cultures with high birth rates will cause a torrent of new children to flood the public schools. Demographers agree that if current trends continue, public school enrollment can be expected to increase by about 26 percent in the next decade. School population growth is a very straightforward projection since the vast majority of students who will be in

Figure 1.2: Student Enrollment in California Public Schools by Grade Level, 1993–94.

Grade Level	1993-94	% Change from 92-93
K	444,104	2.9
1	444,346	0.1
2	435,329	-0.3
3	431,107	1.4
4	420,233	0.4
5	413,420	0.7
6	405,416	1.4
7	398,553	2.6
8	380,223	4.7
Other Elementary	65,118	-2.9
Total Elementary	3,837,849	1.4
9	406,551	2.5
10	375,992	0.2
11	333,716	1.3
12	277,271	2.4
Other Secondary	35,898	-7.7
Total Secondary	1,429,428	1.3
Total	5,267,277	1.4

Source: California Fact Book, July, 1994, California Department of Education



Figure 1.3: Enrollment Projections by Ethnicity, 1994–95 to 2003–04

schools in the next six years are already here. There is little that will alter this phenomenon. Enrollment by grade level and projections by ethnic group are shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. In addition, Figure 1.4 illustrates the constant level of public school enrollment (approximately 90 percent), compared to private school enrollment over the past decade.

Proposition 187, the recently passed Constitutional amendment which denies education services to the children of illegal immigrants, even if it survives the test of its constitutionality and is fully implemented, will have only a negligible impact on the numbers of new pupils requiring educational services for the long term, compared to the overall enrollment growth in the state. Additionally, even if voucher proponents are ultimately successful,



Figure 1.4: Public and Private Enrollments in California Schools, 1983–84 to 1993–94

new private schools could not begin to accommodate the additional growth in the short term.

Senior Citizens

Another significant demand on the state's general fund is the increasing life span of senior citizens. Absolute numbers and percentages of the total population over age 65 will continue to grow sharply, generating increased costs for health and welfare programs geared to the aged.

Corrections

As if the situation were not precarious enough, the voters in November 1994 also placed Proposition 184, the Three Strikes Initiative, into the state's constitution. This constitutional amendment is now beyond the legislature's reach to amend or revoke, regardless of the economic condition of the state. The key provision of the new Three Strikes law is to double the normal sentence for any second felony if the first conviction was for a violent or serious crime; and triple the normal sentence with a minimum of



Figure 1.5: Prediction for Fiscal Year 2002 Budget

25 years for any third felony if the other two were for violent or serious crimes. These are mandated sentences. Costs incurred by the Department of Corrections will increase dramatically beyond the growth already projected for the corrections budget. Annual increased costs are projected from $2 billion in 1995-96 to $3.5 billion by 2002-03. Figure 1.5 illustrates the likely budget distribution of the general fund with projected increases in spending for corrections.

Higher Education

Demographics also drive projections for demand for higher education. The National Center for Higher Education Management Systems estimates that if California maintains its current commitment to access, there would be a 50 percent enrollment increase (450,000 additional students) in California's colleges and universities through the first decade of the next century. However, The California Higher Education Policy Center reports that there is no conceivable scenario under which higher education, as currently delivered and financed, can support that increase. Modest increases have, however, been proposed for higher education in the Governor's budget.

Unlike other budgetary shortfalls, this one cannot be solved by relying solely on economic recovery. Prospects for tax increases or substantial tax reform are dim, particularly given the Governor's

proposal for a tax cut in 1995-96. None of the options currently available to policymakers are attractive and there is nothing in the recent past behavior of the legislature and the Governor to suggest that they are capable of dealing with problems of this magnitude. In any event, absent some combination of a surprisingly vigorous economic recovery, tax increases, case load reductions, or large increases in federal aid (highly unlikely), the fiscal condition in the state can justifiably be termed serious.

How Does the California Economy Affect the Schools?

By constitutional protection, the public schools are guaranteed a minimum funding level and some protection from changes in the economic fluctuations in the state. Proposition 98, passed in 1988, was designed to provide a floor below which K-12 support would not drop (See Chapter 3).

Even with the deep recession, the state has exceeded the minimum funding level in five of the last six years. The Legislature and the Governor have agreed in recent prior years that irrespective of Proposition 98's guaranteed minimum, schools would not fall below the prior year's level of funding, and in 1995-96 a small budget increase has even been proposed. Much of this has been accomplished by borrowing from future allocations (up to about $1.8 billion) in order to maintain a constant support level. In spite of this level of commitment, school budgets have failed to keep pace with inflation.

There is some reason, after the performance of the Legislature and the Governor over the last few years, to view Proposition 98 as both a ceiling and a floor. When times are very bad, as they have been recently, base school funding has been protected even beyond the levels mandated by Proposition 98. When times are good, schools tend not to get increased funds beyond the amount guaranteed by Proposition 98. Proposition 98 is merely able to protect an insufficient base for public education. It cannot, and was not designed to, provide the answer to the state's inadequate funding for education.

The unambiguous message is that if current attitudes about taxation prevail, schools cannot realistically expect to receive any additional revenues beyond the Proposition 98 mandate because, quite simply, there will be little additional revenue. There is little prospect that there will be sufficient new state general fund dollars



to reduce class size, expand staff development, enhance teacher preparation, improve the curriculum, encourage innovation, or to do any of the things California must do to substantially improve its education system.

CONCLUSION: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The future of education in California is intricately tied to the level of support provided by the citizenry. That support shapes education policy in many ways: through strong public opinions; through support for legislative leadership; and through articulated budget priorities. Each of these areas is complicated by the great number of demands on public dollars in a state that continues to grow and change rapidly.

The commitment by Californians to education has been strong throughout this century. The suggestion that this commitment has changed even slightly is of great significance and needs to be more clearly understood. Undeniably, setting priorities is more difficult under circumstances of fiscal pressure. Fortunately, the economic conditions in the state are improving, and K-12 education is likely to benefit, at least a little, from this easing pressure. This is all the more reason to understand the best place to focus our attention for improved educational outcomes for students.

Throughout this edition of *Conditions of Education,* the issues of politics, economics, and public support for education are raised again and again. In some chapters, the linkages are clear, as in the case between school finance and discussions of the general fund. In other chapters, the linkages may be somewhat more surprising but we believe the connections are essential. Each chapter in this volume, therefore, addresses the context around specific education policy issues, and provides current information about recent and relevant events that affect policy developments.

- ***Assessment and Achievement*** discusses the critical sequence of events that led to the 1994 discontinuation of the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) and what the implications of this decision are for the implementation of future statewide assessment instruments. In addition, recent indicators of achievement in California are presented.
- ***Finance*** is a discussion of the school finance system. It begins by presenting the implications of the Governor's proposed 1995-96 budget on school spending and contin-

ues with an explanation of numerous constraints that contribute to a highly centralized mechanism for funding schools. Possible near-term changes are only part of what must be a wholesale renovation of the school funding system.

- ***Teachers and Teaching*** presents a view of how teachers work within and around the policies that guide education in California. This is the report of a recent discussion with a group of California teachers that explores how they perceive both existing and proposed changes in a variety of education policy areas.
- ***Integrated Children's Services*** provides an update from earlier PACE work about the need for, and current progress with, integrated services approaches. Recent data on poverty, health, and safety in California are presented. As a response to these problems, the Healthy Start program is demonstrating significant positive results in helping families with an integrated services approach.
- ***Child Care and Development Services*** describes the current efforts in the state provided by the California Department of Social Services and the California Department of Education. At this time, with an ever increasing need for greater access to services, the state provides a disjointed array of programs that are particularly difficult to navigate for clients. Current efforts are underway to redesign child care and development policy with a more streamlined approach as the primary criterion.
- ***School-to-Work*** provides a brief history of the federal effort to design programs that integrate secondary and postsecondary education, academic and vocational studies, and school and work. With support from a number of agencies in California, this approach is well under way in the state with a variety of approaches in a range of career areas.

Recommendations follow from the analysis in all of the chapters. It is significant, however, for the reader to understand that PACE believes the reform of public education is a multi-faceted problem that requires a set of interdependent and integrated solutions. We recommend reviewing a separate PACE document that describes our proposed reform strategies. "Rebuilding Education in the Golden State: A Plan for California's Schools" is available by contacting the PACE office.



Endnotes

1 Center for the Study of the States, Albany NY.

2 "California's Looming Budget Crisis," RAND Research Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Fall 1994, RAND.

3 "Downward Trend," Crosstalk, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1995, California Higher Education Policy Center

4 Monies primarily raised from the imposition of the state's income, sales, and business and corporation taxes.

5 These reductions also had huge impacts on local government - cities, counties, and special districts and this led to increased pressures on the state for relief, most noticeably seen in the demand for additional state dollars to fill in the gap left by property taxes and to at least hold the dollars per pupil constant (roughly $500 million in 94-95).

CHAPTER 2:

ASSESSMENT AND ACHIEVEMENT

HIGHLIGHTS:

- Governor Wilson's veto of the reauthorization of the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS) killed the state's ambitious performance-based student assessment system and left California without a means for systematically assessing students' achievements.
- The elimination of CLAS was caught in a web of controversy about the politics of performance-based testing, the sophistication of new test technology, and the purposes of the exam.
- The challenge now confronting California policymakers and officials is to devise a comprehensive exam that accurately measures what students know and are able to do—without reverting to the conventional multiple choice format.
- Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores in the state continue a decade-long upward trend, which is particularly impressive in light of the large number of minority students in California who take the test.
- California's students also continue to post marked gains in the Advanced Placement (AP) exam.

CHAPTER 2:

ASSESSMENT AND ACHIEVEMENT

The Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Governor have called for the Legislature to develop a comprehensive statewide student assessment system in 1995. This charge follows in the wake of a tumultuous year in which the existing system, the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), was discontinued after the Governor vetoed legislation that would have extended its development. In this chapter, we provide a history of CLAS and a detailed explanation of the issues that led to its discontinuation. In addition, this chapter provides discussion about a series of inevitable dilemmas that legislators will confront during their work this year. The intent is to provide a systematic means for thinking about statewide assessment in light of the hard tradeoffs that must be faced.

While CLAS, and the development of a replacement system, is the focus of this chapter, additional information about assessment is also included. For example, in 1994, the Educational Testing Service recalibrated the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT). This adjustment is fully explained in this chapter as are the implications for policymakers. Consistent with earlier additions of *Conditions of Education,* PACE also displays in this chapter the current results of student assessments as shown by the SAT and the Advanced Placement (AP) Exams for students in California compared to the national averages.

An implicit issue that runs throughout this chapter is the connection between assessment mechanisms and changes in schools. The design of assessment techniques, the administration of examinations, and the interpretation of results can be intricately linked to a system by which results inform practice in the schools. Assessment mechanisms can inform the structuring of schools, curriculum, and teaching practices. Policymakers have an opportunity in 1995 to develop a statewide assessment system that is consistent with the ultimate goals of increased student achievement and school performance. In addition, they have an opportunity to develop a system that is consistent with California's curricular and professional development reform strategies.

THE CALIFORNIA LEARNING ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (CLAS)

Governor Wilson's veto of SB 1273—the CLAS reauthorization bill—effectively kills California's ambitious new student test-

ing program a mere three years after it began. While Wilson and his Secretary for Education and Child Development, Maureen DiMarco, support incorporating some of CLAS's components into a new testing bill, it is likely that whatever is produced will differ sharply from the original intent behind CLAS.

The CLAS veto ends a protracted period of conflict within the state over the new testing program. For different reasons, conservative religious groups, parents, the California School Board Association, the California Teachers Association, and the Governor all raised objections to the test during its 1993 implementation. With CLAS now discontinued, many questions emerge. Answers to these can shed light not only on the future of assessment policy in California, but more generally on the politics of testing.

What happened to CLAS? Why did it generate so much opposition? Why was CLAS not able to sustain the political coalition that created it? What are the future prospects for testing policy in California?

What the CLAS case illustrates are some of the difficulties involved in wide-scale transformation of state assessment systems. For advocates of performance-based testing, the California case stands as an exemplar of the difficulties in moving policy towards more "authentic" forms of assessment. While factors unique to California (i.e. election year politics) can partially explain CLAS outcomes, other aspects of the case offer more general lessons for reformers about the politics of testing policy in the United States.

Background on CLAS

CLAS was developed in 1991 to replace its predecessor, the California Assessment Program (CAP). CLAS was designed to satisfy a number of different needs the previous testing program did not meet. Three goals of CLAS stand out: 1) to align California's testing system to the content of what was taught in schools—as represented in state curricular frameworks; 2) to better measure attainment of curricular content though performance-based standard setting and assessment; and 3) to provide individual student assessment of performance as well as data on schools and districts. The goal of the test was to create comparable scores for all parts of the state's educational system. The performance of these discrete parts of the educational system would be measured through both on-demand assessments given once a year, and portfolios that keep track of student work over a longer period of time.

The first round of tests was scheduled to be administered in 1993. These first assessments, and subsequent ones, would be

developed and overseen by an advisory committee comprised of teachers, curriculum specialists, testing experts, and others. The tests would then be scored by a cadre of teachers trained in performance-based assessment. Student performance would be evaluated on a scale of 1-6, with 6 representing exemplary performance.

In the initial year of implementation, 1993, tests were administered in language arts and mathematics to grades 4, 8, and 10 throughout the state. Scores for these assessments, given in the Spring, 1993, were released in April, 1994. The 1993 scores report only the performance of schools and districts. Individual student scores were scheduled to be phased in for the 1994 test for grades 4, 5, and 8 in language arts. Concerns about the validity and reliability of individual student scores were cited as reasons for the slower implementation of individual assessments.

In Figures 2.1 to 2.3 below, are reported the performance levels associated with each score in mathematics, reading, and writing, as well as the 1993 scores. Figures 2.4 to 2.6 illustrate performance results for grades 4, 8, and 10, respectively.

MATHEMATICS

Score	Performance Level Description
6	Student work demonstrates rigorous mathematical thinking and in-depth understanding of essential mathematical ideas. Responses meet and often exceed expectations; they are consistently correct and complete, and use appropriate representations (for example, words, diagrams, graphs, pictures). Student work extends concepts or produces related conjectures. Generalizations and connections are supported by precise logical arguments using multiple or unique approaches and appropriate mathematical tools and techniques.
5	Student work demonstrates solid mathematical thinking and full understanding of mathematical ideas. Responses fully meet expectations; they are usually correct and complete, and use appropriate representations (for example, words, diagrams, graphs, pictures), although sometimes containing minor flaws. Some of the student work contains generalizations and connections supported by effective arguments using multiple or unique approaches and appropriate mathematical tools and techniques.
4	Student work demonstrates substantial mathematical thinking and understanding of essential mathematical ideas, including appropriate representations (for example, words, diagrams, graphs, pictures). Responses are usually correct although the work may contain flaws. Student work exhibits appropriate use of mathematical tools and techniques.

Figure 2.1: Performance Level description for Mathematics; California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), 1993.

3	Student work demonstrates partial mathematical thinking and understanding of mathematical ideas. Some responses are correct; however, gaps in conceptual understanding are evident and representations (for example, words, diagrams, graphs, pictures) need elaboration. There is an acceptable use of tools and techniques.
2	Student work demonstrates limited mathematical thinking and understanding of mathematical ideas. While responses are sometimes correct, student work often falls short of providing workable solutions. Tools and techniques are rarely used or are used inappropriately.
1	Student work demonstrates little or no mathematical thinking and understanding of mathematical ideas. Responsibilities show little or no progress toward accomplishing mathematical tasks. There is little correct or appropriate use of tools, techniques, or representations.

READING/LITERATURE

Score	Performance Level Description
6	Student performances at this level demonstrate insight as readers consider a whole text. These readers are confident and willing to take risks as they explore the meaning of a text; are open to considering and developing new ideas about a text and use the text to check their understanding; explore complexities in depth; revise their interpretations ; expand on the possible meanings of a text; and connect ideas developed in the reading experience to their own experiences and to the world at large.
5	Student performances at this level demonstrate perception and thoroughness in considering a whole text. These readers are confident and willing to take risks as they explore the meaning of a text; consider new ideas about a text and use the text to check their understanding; explore complexities and expand on the possible meanings of a text; often revise their interpretations; and connect some ideas developed in the reading experience to their own experiences and to the world at large.
4	Student performances at this level demonstrate a thoughtful understanding of a whole text. These readers are confident in their interpretation but have little willingness to take risks, tending to accept their initial understanding; usually connect their understanding of a text to their own experiences; when directed, use a text to check their understanding in a general or limited way; and identify some general significance or wider application of their understanding of a text.
3	Student performances at this level demonstrate plausible, general understanding of a whole text. These readers make superficial con-

Figure 2.2: Performance Level description for Reading/Literature; California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), 1993.



nections with or among the parts of a text or not at all; are safe readers, unwilling to take risks, with little tolerance for difficulties in a text; rarely question a text, but when they do, the questions are likely to be simple or superficial; do not revise their first interpretation of a text or explore other possibilities of meaning.

2 Student performances at this level demonstrate a superficial understanding of a text. These readers may not see a text as a whole, tending to focus only on portions of a text; occasionally recognize ideas without connecting them; seldom ask questions of a text or offer meaningful evaluations of what they have read; and may not read a complete text.

1 Student performances at this level demonstrate an understanding of only an individual word, phrase, or title in a text. These readers do not demonstrate any understanding of the ideas or experiences offered or developed. Reading at this level is an act of recognizing a word or phrase rather than a process of constructing coherent meaning.

WRITING

Score Performance Level Description

6 Student performances at this levels respond creatively and effectively to the demands of a writing assignment. The writing is confident, purposeful, coherent and clearly focused, conveying the writer's knowledge, values, insights, and clarity of thought. The writing is skillfully adapted to its audience, purpose, and subject. It establishes an appropriate tone and uses language that is clear, distinct, varied, and precise. Writers at this level support their ideas with appropriate reasons and well-chosen examples, skillfully using a variety of sentence structures and the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling—committing few if any errors.

5 Student performances at this level respond well to the demands of a writing assignment. The writing is purposeful, coherent, and focused, clearly communicating the writer's knowledge, value and thoughts. The writing is adapted to its audience, purpose, and subject. It establishes an appropriate tone and uses effective language to support its ideas with relevant reasons and examples. The writing employs a variety of sentence structures, and exhibits good control of the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling—with few errors.

4 Student performances at this level respond to the demands of a writing assignment, generally communicating the writer's knowledge, values, and clarity of thought. The writing is appropriately adapted to its

Figure 2.3: Performance Level description for Writing; California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), 1993.

audience, purpose, and subject. It is coherent, adequately organized and developed, and supported by reasons and examples. The writing uses suitable language and employs some variety of sentence structure. Although there may be occasional errors, the writing reflects a fundamental control of the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling.

3 Student performances at this level respond inconsistently to the demands of a writing assignment, usually addressing all parts of the task, but having difficulty communicating the writer's knowledge and values. The writing may contain some insights, but also demonstrates confused, superficial, or illogical thinking. The writing is often limited in development, and contains predictable vocabulary with some inappropriate choices of words. It typically employs simple, repetitive sentence structures, and includes noticeable errors in the use of the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling.

2 Student performances at this level only partially meet the demands of a writing assignment. The work is seriously limited in communicating the writer's knowledge and values, and may address all or parts of a writing task, but with lapses in coherence. The writing is typically brief, disorganized, and undeveloped, or may be vague and difficult to understand. It exhibits frequent errors in the use of the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling.

1 Student performances at this level do not meet the demands of a writing assignment. The work is extremely limited in communicating the writer's knowledge and values, and it exhibits little or no concept of an audience. The writing is brief, incoherent, disorganized, and undeveloped and exhibits only a rudimentary facility in using language. It includes many errors in the use of the conventions of grammar, punctuation, capitalization, and spelling.

Sources, Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3: California Learning Assessment System, California Department of Education, February, 1995

Figures 2.4 to 2.6 illustrate graphically the 1993 CLAS score results. Each figure represents mathematics, reading/literature, and writing results for the grade level noted. As shown by the performance level descriptions on the previous pages, scores range from 1 to 6, with 6 representing the highest level of performance. The figures can be interpreted by examining the percentage of students who scored at a particular performance level on a specific section of the assessment. For example, 40 percent of fourth graders scored a 3 in writing in the 1993 assessment. Similarly, levels of performance in reading/literature and mathematics can be read from the figures and examined against the appropriate performance level descriptions.



Figure 2.4 and 2.5: 1993 CLAS Scores by Subject Area—Elementary Students, Grade 4 (top) and Grade 8 (bottom).





Sources, Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6: California Learning Assessment System, California Department of Education, February, 1995

Figure 2.6: 1993 CLAS Scores by Subject Area—High School Students, Grade 10.

WHAT HAPPENED—A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT OVER CLAS

Controversy over CLAS intensified after the first round of tests was given in Spring, 1993. Rumors quickly spread among conservative groups and parents about the test's "objectionable content." These rumors were exacerbated by the secrecy that shrouded the test—secrecy that the California Department of Education (CDE) said was essential for retaining the 1993 test's integrity. Without actual exams available, rumors increased—and with them complaints by religious groups that the test's content undermined parents' moral values and invaded the privacy of students and their families. While some parents complained about privacy, others took issue with the open-ended nature of the performance assessments, and the lack of "objective" scores made available by the exam. The designers of the CLAS items had not included potential critics—those that represented traditional religious and conservative groups. The specific wording of the ques-



tions had not been floated for political critique.

The first official response to the controversy came in January, 1994 when State Senator Gary Hart put together the CLAS reauthorization bill—SB 1273. The new bill took four steps to deflect the criticism lodged at the tests. First, a review panel would be appointed to ensure compliance with the intent of the legislation. Second, past copies of the test would be provided each year for review by the public. Along with this was a provision for school board review of each year's test before it was given—provided the board could guarantee test confidentiality. Finally, to answer concerns about open-ended assessments, the bill increased the number of fact-based multiple choice and short answer questions to complement the performance tasks. Though the Hart bill was an honest attempt to deal with the controversy, it would eventually contribute to CLAS's demise later in the year. This demise was precipitated by events in the subsequent months.

The State Board of Education's removal of an Alice Walker reading selection from the 1994 test brought a firestorm of negative reaction by newspaper editorials and groups like People for the American Way. Then the scores of the 1993 tests were released in March, 1994. Some schools that had done well on previous assessments had fared poorly on the new tests. Some of these schools were in the wealthiest areas of the state. The results increased anger on all sides. In April, the *Los Angeles Times* published an investigation critical of the test's sampling procedures. The article claimed that there were over 11,000 sampling violations in the 1993 test. School boards in Conejo Valley and Antelope Valley opted out of the 1994 tests. A conservative legal group—the Rutherford Foundation—filed suits on behalf of parents in Sacramento and San Bernadino claiming the tests violated privacy laws. The final blow of a heated month came in a scathing letter from Del Weber, the president of the California Teachers Association (CTA), to William Dawson, the Acting Superintendent of Public Instruction for the California Department of Education. Weber's letter rebuked the Department for both its administration and design of the tests. While ultimately supportive of the CLAS concept, CTA's response added to the public relations nightmare for CDE and CLAS.

At the end of the month CDE responded. In a press release dated April 30th, Superintendent Dawson addressed the criticism of the previous months. Stating in strong language that all districts would be required to administer the tests, he did note that they could create opt-out procedures for parents who wished to do so. Defending both the confidentiality of the test and the scoring procedures used in the first year, Dawson claimed the *Los Angeles*

Times article was inaccurate. Only 150 schools had samples that should not have been released to the public. Nonetheless, recognizing the controversy, Dawson vowed to have the public more involved in future test review. Most importantly, he commissioned a scholarly review board of testing experts, led by Stanford University Professor Lee Cronbach, to examine sampling and other statistical issues from the 1993 tests.

In early May the Governor finally spoke out. Emphasizing the controversy over content and the sampling problem, Wilson called for the State Auditor General to review CLAS fiscal issues. Secretary DiMarco called the assessment "seriously flawed" and "disastrous." The response to the Governor and Secretary DiMarco's comments were swift. In a May 12th article from the *Los Angeles Times*, former State Superintendent Bill Honig blasted Wilson and his aide for jumping off the CLAS bandwagon. Implying that the Governor did so for political gain, Honig claimed Wilson's actions played into the hands of extremists with an agenda. In the ensuing months the volleys back and forth between the Governor, DiMarco, and Dawson continued. In mid-July, CDE put the 1993 tests on public view. Initial reports were positive as many parents who had expressed fears claimed the tests were not as bad as they originally believed. But whatever boost the Department might have received from the public viewing was soon nullified by the release of the expert statistical review committee's report.

While Dawson and his Department tried to put a positive spin on it, the report of Professor Cronbach's group, the Committee on Sampling and Statistical Procedures, was undeniably critical. Suggesting that operational problems were significant in 1993, the committee recommended some measures to ensure technical competence and quality control in future tests. While the samples were basically sound, the committee found them poorly implemented by the department. Regarding individual scores for 1994, the tests were found to have adequate reliability, but concerns about large standard errors led to the recommendation that the 1994 test be administered on an experimental basis only.

In his press release announcing the report, Dawson emphasized the positive, and implied that CDE's plan regarding both technical procedures and individual scores was validated by the committee. But Governor Wilson and Secretary DiMarco did not see it that way. Citing some of the conclusions of the expert report, the Governor vetoed SB 1273 on September 27, 1994 and called for a new statewide testing program in its place. Wilson's veto announcement showed the Governor moving away from his earlier emphasis on problems of sampling and content. His focus

was clear: SB 1273 was vetoed because it failed to provide individual scores for students. In her comments, Secretary DiMarco claimed the new bill veered away from the intent of the original CLAS bill—SB 662—which prioritized pupil scores as the overriding goal of CLAS. What happened instead was that in its implementation of CLAS, CDE prioritized the performance-based aspects of the test and this decision was codified into the new bill. In a sense the Governor and Secretary DiMarco's comments are correct. An analysis of the two different CLAS bills reveals many instances in which references to individual scores have been removed or changed. Indeed, the part of SB 662 DiMarco cites regarding the primacy of individual scores—part (e) of section 60602.5—was deleted from the later bill. The ambiguity comes from a reading of the initial language of that section which states that: "comparable individual pupil results shall be completed prior to any expansion and development, or both, of new performance-based assessments *except to the extent that performance-based assessments are an integral part of the system for providing individual pupil results."* (pp. 3003) (Emphasis added.)

It can be argued that, in CDE's judgment, performance-based assessment was an "integral" part of providing individual pupil results and would therefore take priority. Certainly that is what Bill Honig believed at the time of CLAS's creation in 1991. Wilson and others, however, saw the priorities differently. Given the political controversy it is not surprising that their view won.

WHY CLAS WAS DISCONTINUED

Governor Wilson's veto was merely the final blow to a new testing system that had difficulties from the beginning. Certainly political factors unique to CLAS helped undermine it: the strength of traditional religious groups, and perhaps the need for Wilson in a reelection year to shore up his support with these groups. Yet, in addition to these specific factors, the CLAS case highlights a number of more general issues regarding the politics of assessment policy in the United States. Conflict over new performance based assessments is not unique to California: Virginia and Connecticut have had similar controversies in the last year. The demise of CLAS offers a constructive lesson for policy makers committed to assessment reform rooted in performance-based testing. Three key dimensions of the CLAS case stand out as lessons for testing policy in general: 1) the tension between political and technical factors; 2) the divergent priorities and goals of key stakeholders, and 3) the extent of anti-government feelings among the public.



THE TENSION BETWEEN TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS

While there is much agreement among policy makers and testing experts on the benefits of performance-based testing, the different world of policymakers leads technical realities to be ultimately subsumed to political ones. In the CLAS case the political reality dictated an overly optimistic 1994 timeline for implementation against the recommendation of those familiar with performance-based examinations. The traditional needs for a wide scale assessment—test validity and reliability—are more problematic given the state of the art of performance-based and constructed response exams. Developing an assessment that measures the complex skills detailed in curricular frameworks is a difficult and costly process. Making such a test high stakes for students and schools—as CLAS did—raises the ante on technical and cost issues considerably. As the statistical review committee noted in their report, the tradeoff between cost and precision in a performance-based exam is significant. Making scores reliable and valid for accountability purposes is a difficult proposition.

Further, the committee noted that a design superior for assessing schools creates difficulties for measuring individual scores. The chances of students getting comparable forms of the test decreases with a larger sample, making student-level accountability decisions hazardous and possibly quite unfair. Yet CDE was expected to solve these technical problems and deliver a test with student and school scores by 1993. CDE's choice to push performance-based testing at the expense of individual scores says much about the agency's priorities. Still, it is likely whatever choice the agency had made would have alienated someone. Policymakers' need for quick and decisive action may be disastrous for performance-based reforms like CLAS that need time and a serious discussion of the tradeoffs between cost, precision, and accountability.

DIVERGENT PRIORITIES AND GOALS OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Assessment policies, like all policies, are the creation of political coalitions. Since the actors involved often have divergent goals for testing it is often necessary to write legislation in vague terms or incorporate seemingly conflicting goals into the same policy. In the California case, the three key stakeholders who helped to create CLAS—Governor Wilson, State Senator Hart, and former



State Superintendent Bill Honig—all had very different priorities for the testing program. Wilson's clear priority was to replace the older CAP system with a new one that provided individual student scores. Student data would allow for more parent awareness and stringent accountability of teachers, an important goal of the Governor. Senator Hart—for his part—was much more interested in holding the schools accountable for performance. Hewing to many of the ideas of the National Governor's Association and other policy organizations, Hart wanted to trade the schools' deregulation for stricter performance accountability. Finally, Bill Honig and the state education establishment were committed to performance-based testing and to tying assessment to the curricular frameworks.[1]

All of these goals appear in the initial legislation. However, once implementation of CLAS occurred, it was clear that not all of the priorities could be accommodated. When CDE implemented a policy closest to Honig and Hart's vision, the Governor and others who supported his position balked. The controversy over testing content helped strengthen the opponents' contention that the test was "seriously flawed." What has not been resolved in either California or other states speaks to the goals of assessment policy. Should tests emphasize student or school-level accountability? Given cost and precision factors this issue may involve a clear tradeoff for many states. Are assessments predominantly informative and persuasive tools to help students and teachers to perform better, or are they regulatory instruments tied to rewards for good scores and sanctions for non-performance?[2] These questions and others were not resolved in the California case and led to an inevitable conflict once CLAS was implemented.

ANTI-GOVERNMENT FEELINGS

Many policymakers have been surprised by the extent of the negative reaction to reforms like performance-based assessment and outcomes-based education. Since many of these cries have come the loudest from religious groups they are often dismissed as mere "extremism." However, this tends to ignore the origins of much of the unrest; the extent of anti-government feeling these complaints tap into. Nearly all the CLAS criticism has been directed at CDE and other key figures in the state capitol. Much of this has focused on the privacy issue. As one of the lawyers for a parents group that sued the state put it:

> "The state has an interest in assessing the quality of teaching in the schools. They also have an interest in knowing whether kids can think rather than regurgitate facts. But there's a difference between testing a student's ability to think and asking them what they think about personal things. And frankly, the latter is no business of the state."[3]

The criticism did not stop at privacy concerns. The *Orange County Daily News,* in an editorial, railed against the "Sacramento bureaucrats" to whom CLAS cedes control over "core issues of schooling." The president of one of the school boards that opted out of CLAS claimed the concern was "not the moral issue as much as the absence of testing basic skills." These criticisms reflect more than just disagreement over education goals and means. Rather, they illustrate the extent of anti-government feelings in California at the very time reforms are trying to expand the reach of the state and persuade many of the need to rethink traditional ways of testing. The convergence of these two trends does not bode well for ambitious testing reform being considered in other states. In effect, the public is being asked to reject the traditional way of thinking about testing when they themselves do not trust the questioners.

What is the future of assessment policy in California? Governor Wilson and Secretary DiMarco are committed to making individual scores the priority for the new testing system. Performance-based exams will be used "in accordance with their strengths and limitations," according to the Governor. Whether a new political coalition can be built to conform to these priorities is uncertain. Assuming that the political problems can be surmounted what might a new state testing program look like? To what extent will performance-based assessment anchor it?

Twenty-eight million dollars have already been spent on a testing program that has been called a failure by the Governor's chief educational aide. The commitment to reliable and valid student and school scores will require a major investment in some assessment technology. Estimates are that performance-based assessment can cost as much as $50 per student—more than ten times the cost of traditional multiple choice tests.

Cost is just one of many issues that policymakers will face in the development of a statewide testing system. In the next section, some of the inherent dilemmas in designing assessment systems are outlined.

THE DILEMMAS OF STATE-BASED ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES

The two types of testing that are under discussion at this time are the traditional multiple choice format and the performance-based, open-ended response that was the trademark of CLAS. With either of the techniques, the objectives of the assessment exercise should be clear. The following questions are designed to help focus the discussion on the intent of the instrument.

1) Does The Test Matter to Students?

One important consideration in designing an assessment instrument is that it matter to the person taking the test. This turns out to be more critical for older students than for younger students. In either case, it is essential that the student want to perform well on the exam. This is not to say that the individual benefits of taking the test is all that matters, but individual benefits are critical in reinforcing the motivation that is necessary to ensure high performance.

The dilemma in developing statewide assessment instruments is that they generally have multiple purposes. First, they are designed to indicate some level of performance of students across the state. Second, these instruments have in the past been tied in some way to the reporting of performance of schools. Therefore, the public as well as state officials rely on these assessment techniques as a way of improving accountability. If the students do not believe that the tests matter, the critical link between their personal performance and systemic accountability is broken.

2) Predictive versus Content Validity

In testing, there is a fundamental decision that needs to be made by designers. Is the test designed to predict something, like college performance, or is it designed to assess a student's abilities compared to some expert standard (content validity)? In the former case, the prediction of grades, or college attendance, or wages have been relied upon heavily. But being able to predict these types of outcomes is a strong limitation of the test. Further, educators and parents may want to know more about a student's skills than whether, in the future, a particular outcome is likely or unlikely to occur.

Content validity asks whether the student's performance compares well with what experts agree to be certain perfor-

mance standards. This is consistent with the design of CLAS. Several fundamental issues are immediately raised. First, expert opinions vary. Second, setting standards for performance requires some subjective decision-making. The distinction between excellent critical analysis skills in literature and good critical analysis skills varies among experts. It also varies among observers. Third, a common remedy in establishing content validity is to ask more experts. This holds true not only for the design of tests, but also for grading exams. Expert consultation requires greater time and increases costs.

Numerous studies exist on the consistency with which multiple raters assess the responses provided by those being examined. In general, inter-rater reliability, as it is known, is a problem in subjective assessment but is improved by increasing the numbers of raters and the guidelines by which raters systematically assign scores to responses.

3) Reliability—A Question of Quantity

In the design and administration of assessment instruments, the most fundamental concern is the reliability of the results. Test designers care about reliability because it provides assurance that the results are not happening by chance. When a multiple choice exam is administered, the student may have literally hundreds of opportunities to demonstrate his or her performance in particular areas. Sections of math questions in the SAT are grouped thirty at a time, for example. What this allows statisticians to do is to be certain that the performance is consistent over many trials.

In contrast, performance-based exams provide many fewer opportunities to demonstrate abilities. In fact, they may only allow for one opportunity in a particular discipline. The difficulty, therefore, is in determining the reliability of the results from the single (or few) administrations that might be available.

Note that this problem is partly about time. If students were to be given multiple opportunities to respond to open-ended questions, evaluators would have a larger sample on which to base their assessment of the students' work. But many of the types of questions that are available in performance-based assessment instruments require considerable time and supervision during the assessment. Of course, were more questions to be added, the problem of scoring



the responses, and the difficulties of multiple raters, as noted above, would still hold.

WHAT POLICYMAKERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TEST DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The points noted above are dilemmas that cannot be easily resolved. The implementation of any assessment instrument—and particularly one at the state level—needs to weigh the tradeoffs implicit in these dilemmas and arrive at a system that is consistent with the goals of the assessment program. This being said, the following points are critical to keep in mind.

1) Designing Tests is Difficult and Time Consuming

The careful and systematic implementation of an assessment instrument is extremely complex and cannot be underestimated by policymakers. Questions need to be designed and piloted. The instrument needs to be calibrated against other assessments. Mechanisms for administering the assessment and scoring the results need to be put into place. People need to be trained. And finally, the results of the assessment need to be analyzed and reported. Throughout the entire process, security is a concern. If there is a breach in security, the reliability of the test is compromised.

As a result, it is impractical to believe that a statewide assessment system could be successfully put into place in a short period of time.

2) Testing is Not That Accurate

Independent of the testing instrument, testing is subject to a number of pitfalls. Reliability is the most critical. While there are a number of mechanisms available to increase the reliability of testing, they all include in some way increasing the number of questions, or number of tests that are administered. Administering any test is costly, and multiple test administrations can only occur with great increases in expense.

3) There Are No Technical Fixes Around the Corner

As reported earlier, one of the dilemmas surrounding the debate over the CLAS test was the issue of individual student scores. While it had been argued that CLAS would be



able to present scores on an individual basis, the reliability of this information was called into question along with the realization of the high costs of scoring performance-based exams with multiple raters.

It should be well understood that there is no technical solution to this problem. The fundamental issue rests with the reliability of the exam. It is unrealistic to think that developments in statistics or psychometrics will alleviate this problem.

4) Comparisons Over Time Are Critical

As a mechanism for understanding changes in the system of public education across the state, the public and state officials depend on some indicators of student progress over time. It is of some concern that the stability of this longitudinal comparison was jeopardized by the break in administration of any statewide testing instrument. A break in testing for even one year is a serious loss.

In addition, it is critical that testing systems be calibrated between each other when the assessment instruments change. How do the results of the CLAS test in 1994 compare with the results of the California Assessment Program (CAP) in 1993? In order for the state to maintain some historical record of statewide achievement levels, the various indicators must be comparable at some level. The process of calibrating tests is quite complex and costly. There was no effort to calibrate CLAS and CAP scores during the development of the CLAS instrument.

THE NEXT STEPS FOR STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT

With these dilemmas in mind, the mandate to develop an assessment system remains. The discussion in Sacramento so far has been focused on three possible solutions: return to multiple choice; maintain an authentic assessment; and blend the two techniques. Each of these three potential solutions, of course, has merits and disadvantages.

The most straightforward way to insure reliable individual student scores is to return to a method of multiple choice testing. While this technique is the most methodologically pure, it retreats from the advantages of authentic assessment. Outcome-based assessment provides students with an opportunity to demonstrate



knowledge. The structure allows students to demonstrate their abilities to solve math and science problems, write persuasive essays, understand the complexities of characters in novels, synthesize and analyze data, make inferences, and design creative solutions. The problems of reliability in scoring these responses, particularly for individual scoring, remains.

A number of people have recommended a composite of the two techniques be used for statewide assessment. While the idea has appeal as a compromise, there are still tradeoffs. First, in a blended assessment, none of the difficulties of the authentic component go away. All of the issues of reliability, inter-rater scoring, and subjectivity remain. In addition, a new issue emerges that has to do with how, or if, the two sections should be blended. Some have argued that a melded score could be designed that takes into account both types of testing. In fact, this is itself a difficult task. For example, should the two sections be melded based on the relative amounts of time that were spent completing the question? Should they be melded based on what we believe to be the relative investment needed to answer the questions?
Ultimately, the dilemma policymakers face is that movement from a standardized multiple choice format will require additional cost and some changes in assessment accuracy for individual students. This is balanced, however, by the benefits of performance-based assessment on a number of other grounds. Significantly, the development of an open-ended answer format may provide teachers with new opportunities to experiment, innovate, and challenge their students.

A number of teachers have reported to PACE that they liked the way the exam influenced their teaching. They reported that the structure of the exam encouraged them to broaden the type of learning in their classroom away from the factual recall that had previously been encouraged for assessment purposes. While it is difficult to quantify this change, it is significant that CLAS encouraged some teachers to change their method of instruction.

Other Assessment Indicators

This chapter now turns to a review of other assessment indicators. Specifically, information on the SAT and Advanced Placement Tests are presented. When possible, these results are shown over time and are broken down by ethnic groups.

A significant change is occurring in the SAT that must be noted. Beginning in April, 1995, the Educational Testing Service (ETS) will be reporting SAT scores on a "recentered" basis. This

adjustment in scores does not reflect any change in the test per se, or in the percentile rankings associated with any given score. Rather, the adjustment in scores has been made to readjust the mean score back to the midpoint (score of 500) on each of the verbal and math sections. This is the result of changes, since 1941, that have gradually moved the mean score away from the midpoint. ETS explains that these reasons include changes in the test-taking population, an increased volume of test takers, and changes in how and what students are taught in school. Significantly, this change will occur for students who took the PSAT in Fall, 1994 and students who will take the SAT in Spring, 1995. The data presented below in Figure 2.7 are from before Spring, 1995, and do not reflect any adjustments in scores as a result of the recentering.

SAT performance in California has shown improvement over the past decade. The significant increase in SAT takers in the past ten years, and notably the rise in the percent of minority students taking the test, have been the result of an increasing movement toward preparation for postsecondary education across the state. As shown in Figure 2.8, which compares California to the nation, the minority participation rate is 55 percent in California, compared to 31 percent nationwide.

A similar pattern can be seen in the scores on the Advanced

Figure 2.7: Change in SAT Verbal & Math Performance in California, 1983-84 to 1993-94.



	California	Nation
SAT Verbal Scores	413	423
SAT Math Scores	482	479
SAT Total Scores	895	902
Participation Rate (1)	46.0%	42.0%
Minority SAT Takers	55.0%	31.0%
Parent Income Above $40,000	51.0%	55.0%
Parent Income Below $10,000	8.0%	6.0%
Parent Education - B.A. or Higher	50.0%	51.0%
Parent Education - Not High School Graduate	11.0%	5.0%
English Not First Language	20.0%	8.0%
Average Per Pupil Expenditure	$4,625	$5,581
Completed 20 Academic Courses (2)	29.0%	41.0%
Average Number of Academic Courses Completed (3)	17.9	18.4

Figure 2.8: SAT Background Variables for California and the Nation, 1993–94 Takers.

	Percent Taking Test	% Growth Since 1985
All Groups	42.0%	12.3%
African American	39.5%	55.5%
Asian	58.8%	3.9%
Hispanic	24.8%	54.0%
White	37.6%	5.6%

Figure 2.9: Increase in SAT Test Takers by Ethnicity, 1985–1994.

Sources, Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9: California Department of Education, 1994

Placement tests offered for advanced credit in particular areas of study upon entrance to college. Over ten years, the rate of students qualifying with a score of 3 or better has increased over 200 percent. Figure 2.10 shows the change since 1985, by ethnic group.

In contrast to the CLAS scores, these two indicators report

	% Change From 1985
All Groups	163%
African American	240%
American Indian	360%
Asian	170%
Hispanic	358%
White	140%

Figure 2.10: Change in AP Qualifying Rate by Ethnicity Since 1985.



Figure 2.11: AP Qualifying Rate per 100 Juniors and Seniors in California Public Schools, 1984–94.

statistics for students who are targeted for postsecondary education. At this time, the progress of students who may not be in college preparation programs is less well known. Nevertheless, the increasing participation rates on both the SAT and AP exams are encouraging in that they indicate a larger percentage of the students are preparing for postsecondary education.

Figure 2.12: AP Qualifying Rate per 100 Juniors and Seniors, California and the United States, 1984–1994.

Year	California	United States
1984	3.4	2.2
1985	4.1	2.5
1986	4.9	2.9
1987	5.5	3.3
1988	6.5	4
1989	7.1	4.1
1990	8.4	4.9
1991	8.7	5.2
1992	9.2	5.8
1993	9.9	6.5
1994	10.8	7.3
84-94 Change	218%	232%

Sources, Figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12: California Department of Education, 1994

Finally, Figure 2.13 shows high school performance trends as illustrated by six indicators. For each of these, performance has improved between 1988 and 1993, with the exception of the number of students attending the University of California or California State University systems. It is of great concern that with increases in post-secondary preparation, attendance in California's higher education institutions is declining. Figure 2.14 illustrates the impressive decline in dropout rates of California high school students over the past decade.

Figure 2.13: High School Performance Trends in California: 1988-1993

Indicator	Change over 5 Years	Description
SAT & ACT	*SAT or ACT examinations with scores at or above the national average have increased 9.2 percent from 1988 to 1993*	*The results of these examinations are used in determining college admission status. The number of tests which meet scoring criteria (at least 900 on the SAT or 20.7 on the ACT) is reported as a rate per 100 seniors. These criteria represent national average scores.*
Advanced Placement	*AP tests qualifying for college credit have increased 62.3 percent from 1988 to 1993.*	*These examinations are offered in 29 subject areas. Students may qualify for college credit if they score 3 or better on the test. The number of tests taken that qualify for college credit are reported as a rate per 100 juniors and seniors.*
Students Staying in School	*There has been a 6.8 percent increase in the number of students staying in school, from 78.2 in 1987 to 83.5 in 1992.*	*This value is 100 minus the three-year derived dropout rate, and it represents the percentage of students staying in high school.*
A-F Course Enrollments	*Enrollment in A-F courses has increased 3.5 percent from 1988 to 1993.*	*A-F courses are accepted by the University of California (UC) as subject requirements for admission.*
UC and CSU Attendance	*There has been an 18.4 percent decrease in the number of students attending UC or California State University (CSU) from 17.4 in 1987 to 14.2 in 1992.*	*This number represents the percentage of high school graduates attending a UC or CSU as first-time freshmen.*
Geometry	*Enrollment in geometry classes has increased 11.5 percent from 1988 to 1993.*	*Geometry is required for entrance to four-year colleges and universities.*

Source: California Department of Education, News Release 94-76, 11/15/94



Figure 2.14: Derived Dropout Rates for Grades 10 through 12 in California Public School Districts, by Ethnicity, 1986–1993.

CONCLUSION

The discussion of assessment and achievement raises critical questions about how California can best develop accountability mechanisms related to student, teacher, and school performance. At the state level and in local districts, there are serious concerns about the basic level of student achievement in reading, mathematics, and writing at all grade levels. These concerns are supported by the CLAS results, and by the California results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). The encouraging results in postsecondary preparation are simply not encouraging enough. As policymakers rethink a statewide assessment system in the coming year, nothing will be more critical than linking the assessment system to performance goals for students. The mechanism for assessing students must be linked to specific strategies that improve classroom practice and ultimately drive higher levels of student performance.

Endnotes

1 McDonnell, L. M. (1994) "Assessment Policy as Persuasion and Regulation." American Journal of Education 102(4): pp. 394-421.

2 McDonnell, L. M. (1994)

3 EDCAL, May 30th, 1994 pp. 8

CHAPTER 3:

FINANCE

HIGHLIGHTS:

- With a price tag of $ 30 billion in 1995-96, financing California's K-12 public schools is one of the largest fiscal undertakings in the United States, and the largest single fiscal activity in California.

- Education finance in California has become highly centralized and closely tied to the state's fiscal fortunes.

- On virtually every dimension of school finance—from amount spent per pupil to dollars allocated to construct new school buildings to accommodate the growing student population—California's relative position in terms of fiscal adequacy has been diminished during the 1990's.

- Even if the Governor's proposed 1995-96 education funding increases are enacted, California's per pupil expenditures, adjusted for inflation, will continue to decline.

- Short-term strategies can be adopted to improve the state's school finance system, but long-run solutions will be found only in a wholesale renovation of California's mechanism for funding its schools.

CHAPTER 3:

FINANCE

Financing California's K–12 public schools is one of the largest fiscal undertakings in the United States, and the largest single fiscal activity in California. The public school system will serve over 5 million students and spend $30 billion in the 1995–96 school year. Large growth in the numbers of students, and the subsequent large numbers of additional dollars needed to finance this growth, continue to complicate California's ability to respond to the educational needs of its children.

This chapter analyzes the dilemmas California faces in financing its schools. These dilemmas include unpredictable state and local revenue growth, shifting enrollment projections, and the myriad ways in which school financing decisions interact with other significant education policy issues.

This chapter rests on three major themes:

(1) Schools' fiscal fortunes are closely tied to the state's economic fortunes and budgeting process;

(2) Education finance authority is intensely centralized at the state level;

(3) Short-term strategies can be adopted to improve the school finance system in California, but long-run solutions will be found only in a wholesale re-examination and renovation of the state's mechanism for funding its schools.

California School Funding and the Proposed Budget for 1995–96

The ability to fund public education has been severely limited for most of this decade by a recession which has lasted longer and been deeper than in most other states. However, the state's economy is showing modest signs of recovery, and the Governor's 1995–96 budget, although precariously balanced, has proposed a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for school districts. Specifically, the 1995–96 budget proposes:

(1) full funding for the 136,660 new students projected for 1995–96;

(2) adjusting the funding to accommodate a 2.21 percent COLA (about $61 per pupil on average);

(3) adjusting the funding for special education to accommodate projected growth and a 2.21 percent COLA;

(4) providing $153 million, on a one-time basis, for various programs such as deferred maintenance, textbooks, and education technology;

(5) allowing $20 million for the Governor's Healthy Start (integrated children's services) program;

(6) providing an increase of $20 million to expand the state preschool program (this half-year increase, if funded on a continuous basis, is equivalent to a $40 million per year annual appropriation); and

(7) allocating $10 million for school safety programs.

Even if these funding increases are adopted, California per pupil public school expenditures in real (adjusted for inflation) terms will continue to decline. The money needed to keep pace with inflation would require a 3.35 percent cost-of-living increase, 1.14 percent more than the Governor has proposed. Moreover, the Governor's proposed budget may, as the Legislative Analyst suggests, be based on some overly optimistic assumptions about state revenues, court actions, cuts in health and welfare costs that require legislative action, plus several federal revenue sources which may not materialize.

Additional pressure comes from the Governor's budget in the form of a tax-cut proposal. The proposal has two major components. First, the personal income tax rates for high-income taxpayers would be maintained at 10 and 11 percent, instead of reverting to the 9.3 percent rate in 1996 as directed by current law. Second, the personal income tax and the bank and corporation tax would be reduced 5 percent each year for three years. These taxes would then be 15 percent lower than their 1995 levels. The Franchise Tax Board has estimated the state revenue effect at a loss of $7.3 billion.

While it is difficult to know the likely effects of this tax reduction on the state's economic condition, school revenues will almost surely be reduced, consistent with school finance mechanisms now in place. The Legislative Analyst's Office projects that by 1998–99, the general fund portion of school revenues would be $3.9 billion less with the tax cut than without.

Numbers do not tell the whole story. The Governor's budget must be placed in perspective. As the most recent budgetary proposal in a string of mostly bad news proposals in the 1990's, this budget, reflecting the hoped for improvement in the general eco-

nomic situation faced by the state, can be viewed as a welcome departure from the past. However, when compared with the 1980's when California was able to accommodate large-scale growth, cost of living increases and still could fund significant school reform efforts, the current picture is far from rosy.

The upshot is a direct connection between the annual budgeting process at the state level and uncertainty for schools and school reform initiatives. As has been illustrated, the cost-of-living increase provides only a portion of the revenues that are required to keep California schools at their current funding level. In addition, the uncertainty of the budget process makes it impossible for schools to plan. Schools often do not know their revenue until well into the school year.

The fact that the funding level is determined at the state level is the result of a complex series of legal cases, legislative activity, and voter-supported propositions, beginning in the early-1970's, that have persistently resulted in increasing the centralization of school financing. As a result, local communities have notably little to say about the level at which they provide funding for their schools.

CALIFORNIA'S DECLINE

How has this process come to affect the schools over time? Over 30 years, the centralized allocation process of distributing school district funds has contributed to a serious decline in the funding level of California's schools. On virtually every dimension of school finance, California's relative position in terms of adequacy has been diminished in the decade of the 90's. In 1991-92, Californians spent $35 for public elementary and secondary schools per $1,000 of their personal income. Only five states ranked lower than California on this measure (See Figure 3.1). As a result, California now ranks 40TH among the states in current per pupil expenditures for public elementary and secondary schools, $1,090 below the national average expenditure level (See Figure 3.2). As shown in Figure 3.3, according to the Legislative Analyst, real dollars per pupil declined from the high in 1989–90 of $4,103 to a low in 1994–95 of $3,780 — a drop of $323 per pupil or roughly $10,000 per classroom.

Alaska	71	Idaho	44	Georgia	39
Wyoming	64	Rhode Island	44	North Carolina	39
Vermont	58	Ohio	44	Colorado	38
Montana	57	Iowa	44	Delaware	38
West Virginia	56	Indiana	44	Arizona	38
Maine	51	Minnesota	43	Maryland	37
Michigan	49	South Dakota	43	District of Columbia	36
New Mexico	49	Kansas	42	Alabama	36
Wisconsin	48	Pennsylvania	42	New Hampshire	36
Oregon	47	Mississippi	42	Virginia	35
Utah	46	Connecticut	41	Florida	35
New Jersey	46	Oklahoma	41	Hawaii	35
New York	46	Arkansas	41	CALIFORNIA	35
Louisiana	46			Massachusetts	35
Texas	46	United States	41	Nevada	34
North Dakota	45			Missouri	34
Kentucky	45	Nebraska	40	Illinois	33
South Carolina	44	Washington	40	Tennessee	33

Figure 3.1: Current Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in 1991-92 per $1,000 of Personal Income in 1992.

Figure 3.2: Current Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Schools per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance, 1993-94.

New Jersey	10,112	Wyoming	5,797	Nevada	5,029
Alaska	9,811	Washington	5,782	New Mexico	4,966
New York	8,899	Minnesota	5,770	North Carolina	4,952
Dist. of Columbia	8,632			Louisiana	4,807
Connecticut	8,429	United States	5,730	South Carolina	4,798
Vermont	7,212			South Dakota	4,738
Pennsylvania	7,197	New Hampshire	5,687	CALIFORNIA	4,640
Wisconsin	6,919	Kansas	5,652	Missouri	4,598
Massachusetts	6,802	Illinois	5,520	Georgia	4,473
Rhode Island	6,764	Indiana	5,517	North Dakota	4,449
Delaware	6,587	Texas	5,379	Tennessee	4,361
Michigan	6,538	Virginia	5,357	Arizona	4,240
Maryland	6,502	Florida	5,356	Idaho	4,208
Ohio	6,212	Montana	5,276	Oklahoma	4,155
Oregon	6,068	Iowa	5,264	Alabama	4,061
Maine	6,046	Colorado	5,254	Arkansas	3,949
Hawaii	5,936	Kentucky	5,163	Mississippi	3,512
West Virginia	5,799	Nebraska	5,108	Utah	3,419

Source for Figures 3.1 and 3.2: Rankings of the States, 1994, National Education Association, West Haven, Connecticut



Source: *Cal Update, March, 1995, The Legislative Analyst's Office.*

Figure 3.3: K-12 Education Funding per ADA in Current and Constant Dollars, 1986-87 to 1995-96

In California, the state's economy, rather than local school district preferences, dictate the level of school support. This is particularly true today as California faces the daunting task of providing for sizable enrollment growth, attempting to keep pace with inflation, and repaying (pending a court decision) $1.8 billion it borrowed from future Proposition 98 funds.

In 1992–93 and 1993–94, the legislature and the Governor borrowed the $1.8 billion from future Proposition 98 guarantees to provide schools with enough money to keep their revenue limits relatively constant. The repayment of this began in 1994–95 and is continued in this year's budget. However, a lawsuit (CTA v. Gould) was filed which claims that the repayment is unconstitutional. Pending the outcome of that lawsuit, the state will continue to repay the loan ($379 million in 1995–96).

To complicate matters further, as noted earlier, the Governor is proposing income tax relief in his 1995–96 budget which, because it reduces state revenues, also reduces the Proposition 98 guarantee. If the court decides in favor of the state, the loan payments continue to be required, and the Governor's tax proposal is successful, the prospect that the schools will be able to keep pace with inflation is a dim one. If on the other hand, the court decides in favor of CTA, the Governor's tax proposal is unsuccessful, the

economy continues to grow, and property taxes grow at a healthy rate, schools reasonably could expect enough from the Proposition 98 guarantee to be able to cover enrollment growth, inflation, and begin to reduce the existing revenue gap and/or to receive funds for school reform or other new programs.

Why is The School Finance System Centralized?

California's school finance system relies on the state's general fund for revenue. Other states which depend more heavily on locally controlled property taxes for support, because of the relative stability of the property tax, tend to be more resilient and can more readily withstand financial exigencies. Conversely, California districts, in the absence of any local taxing discretion whatsoever, are powerless to undertake such compensating actions, regardless of the desire on the part of the local citizenry.

The reliance on centralized decision making is the result of 25 years of legal decisions, legislative actions, and voter-supported initiatives that have amended the California constitution. The impact of this chronology is that school financing is in gridlock. In order to make significant changes in the mechanisms by which California funds schools, wholesale changes in tax policy, voting policy, and school district governance need to be initiated. These changes, undeniably, would have an impact on countless other fiscal policies in the state.

Some highlights of the chronology are presented below. It is critical to understand that the centralized mechanism came about in a way that was not exclusively about schools or school funding. Rather, the significant economic growth in California, and the associated rapid rise in property taxes, catalyzed both legislative actions and voter revolts. These resulted in distancing locally raised property taxes from the schools. Spending equity across schools, property taxes, and limits on government spending are reviewed below to illustrate how the components fit together and result in centralized control.

The History of School Finance in California: Is it Equitable?

Prior to California's precedent shattering Supreme Court Ruling in *Serrano v. Priest*[1], California's chief source of school revenue was the local property tax. The level of these funds was pri-



marily a function of the value of property within a school district's borders and willingness of the district's residents to tax themselves for education. The state also contributed in two ways. It provided "basic aid" in the form of a flat per pupil grant to each district regardless of the relative property wealth of the district, and it provided "equalization aid" in inverse proportion to the property wealth of the district. The equalization aid was allocated to bring districts to a predetermined "foundation" level. The foundation level was determined annually by the legislature and was presumed to be the "minimum" per pupil revenue to which all districts were entitled. If the sum of the local property tax (at a prescribed tax rate) and "basic aid" did not achieve the foundation level, the state made up the per pupil dollar difference.

There were great variations among districts in available revenues per pupil. Districts with valuable property could levy a tax and raise substantial amounts of local revenue, often with tax rates lower than that of property poor districts and often generating revenue far exceeding the guaranteed "foundation" amount. "Basic aid" compounded the problem, because it was given on a per pupil basis to every district, rich or poor. Thus for wealthy districts the combination of substantial property tax revenue and basic aid brought total revenue per pupil to a point high above the foundation level. In poorer districts, local property tax revenue, basic aid and equalization aid brought the revenue limit only to the minimum (the foundation level).

In 1976, some eight years after the filing of the original law suit in *Serrano,* the California Supreme Court determined that the efforts in California to equalize revenues between districts were inadequate — there was too much wealth-based disparity in the state system of school finance and as a consequence the school finance program was in violation of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. Earlier, a 1974 Superior court judge had determined that all wealth-based disparities should be substantially less than $100 per pupil. A 1983 *Serrano* appeal court decision allowed the $100 band to be adjusted for inflation.

The current system of school finance grows out of the Legislature's response to *Serrano* and the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. The central element of the current system is the "revenue limit," a concept introduced in 1972 and intended to place a limit on the revenues per pupil local districts could generate. Placing a limit on school district revenues, its advocates argued, would serve at least two purposes, reduction in the reliance on the property tax and potential diminution of inter-district revenue disparities. The revenue limit system has undergone periodic changes, but, in essence, operates as follows. A district receives general rev-

enues equal to its average daily attendance (ADA) multiplied by its "revenue limit" per unit of ADA. The original base revenue limit per ADA was established for each district in 1973–74 and consisted of the combination of general purpose state aid plus property tax revenues for the prior year, both adjusted for inflation.

Prior to the revenue limit concept, districts established a tax rate and as property values grew, especially in property wealthy districts, revenues automatically grew. In periods of rapid property value growth, school districts enjoyed huge increases in revenue. By placing a limit on per pupil revenue, rapid property value growth would result not in increased local revenues, but in reduced state obligations, since the limit was independent of the increase in local property values. Conversely, when property values grew slowly, the state's relative obligation increased.

In either case, the revenue limit is determined not at the local level, but by the state. In order to bring about equalization, the state infused the school finance system with additional dollars aimed at increasing the relative revenues of the lowest revenue districts and provided a variable cost-of-living adjustment that provided inflation adjustments on a sliding scale. The inflation factor was inversely proportional to relative revenue limits: districts whose revenue limits exceeded the state average received a smaller inflation adjustment than those at the average or above. Those below the average received a larger increment for inflation. Thus over time, the dollar disparities in district revenues have diminished. More recently, the sliding scale has been replaced by a flat dollar amount, which translates into a smaller percent increase for higher-than-average revenue districts and a larger percentage increase for below average revenue districts.

The second major variable in school finance was the imposition of Proposition 13, the Jarvis-Gann Initiative of 1978. The major impact of this proposition was to materially reduce the availability of local property tax revenue as a funding source for schools, and in so doing to virtually require a centralized system of school finance. Property taxes were limited to one percent of assessed value for the support of all local government: schools, cities, counties and special districts. School districts could no longer depend on the property tax as the major funding source and could no longer increase their local general purpose tax rate. For all practical purposes, for the vast majority of school districts and an even larger proportion of pupils, decisions about how much funds they receive are made not by local citizens voting on property taxes to fund schools, but by elected officials at the state level.



Recent court cases have determined the current California school finance system is in compliance with *Serrano*. While not perfect, the great majority of California students attend schools in districts with only modest revenue disparities. In 1993–94, the California Department of Education reported that 96.1 percent of California's students attend schools in which the disparities between school expenditures is within a range found acceptable to the court. Virtually all pupils outside the $100 inflation-adjusted band have revenue limits which are higher, not lower than the state median. Figure 3.4 illustrates the percentage of school districts that fall within the current equity band.

District Type	Small Districts			Large Districts		
	Below	Within	Above	Below	Within	Above
Elementary	5.9%	75.2%	19.0%	0.02%	93.3%	6.7%
High School	0.0%	69.2%	30.8%	0	97.9%	2.1%
Unified	0.0%	85.5%	14.5%	0	96.9%	3.1%
All Districts				0.01%	96.1%	3.9%

Source: EdSource Resource Card #20, January, 1995

Figure 3.4: Number of Districts within Inflation-Adjusted Serrano Band, 1994.

California has done well in its longstanding attempts to equalize wealth-based revenues per pupil. However, on the other dimension of school finance—adequacy—California, by almost every dimension, has fared poorly.

How is the Funding Level Determined and Is it Adequate?

The discussion so far has focused on the issue of school finance equity within the allocation process. We now turn to the actual mechanics of determining the funding level. While Proposition 13 limits the revenue for schools that can be collected from property taxes, it does not limit the amount of school revenues. Three additional propositions are significant in regulating spending levels.

Proposition 98, Proposition 111, and Proposition 4

Proposition 98, passed in November 1988, provides for a minimum level of funding for the K–14[2] education system. Two years later, in 1990, Proposition 111 also passed and made modest alterations to the basic Proposition 98 principles. Proposition 98 was enacted by California voters in response to a number of

important changes which had been occurring in California school finance. To the challenges of responding to *Serrano* and Proposition 13, the voters in 1979 added the Gann limit, Proposition 4. This initiative limits the rate at which government itself can grow, and promises citizens immediate tax relief in case government grows at too rapid a pace. One particularly onerous provision of the Gann limit holds state spending to the lesser of two potential cost-of-living adjustments. This feature alone virtually guaranteed that schools and other government spending programs could never keep pace with inflation and growth.

In sum, Proposition 13 restricts revenues, the Gann limit restricts expenditures. In response to the increased pressures created by this double whammy, the educational establishment, led by the California Teachers Association, lobbied for and was successful in passing a constitutional amendment, Proposition 98, designed to guarantee "adequate" funding for schools. The theory behind Proposition 98 was that as the economy prospered, schools would prosper and as the economy worsened, schools would be held relatively harmless. It carved out for schools (and community colleges) a constitutionally protected category in the state's budget deliberations.

Three "tests" are in place that dictate the minimum level of funding schools will receive based on the state's general fund. Briefly, the three tests can be thought of as a set of guarantees that provides some stability to school funding particularly during times of decline in state tax revenues. In years of normal or strong state tax revenue growth, the K–14 systems are guaranteed the larger of two criteria. They are as follows:

Test 1: The same share of the general fund as 1986–87, the "base year," (about 41 percent) adjusted for differences in the contribution of property taxes.

Test 2: The prior year's funding level from both state and property taxes adjusted for inflation (consumer price index) and growth.

In years when state tax revenues grow slowly, Test 3 is applied.

Test 3: The same as Test 2, except that inflation is defined differently. It is the increase in per capita General Fund revenue plus one-half percent.[3]

The Legislature, by two-thirds vote, can suspend Proposition 98. If funding is automatically reduced due to the application of Test 3, the Legislature is required to restore the lost amount in subsequent, better revenue years.



In simple terms, when the economy is growing rapidly, Test One kicks in, increasing the total revenue available for schools. By increasing the base, even a one year upswing in the state's economic fortunes has a long-term benefit for schools. When the economy is relatively stable, Test Two kicks in, which stabilizes funding for K–14. Finally, when the economy is struggling, schools also struggle, but with the notion that when times get better again, the reductions taken during the down periods will be fully restored. Unfortunately, since its passage, the state has only enjoyed one high revenue growth year (1988–89).

While California public school revenues are derived from local, state and federal sources, the Proposition 98 portion (the state portion) is the largest contributor of the three. For the 1995–96 budget year, the state will provide $16.2 billion. Local property taxes are projected to provide an additional $11 billion. Federal aid is estimated at about $2.5 billion and the lottery at $568 million (Figure 3.5). Figure 3.6 illustrates the various contributions from 1985 to the present.

Figure 3.5: 1994-95 K-12 Revenues by Funding Source.



Source: Cal Update, March, 1995, The Legislative Analyst's Office

Year	State Funds	Local Property Tax Levies	Federal Funds	Other Local Income	Lottery	Totals
1989-90	15,013	4,797	1,634	1,943	781	24,168
1990-91	15,770	5,252	1,770	1,770	602	25,164
1991-92	16,510	5,642	2,041	1,845	432	26,470
1992-93	16,255	6,841	2,257	1,786	479	27,618
1993-94	14,867	8,663	2,335	1,830	556	28,251
1994-95 (Est.)	15,081	9,130	2,477	1,875	568	29,131
1995-96 (proposed)	15,763	9,449	2,533	1,921	568	30,234
Cumulative Change						
Amount	$750	$4,652	$899	($22)	($213)	$6,066
Percent	5.0%	97.0%	55.0%	-1.1%	-27.3%	25.1%

Source: Cal Update, March, 1995, The Legislative Analyst's Office.

Figure 3.6: K-12 Education Funding by Funding Source, 1989-90 to 1995-96, in Millions.

State Revenues

Since the state provides the largest proportion of school district revenue, changes in the status of the state's budget has a direct and immediate impact on the schools. As previously indicated, the length and severity of the recession in California has resulted in a severe downturn in the state's revenues. The impact is at least somewhat mitigated by the provisions of Proposition 98, but Proposition 98 or not, to an extent unthinkable prior to *Serrano* and Proposition 13, schools find themselves at the mercy of the vagaries of the state's revenue situation. In addition, Proposition 98, which provides schools with a valuable hedge against state revenue reductions, has had little effect in materially increasing state dollars for schools. In fact, in the two years in which the state has appropriated funds for schools beyond the Proposition 98 minimum, those dollars have been considered loans against future Proposition 98 funding.

Property Tax

Property tax revenues, although they too have grown more slowly than projected in the 1990's, are generally more stable as a revenue source, but the interaction with the revenue limit concept keeps these dollars from accruing to a district's benefit. If, for example, assessed value of property grows rapidly, the schools receive no benefit; the state's obligation to schools is merely offset by the growth in property tax revenues. If, on the other hand, property loses value or grows at a slower rate than state revenues,

the result places additional pressures on the state general fund to make up the difference. So far in the recessionary 1990's, California schools have faced the worst of both worlds—the growth in both state revenues and assessed value has been slowed. The slower-than-projected growth in assessed value has placed an additional burden on the state's general fund at a time when state revenues were barely growing.

Buttressing the System With Additional Revenue

There are three additional sources that increase the level of funding for schools: the lottery, categorical aid, and federal funding. Consistent with the discussion so far, each of these three sources of funding reinforces the centralized structure of the system.

The Lottery

Lottery revenue is a minuscule portion of the state's total funding package for schools. Lottery revenues will provide only about $600 million for schools, less than 2 percent of the total budget in 1994–95. This is down from 4 percent five years ago. On a per pupil basis in 1993–94, this resulted in a per pupil revenue of just $102. Recently, moreover, as receipts from the lottery remain relatively stable and the school population continues to grow, lottery revenue becomes even less of a factor.

Categorical Aid

In addition to funding levels that are calculated using revenue limits, all districts receive additional funds for particular programmatic purposes. These are known as categorical funds. They cover a wide range of educational programs and are supported by funding directly from the state and federal government. Examples include programs for staff development, education technology, and demonstration programs in reading and math.

Categorical funding is not distributed on a per pupil basis and is largely independent of the revenue limit allocation process discussed earlier in this chapter. As a result, categorical funding provides targeted resources for students, teachers and schools. Some categorical funds are distributed based on eligibility and others are available as grants through a competitive application process. A

Figure 3.7: State and Federal Categorical Funding Levels, 1993-94 to 1994-95, in Millions.

State Programs	1993-94	1994-95
Special Education	1547.897	1608.166
Desegregation	500.846	498.05
Court Ordered ($414.682)		
Voluntary ($83.369)		
Child Development, Preschool	410.166	429.445
Adult Education	420.233	422.354
Transportation (Including Special Ed.)	328.29	328.29
EIA (Economic Impact Aid)	293.837	323.687
SIP (School Improvement Program)	316.913	316.913
ROCP	240.899	240.899
Instructional Materials	129.445	138.563
Mentor Teachers	67.949	67.949
Child Nutrition	63.796	63.43
Year-Round School Incentives	58.09	58.09
Deferred Maintenance	52.671	47.579
Staff Development	32.163	33.413
GATE (Gifted and Talented Education)	31.482	31.482
Class Size Reduction	29.908	29.908
Restructuring Grants	24.438	24.438
Miller-Unruh Reading	21.62	21.62
Healthy Start	19	19
Drug, Alcohol, Tobacco Education Programs	25.016	19.147
Education Technology	13.398	13.398
Dropout/High Risk Youth Programs	11.663	11.663
Vocational Education	8.912	8.912
Tenth Grade Counseling	8.006	8.006
Pupil Testing	23.504	6.304
Administrator Training/Evaluation	5.395	5.395
Beginning Teacher	4.832	4.832
Demonstration Programs Reading/Math	4.541	4.541
Specialized Secondary School Programs	3.664	3.664
Partnership Academies	3.282	3.282
Small District Bus Replacement	3.28	3.28
Agriculture Vocational Education Incentive	3.119	3.119
Indian Education Programs/Centers	2.237	2.998
County Fiscal Oversight	1.75	2.75
Supplemental Grants plus other Programs under $2 million	178.866	0
Federal Programs	**1993-94**	**1994-95**
Child Nutrition	864.413	864.143
Chapter 1	769.283	769.283
ECIA ($661.835)		
Migrant Education ($107.448)		
Special Education	233.035	246.436
Child Development	87.495	135.07
Vocational Education	107.502	107.502
Impact Aid	65	68.200*
Drug Free Schools	41.752	42.252
Chapter 2	41.988	35.38
Adult Education	18.402	25.681
Math/Science Teacher Training	19.093	20.289
Emergency Immigrant Education	15.21	15.21

Source: Ed Source Report, School Finance 1994–95, October, 1994

complete listing of state and federal categorical programs is shown in Figure 3.7, along with the funding levels from the past two years.

Three years ago, in the 1992–93 budget year, the Legislature tried to bring some rationality to the growing number of categorical programs and the inflexible nature of the funding structure. Thirty-eight of the state's categories were combined into one huge appropriation, the "mega-item." Special education, by far the largest categorical program at nearly $1.6 billion per year in state funding, was not included.

The "mega-item" allows individual districts the flexibility to transfer up to 10 percent of funds from one category to another as district needs dictate. One unanticipated consequence is that according to the Legislative Analyst's Office, these transfers reinforce core educational programs at the expense of long-range planning and professional development.

Federal Revenue

As a revenue source, federal funds offer little prospect for substantially improving California's school finance situation. For most of the last two decades, federal aid to schools has been a relatively constant share of total state revenues. The federal contribution in California will be 8.3 percent in 1994–95. Federal funds are virtually all categorical, either targeted to specific groups of students (e.g., the disadvantaged), or designated for a specific program (e.g., vocational education).

November 1994 election results create considerable uncertainty about the amount of new federal funding that California will receive. Block grants currently under discussion could change the categorical structure in the 1994 reauthorization of Title I, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Indeed, as of this writing, there have been signals that some funding for education may be in jeopardy as a result of pressures to reduce federal spending. Funds are being "rescinded" at this time which means that previously authorized federal programs will not receive funding as earlier promised. Figure 3.8 shows the 1993–94 spending levels in California for Title I programs.

Even with the uncertainty at the federal level today, there have been a number of positive developments with regard to federal assistance. The California State Education Department secured a $10 million federal grant in Fall, 1994 to plan for Goals 2000. Of this amount, $6 million will be used for local competitive grant competitions in spring 1995. Setting the uncertainty aside, Figure

Type of Grant	California 1993-94 Funding	Percent of Total*
Basic *Provides funds to schools according to a formula involving the number of children in poor families.*	*$549.9*	*72.3%*
Concentration *Provides additional funding to schools in the poorest areas.*	*84.4*	*11.1*
Even Start *Literacy program for the parents of Chapter 1 students.*	*8.4*	*1.1*
Migrant Education *Grants to states for the purpose of providing supplementary instruction for migrant children.*	*101.0*	*13.3*
Neglected and delinquent youth *Grants to states for the purpose of educating neglected and delinquent youth.*	*3.5*	*0.5*
Capital Expenses *Grants to states for the capital expenses for services to private school children.*	*4.4*	*0.6*
Program improvement *Grants to states for extra assistance to nonperforming Chapter 1 schools.*	*2.7*	*0.4*
State administration *Grants to states for reimbursement of costs associated with operating Chapter 1 programs.*	*6.5*	*0.9*
Total	*$760.8*	*100.0%*

* *Details may not add to totals due to rounding*

Source: The 1994-95 Budget: Perspectives and Issues; Report from the Legislative Analysts Office to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee. Page E-81.

Figure 3.8: Title 1 Grant Programs for California, 1993-94, in Millions.



	FY 1994 Appropriations	FY 1995 Congress Appropriations	Percent Change
Goals 2000 Grants to States and LEAs	10.3	36.3	+254
Education Technology in Goals 2,000	0	4.9	+100
Title I ESEA (formerly Chapter I)	693.2	732.8	+5.72
Eisenhower Professional Development	47.4	60.1	+28.75
Immigrant Education	15.3	19.8	+28.24
School-to-Work Transition	5.0	15.0	+150

Source: California Department of Education, Federal Programs Division, 1994

Figure 3.9: Increases in Federal Aid to California, Fiscal Year 1994.

3.9, above, illustrates the major increases in federal aid to California for the federal fiscal year that began in September, 1994.

Next Steps In School Finance Reform

The convergence of a complex legislative history and economic cycles leave California with a school finance system that is simply inadequate. PACE believes that it is impossible for the system, as currently configured, to provide a consistently high quality and enriching education given the current needs of the system and enrollment projections. As a state, we spend at a level that is not responsive to the needs of local parents and citizens. To the contrary, spending is based on arcane and little understood formulas driven by the exigencies of the state's current fiscal situation. What can be done to improve the system for financing schools? How can communities play a greater role in deciding funding levels?

The system is ready for a full-scale renovation. As noted earlier, state tax policy, voting laws, and school governance all have to be considered in a complete analysis and reformation of the school finance system. One significant starting point is the current work of the Constitutional Revision Commission, currently reviewing major fiscal policy areas in the state.

In the interim, there are two places where immediate attention can be focused. First, in the short-term, California can increase the flexibility of categorical funds. Second, the state can review options for facilitating local control of some education dol-

lars. The former is an approach which can be realized relatively quickly and is within reach. The latter is more complex and brings into question a number of legal and legislative issues.

Reforming Categorical Aid

In the near term, California must revise its overly complicated and restricted system of categorical funding for education programs. The Governor's current budget proposes to increase local flexibility by allowing districts to redirect up to 15 percent (rather than 10%) of these revenues and to increase the limit on individual program fund transfers from 15 percent to 20 percent. In addition, the Governor proposes to remove four programs from the mega-item: Adult Education, Adults in Correctional Facilities, Child Development and School Law Enforcement/Partnership Programs.

The Legislative Analyst has proposed a sensible and workable reform of the state's categorical programs which would reduce the number of categories and combine existing programs into targeted block grants. Under the LAO plan, one block grant would be established for school site programs (e.g., School Improvement Program, Instructional Materials, Class Size Reduction, Tenth Grade Counseling, Demonstration Programs in Reading and Mathematics, etc.) another for Staff Development (e.g., Mentor Teacher Funds, School-Based Staff Development, Bilingual Teacher Training, etc.), another for Dropout Prevention and Alternative Schools (e.g., AB 65 Dropout Prevention, Continuation School, Gang Risk Intervention Programs, etc.) and a final category, Other Categorical Programs, which would house the other programs which do not fit neatly into one of the other three groupings (e.g., adult education, child development, desegregation, vocational education, home-to-school transportation, etc.). The Analyst further provides that within the school site category, districts be given increased flexibility (30 percent – 40 percent) to transfer funds, and that substantial funding flexibility be given to districts.

Imbedded in this proposal is an important philosophy that schools need greater flexibility internally to construct comprehensive programs for students. The block grant idea provides sufficient flexibility, in broad program areas, to enable individual school districts to customize programs that are appropriate to students and the community. At the same time, the regulatory burden for both schools and the state is lessened. This reform strategy allows for a

transfer of responsibility to the local districts, and at the same time is targeted toward strategic program improvement.

Increasing Local Community Discretion in Funding

In addition to other constraints on school funding, local funding flexibility was decimated by Proposition 13 which capped the revenue that can be generated by property taxes. There are three possible resolutions for this dilemma: (1) amend Proposition 13 by a statewide referendum to restore local property tax flexibility; (2) utilize county-level sales taxes that are now authorized by the state if 50 percent of the voters agree; and (3) authorize, through state law, a simple majority vote local school district surtax on the state income tax. In PACE's judgment, the third option is the least objectionable and the least discussed.

The first and second options are extremely unlikely. The only way to change the property tax cap imposed by Proposition 13 is by constitutional amendment. Countywide sales taxes are difficult to pass because most local voters identify with their local district and not their county.

This leaves the third alternative, an equalized local income tax, as a more feasible option. Other states such as Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland use a local income tax for schools. California could authorize school boards to request a majority of voters to pass a state income tax surcharge. The state would collect the tax and rebate it to the district. In addition, the state would employ a mechanism called "power equalization" to guarantee an equal income tax yield for equal tax effort. For example, a one-half percent local income tax increase would yield the same amount per pupil for any district in the state so that wealthy and poor communities would have the same revenue raising capacity.

A hypothetical case will illustrate how such a system would work: suppose that each of two California school districts, District A and District B, votes to increase its income tax rate by $1 per $100 of resident income. Suppose, further, that income in the two districts differs, so that the tax increase yields only $300 per pupil in District A but $600 per pupil in District B. Suppose, too, that the state already guarantees each school district a minimum of $5,000 per pupil. If nothing further is done, the tax levies in District A and District B representing the same tax effort of $1 per $100 of income will result in District A having $5,300 to spend per pupil while District B has $5,600 to spend. At this point,

under the concept of local guaranteed yield, the state will redistribute to District A some of the funds raised in District B, so that both districts have the same additional amount above the state minimum to spend—in our hypothetical case, $450 above the state floor, or $5,450 per pupil. In this way, the same tax effort raises each district to the same level above the guaranteed state minimum.

It is significant that a majority, and not a two-thirds, vote of a local school district's voters be sufficient to pass the tax. There is no reason that a "no" vote should be twice as consequential as a "yes" vote.

PACE has urged the State Constitutional Revision Commission to place on the 1996 ballot a set of initiatives that would make it possible for local communities to approve capital outlay bonds and raise revenue for current operating expenditures with a simple majority vote.

CONCLUSION

PACE believes that over the long run, the state would be well served by a comprehensive review and analysis of California's system of financing its schools. A great deal has been learned in the 25 years since *Serrano* and many of these ideas are in place in other states. It is time for a complete assessment of the California education finance system that takes into consideration the changing conditions educationally, economically, and socially in the state.

Endnotes

1 Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal. 3d 728

2 Proposition 98 has an impact on both K–12 districts and community college districts. About 90% of the Prop. 98 guarantee is designated for K–12 and about 10% for community colleges.

3 There is also a Test 3B, which requires that K–14 education not be cut more than other state funded programs.

CHAPTER 4:

TEACHERS AND TEACHING

HIGHLIGHTS:

- California employs nearly 220,000 teachers in public school K-12 classrooms.
- The State's teachers—80% of whom are white—do not reflect the demographic makeup of California's students.
- Nearly three-quarters (70%) of the state's teachers are prepared for their profession at a California State University campus.
- California teachers' salaries rank ninth in the nation.
- A PACE-conducted focus group of urban teachers revealed that:

  —teachers want more parents involved in school programs and activities

  —teachers are willing to be held accountable for improving students achievement if they have the professional discretion to shape educational programs

  —experienced teachers do not believe new teachers are being adequately prepared for the profession

  —teachers believe there often is a mismatch between education policy enacted in Sacramento and good classroom practice.

CHAPTER 4:

TEACHERS AND TEACHING

What do we know about California teachers and about the professional environments in which they work? Available statistical data about California teachers reveal the following:

- California currently employs 218,500 teachers in kindergarten through grade twelve (Figure 4.1).
- Eighty percent of the state's teachers—a figure that has remained virtually unchanged for the last decade—are white. Hispanic teachers account for just eight percent of the state's teaching force, African-Americans for just six percent, and Asians for only three percent of California's teachers (Figure 4.2).
- The average California teacher is 44 years old and has taught for 15 years.
- Approximately 70 percent of the state's teachers are prepared for the profession by the California State University System.
- Forty percent of California teachers have earned a master's degree. The average annual salary paid to the state's teachers is just above $40,000 (Figure 4.3).
- Average class size in elementary and secondary schools currently hovers at 30 students, having crept steadily upward for the last half decade (Figure 4.4).

Having displayed these data, what do we now know about what it is like to be a teacher in a California classroom today? The answer is, very little.

What is the state of the profession of teaching in the nation's largest state? What challenges do teachers face? What frustrations do they experience? What policies or regulations support or constrain teachers' efforts to provide a quality instructional program to an increasingly heterogeneous student population?

Statistics provide an accurate but rather stark and barren numerical description of teachers and the teaching profession. Numbers paint neither a rich nor a detailed picture of the professional lives of California classroom teachers. Yet it is precisely such a picture that policymakers need in order better to inform education policy development as it relates to teachers particularly and to the state of education more generally.

PACE undertook the task of beginning to develop a more complete portrait of the professional lives of California teachers.



Figure 4.1: California Teachers and Administrators, 1982-83 to 1993-94

Male/Female Teachers

Percent Male	30
Percent Female	70

Teachers by Education Level (%)

PhD	2
Masters30	23
Masters	16
BA30	46
BA	13
Less than BA	1
Average Age	44

Teachers by Ethnic Group (%)

American Indian	1
Asian	3
Pacific Islander	0
Filipino	1
Hispanic	8
Black	6
White	81

Years of Service

Average District Years	12
Average Total Years	15

Source: CBEDS, Winter, 1995

Figure 4.2: Teachers—Demographic Data, 1992.

Connecticut	49,910	Illinois	39,387
Alaska	46,581	Rhode Island	39,261
New York	45,772	Oregon	37,590
New Jersey	44,693	Delaware	37,469
District of Columbia	42,543	Hawaii	36,564
Michigan	42,500	Minnesota	36,146
Pennsylvania	42,411	Wisconsin	35,990
Massachusetts	40,852	Washington	35,855
CALIFORNIA	40,289		
Maryland	39,463	United State Average	35,723

Source: Rankings of the States, 1994, National Education Association, West Haven, Connecticut

Figure 4.3: Comparative Teacher Salaries, Top 20 States, 1994.



Source: California Fact Book, July, 1994, Page 29

Figure 4.4: Average Class Size in California Public Schools, 1987-88 to 1993-94.

The initial data gathering procedure was a relatively simple one. PACE assembled a group of six urban classroom teachers from various districts in the state for a four-hour conversation about what it is like to be a teacher in California.[1] It is that conversation that comprises the remainder of this chapter.

THE CONTEXT

We do not suggest here that the conversation reported is perfectly representative of the views of all urban classroom teachers in California. The number of participants was too small to make that claim with absolute surety. But we believe that the results of this conversation are sufficiently illustrative so as to offer to policymakers and others a window on important California-specific aspects of teachers, teaching, students, and schools. Moreover, results of this teacher focus group will assist PACE to shape a more comprehensive research agenda on teachers and teaching.

The urban classroom teacher conversation took place over a four-hour period on a single day in December 1994. The six teachers who participated in the PACE-conducted discussion represented more than a century-and-a-quarter of accumulated teaching experience in a variety of urban teaching milieus. Two high school teachers—one who teaches mathematics, the other who instructs in science—were part of the group. Another discussant was a middle school teacher whose specialty is seventh and eighth grade social studies. The three remaining teachers teach elementary school, third, fourth, and fifth grades respectively.

The teacher discussion was purposely wide ranging and encompassed a variety of important policy dimensions, including class size and student composition; relative levels of teacher professional decision making authority; allocation of fiscal and other resources; parental support and involvement; relationships with teacher colleagues and administrators; preparation of new teachers and opportunities for continuing professional development for all teachers; and the influence of state policy on teaching and teachers.

"Spirited" and "lively" are the words which best characterize the conversation. The teacher participants were not shy about sharing their views and their experiences. They were candid, open, and frank. Many of their comments, we believe, are quite revealing.

Conversation highlights are organized thematically in this chapter. Where possible, we have included direct quotes from teacher participants themselves. We begin with the first segment of the discussion, that which dealt specifically with students.

THE CONVERSATION

The four-hour conversation, perhaps not surprisingly, revolved largely around students. No matter the specific topic under discussion, the teachers consistently returned to ways in which issues, conditions, priorities, and decisions make educational sense—or make, in the teachers' view, "no sense"—for the students they teach.

ARE STUDENTS DIFFERENT?

Much has been made, in press accounts and reform reports, about ways in which today's students are "different" from those of a generation ago.

Thus, we began our conversation with a question designed to elicit teachers' perceptions of precise ways in which students have "changed" over the last ten or twenty years. We asked the teachers to describe, classify, or categorize the dimensions along which today's urban public school students are different from their parents, or from older siblings.

Somewhat to our surprise, the teachers responded almost immediately that students today are not different from their counterparts of an earlier generation. As we probed this issue a bit more deeply, we learned that teachers believe that their students are not different than those who came before, but the conditions, the life situations students face—more crime, more poverty, larger numbers of unwholesome temptations such as drugs, fewer intact families—these are different, and more troubling.

The emphasis on conditions rather than students was a subtle but critical one. As the discussion proceeded, it became increasingly clear that these teachers' abiding belief that children are still "basically the same" gives them the continued drive to persevere in their chosen profession. Despite all of the frustrations that would be revealed as the discussion went on, the teachers returned to the theme that problems students experience are the result of a set of conditions, and conditions can be altered.

MULTIPLE CHALLENGES

Having said that, it is important to point out that these teachers are neither naive nor Pollyannaish about the circumstances in which their students must learn and grow up. Commented one teacher, "...City populations of children have become more needy,

more dependent on outside (of school) forces for help. [They need more] tutoring programs, neighborhood resource programs, after school care, and after school sports programs." These are resources that often, according to the teachers, are unavailable to city children.

Another teacher remarked on the increasingly complex interrelationship between problems which are "educational" in nature and those which are not conventionally considered within the school's purview:

> "So many of the problems we face are not school problems, really. They're not educational problems, they're not curriculum problems, they're not professional training problems, they're not even physical plant or bureaucratic problems. They're just social problems. And they're social problems that neither our state nor our country has really taken any major steps to address. So ... when a child arrives on our [the school's] doorstep, we find ourselves having to deal with things for which this [the school] may not be the right venue, but for which there is no other."

The teachers then raised a concern about an issue which they describe as an "approaching problem," namely the large number of so-called "crack babies" who are reaching school age and soon will populate city classrooms. "We have no special training to deal with the developmental problems these children will experience," said the teachers. They added that, to the best of their knowledge, neither their schools nor their districts have made preparation for this troubled group of children.

As the discussion continued regarding the myriad social and emotional problems many urban students bring with them to the classroom, the teachers were asked about California's Healthy Start Program, or other similar efforts to provide school-linked or school-based integrated services for children. All of the teachers knew these efforts existed ("somewhere," as someone said), all thought these efforts a good idea, but none of the schools at which these teachers teach have any such program.

One dimension on which all of the teachers agreed that students are "different" from those they previously have taught is the degree to which increasing numbers of students in their classrooms are limited- or non-English proficient. Each of the teachers commented on the number of students who speak no, or only a little, English. Most of the teachers said students in their classes reflect



both a range of student language abilities and a variety of native languages. One teacher said that in her fifth grade class alone ten different languages are represented.

A complicating factor, one the teachers believe often is not sufficiently acknowledged by policymakers, is that some students who are not native English speakers also are not proficient in their native language. In other words, these students can neither read nor write in their home language. Thus, according to the teachers, programs which seek to "maintain" students in their native language and offer instruction in that language while the student learns English impose an extra challenge for students for whom literacy in not yet an acquired skill in any language.

The teachers did not advocate a particular instructional strategy or methodology for their students whose first language is not English. They did, however, emphasize that they believe that all of their students must learn English. And they expressed some frustration over what they characterize as the "conflicting signals" emanating from state policymakers regarding the purposes of instructional programs for students who are not proficient in English.

We touched in the conversation on the topic of student discipline. This led to a discussion about the role of school in students' lives. All of the teachers reported that in their classrooms they try to enforce that actions have consequences, that behavior has results. The teachers linked the importance of teaching this lesson to their assessment that school provides the most structure in many of their students' often chaotic lives. School is often the place, reported the teachers, where students receive the most forceful and consistent messages that there are rules.

School is also viewed by many urban students, said the teachers, as a kind of safe haven. Several of the teachers in the PACE conversation teach in schools which are located in very difficult neighborhoods—violent, crime ridden, unpleasant places. School, for many students is "an oasis." It is safe, the rules are known, and rewards, incentives, and consequences are clear.

The discussion of students naturally led to a conversation about parents, and their role in the educational process.

About Parental Involvement

It is often said that teachers either resent parents' intrusion in school, or despair of parents' lack of involvement in their children's education. We found neither of these often-repeated assertions to be true.

Teachers in the group assembled by PACE welcome the parent involvement they currently have, and are eager to finds ways to increase both the level of parent participation and the number of parents involved in some way in the schools. The teachers view it as a component of their professional responsibility—and the responsibility of their respective schools—to reach out to parents and try to find ways for them to be part of their children's education.

Teachers suggested that there need to be programs—supported by teachers and administrators—designed to "bring the school to the community," by encouraging more visits to students' homes, inviting parents more often to school (rather than just for the semi-annual "Back to School" night), and holding community-based meetings off the school grounds.

In the portion of the discussion about parents, teachers again expressed frustration created by the language barrier. This time, the barrier was not between student and teacher, but between teacher and parent. "My school sends notes home in five languages," said one teacher, " but I cannot call and speak to a parent. I wish the district would provide some help, but it doesn't."

Teachers have developed creative ways to deal with this dilemma, such as asking students (if they are sufficiently proficient in both English and their native language) to serve as translators. But this, report the teachers, is not an entirely satisfactory solution. It is a solution that is particularly troublesome in instances in which the teacher needs to confer privately with the parents.

PROFESSIONALISM

A considerable segment of the four-hour teacher conversation was devoted to a detailed exploration of the issues of standards, accountability, and professionalism. On these matters, too, teachers have clear and articulate views.

> "...When I walk into a classroom, I have imprinted on my eyelids on the inside 'I am a Pro.' When I address a child in my classroom, my interaction with that child is as a professional adult. I am trained, I am prepared, I am paid to do this task of teaching this subject area. I am not a missionary. I am not a volunteer. I am not a tutor, I am not a parent. I am a professional. And I go in there [the classroom] everyday with that emblazoned on the inside of my



> eyelids. [The student] sitting across from me is just being a kid, and I am just an old man making him do what he doesn't want to do, times thirty. So I am a professional nag to the kid. [No matter] what I do, [the student] takes everything as personal. 'Sit in your chair..' That's a personal thing. 'Open your book'. That's a personal, no that is a professional requirement. 'Open the book and do [the work]' because it is part of the task at hand."

These teachers have a realistic, no nonsense, yet compassionate view of their jobs. They consider themselves to be skilled adults operating in a complex situation which requires of them myriad decisions and actions each day. They spoke often about the necessity, which they believe too frequently is unappreciated by policymakers, of invoking professional judgment in their schools and classrooms.

As one teacher said:

> "I've often thought if somebody can get inside my head for just a half hour period in the classroom, the decisions, the split second decisions, and the things I have to deal with, it's mind-boggling. If you had a little internal tape recorder and you said 'o.k. now I have to see if I can find this for this student,' 'yes, I need to answer that question', 'I need to find this and I've got to remember to give back this paper,' [you'd see that] it's just constant."

STANDARDS AND RESPONSIBILITY

If teachers view themselves as professionals, functioning on the basis of professional judgment, where do they stand on standards? Should, or do, professional standards exist? If they are not now in place, should they be and who should set them? Once in place, how should standards be enforced?

Teachers are more than willing to adhere to standards, even quite high standards both for themselves and their students. But they are quite clear that if they are expected to meet and adhere to student and professional standards, they must know precisely what those standards and expectations are. Currently they do not.

The teachers expressed considerable frustration that at present, in neither their respective districts nor at the state level, are

there clearly articulated sets of standards they and their students are expected to meet. Goals for student achievement, for example, remain unclear.

Interestingly, it was at this point in the conversation that the teachers first raised California's at-least-temporarily-suspended performance-based student assessment system, CLAS. All of the teachers agreed that CLAS provided them with a clear and useful set of expectations for student performance, and they expressed regret that the state had discontinued it.

Standards for professional performance, report the teachers, also are, at best, hazy and ill-defined. The teachers did not raise the issue of unclear standards as a way to argue against the need for teacher accountability. To the contrary, these teachers do not shy away from being held accountable for that which they are expected to accomplish in the course of their professional lives.

But they visibly bristle at the suggestion that teachers should be held accountable for that which the state, or their local school district, is unable or unwilling to clarify and define. First things first, they said. "Yes, I want to be held accountable. But first, tell me the rules of the game. Tell me what I'm being held accountable for and how that will be judged. If you give me the tools, I'll accomplish the task."

They spoke of frustration over shifting policy sands, the feeling that standards and methods of assessment, for themselves and their students, seem to be a moving policy target. What "the task" is remains unclear. "We never know if we are doing our job, what we are expected to do," lamented one teacher.

The question of how to hold teachers accountable, assuming standards are clear, provoked a lively discussion. Some of the teachers suggested that each teacher should be responsible for establishing a set of learning goals at the beginning of the school year, and then she and her students should be "judged" on the degree to which the goals are met. Others in the group advocated some sort of standardized assessment for students, administered on either a statewide or districtwide basis, but concluded that assessing teachers' professional performance was more complicated than simply relying on that which can be measured by student test scores.

The teachers expressed unresolved frustration that, as they see it, much of what they teach is not immediately measurable. One teacher explains this dilemma by telling a story in which she juxtaposes her style of teaching mathematics, which focuses on students' development of mathematical understanding, with a colleague's more technical and traditional approach to teaching the same subject. She suggests that her colleague's style may be seen as



"more successful" based on conventional measurements of students' mathematics achievement. But, she says, "My success in teaching may be revealed in three or four years when my student is taking calculus or is succeeding in his profession." As she points out, however, her "success" is unlikely to show up on a test.

TEACHER EVALUATION

On the topic of evaluation, the teachers were unanimous: The current system employed to assess teachers' professional performance does not work. As one teacher commented, "It's a joke." Good teachers have no better sense of their skills or areas in which they might aim for improvement once the process is complete. Bad teachers, they say (and they all acknowledge they have colleagues who ought not be in the classroom), simply go on teaching. There is neither assistance nor consequences for poor performance.

The teachers did not agree among themselves about the best approach to an improved evaluation system. All of the teachers reported that, in their schools, the principal and vice-principal(s) are responsible for teacher evaluation. Some members of the group asserted that administrators must spend more, and more concentrated, time in classrooms, observing teachers teach and "modeling" lessons. Countered some of their colleagues, not all administrators are properly trained to conduct a thorough professional assessment of teaching practice. Moreover, often times school administrators are simply too busy with other required tasks to devote sufficient time to teacher evaluation. "I haven't been observed by my principal in four years," commented the middle school teacher.

The teachers also expressed the view that there are critical times in a teacher's career when substantive and thorough evaluation is essential. One is the point at which a teacher is up for tenure. "I got tenure on the basis of one 40-minute observation," said one teacher. "That's just not right."

Another crucial evaluation time is when it is determined that a teacher is "in trouble" in the classroom. Everyone, says the teachers, knows who these people are, even if no one talks about it. Teachers who are having difficulty, the teachers agreed, ought first to be offered some sort of assistance, a chance at remediation. This, they say, currently is rare to nonexistent. If remediation fails, they agree, the teacher should not be allowed to remain in his or her position.

The issue of peer review was raised. What if teachers, rather than administrators, had responsibility for assessing the profession-

al performance of their colleagues? This suggestion was met with mixed reviews. Some of the teachers were quite enthusiastic about it, asserting that teachers would be much more demanding of good professional performance than administrators generally are. Other members of the group were more skeptical.

One teacher reported that a modified peer review system had been piloted at her elementary school, but had not been entirely successful. "Going into other people's rooms" violates a long-established norm of the closed door classroom, and makes many teachers nervous and uncomfortable, she said.

Nonetheless, this teacher, along with the rest of the group, agreed that teachers ought to be more fully involved in the evaluation process. Perhaps it should begin, they suggested, with some work on developing a sense of professional colleagueship within a school, and a thorough discussion among the faculty in an effort to reach a shared understanding of what constitutes good teaching practice. "Teachers need first to become comfortable having peers observe them," said one teacher. "Then we can move on to evaluation."

Bureaucratic Accountability

When asked to describe other forms that accountability takes in their schools, the teachers referred time and again to a kind of bureaucratic accountability, a balancing-the-books, squaring the numbers, checklist approach to accountability. Again, frustration was evident as the teachers described by example the multiple ways in which bureaucratic accountability, in the absence of standards accountability, negatively impacts their students' instructional programs. For the teachers, bureaucratic accountability was symbolized by the administrative process of "rebalancing" students, teachers, and space after the start, and often several weeks into, each semester.

The fourth grade teacher told of having spent weeks before the school year began preparing her room—putting up bulletin boards, arranging furniture, thinking through locations of various stationary instructional activities. The semester began smoothly enough, but three weeks into it, and with no warning, the school administration decided classes within the school needed to be "rebalanced." Some of the fourth grade teacher's students were moved to other classes, new students were assigned to her class, and everyone was moved to different classrooms. The frustration associated with this change was evident in the teacher's voice as she told her story.



She understood, she said, the need for flexibility. But changing rooms, class schedules, and class composition several weeks into the semester enormously disrupted instructional programs already underway. The teacher said that when she questioned the school administration about the need, even the wisdom, of such rearrangement of people and space at that particular juncture, she was informed that, "We have to balance the classes before we send the final [class] counts downtown [to central office]." Said the teacher with obvious frustration, "While [balancing classes] may be important for making things look good on paper, [it] simply does not make sense for kids."

More "Balancing and Rearranging"

This same sentiment was echoed by the high school teachers as they described the "shuffling" of classes and students which occurs each semester with what they characterize as depressingly predictable regularity. The high school teachers asserted that the administration uses the process of "balancing" classes and students in order to "keep class size economical and efficient." The problem, they said, is that the process has no regard for the ways in which such alterations affect the educational lives of their students, and those effects, they emphasized, are largely negative.

One of the teachers reported that nine out of the ten students with whom she begins class on the first day of the semester may be different than the students who are in her classes at the midpoint of the semester. This is the result, the teacher said, of a process which is intended make the school, in her words, "fiscally responsible."

She reported that her school conducts a "head count" of students every ten days for the first three months of the semester. The results of this count often lead to moving students in and out of classes so that classes are "balanced," in other words, approximately the same number of students are assigned to each class. In this teacher's experience, corroborated by her colleagues at the conversation table, entire classes are disbanded several weeks into the semester, and students are assigned to completely different classes.

Sometimes it is not only classes that are "balanced and rearranged." So, too, are teachers. One teacher told about her school dividing itself into "houses." This teacher teaches in a large school, and the faculty was concerned that too many of the students were becoming "lost" in a large and impersonal school setting. Anonymity for students was not the ideal situation.

The teachers at this particular school, with the cooperation of the school administration, decided to divide students and teachers into "houses," smaller learning units within the school. Teachers and students would remain together for more than one year and faculty and students would have an opportunity to come to know one another. The goal was to encourage and develop a more personal educational experience for the students and ensure that larger numbers of them remained in school and pursued appropriate educational programs.

The teachers had spent months developing the house system, and initiated it at the beginning of a semester. Yet soon into the semester, the administration, without consulting with the teachers, threw the house system into disarray. One teacher was involuntarily transferred from the school because, according to the district central headquarters, the school was "overstaffed."

Said the teacher relating the story to the PACE group, "I was no longer the science teacher. Now I was the math teacher. I was assigned to two different houses, and, because of my schedule, I could not meet during the common planning time of either of them." The whole purpose of implementing the house system was defeated, says the teacher, "for the sake of getting the class [sizes] right up to 32."

THE ROLE OF THE UNION

We probed a bit more with the teachers this issue of "class balancing." Is it not true, we asked, that the class rearrangement they describe is required by the class size agreements contained in the collectively bargained contracts between their unions and school districts? Is it not the case, in other words, that the administration has no choice but to move teachers and students in order to comply with contractual agreements?

Surprisingly, the teachers, many of whom are strong and active members of their local teachers' organization, scoffed at the notion that the contract requires the movement of faculty and students once the semester has begun. Sometimes, they said, " class balancing" is done in the name of the contract, but only so that class sizes reach their contractual maximums. However, all of the teachers agreed that, given the opportunity to do so, they would be willing to negotiate with their school colleagues a class and faculty arrangement that would not require disruption after the start of the school year. Moreover, said a number of the teachers, they believe their unions would be willing to grant "waivers" to allow



such within-school decision making. Why that has not occurred remains an unanswered question.

The bottom line for the teachers who participated in the PACE-sponsored conversation is that they desire to be held accountable to standards of professional practice, to goals established for their students, and to goals established for themselves, which they believe they should have a hand in setting. They do not want, do not think it benefits their students, when teachers and schools are responsible for meeting what they insist are ill-defined bureaucratic benchmarks which bear little if any relationship to instructional programs.

Preparing New Teachers

The teachers who participated in the PACE conversation have had experience as "master teachers," supervising student teachers who are preparing for their teaching licenses. Some have served as mentor teachers, assigned to assist first and second year teachers as they begin their professional duties in the classroom. Others simply have had novice teachers as colleagues in their schools.

What do these experienced teachers think of the preparation the next generation of teachers is receiving?

While quick to point out that many of the novice teachers with whom they have had contact are smart, eager, and dedicated, the teachers in the PACE conversation also expressed considerable skepticism regarding the efficacy of the results of much of the teacher preparation in California.

The issue on which there was speediest and most universal agreement was expressed in the parable of the "perfect lesson plan." New teachers, fresh from their fifth year teacher preparation programs (generally at a California State University campus) emerge with the mistaken impression, said the teachers, that with the "perfect lesson plan" all will be well in class. Said one teacher, while other heads nodded in agreement:

> "There are a couple of things that they [new teachers] don't get in their teacher preparation programs]. One is that they don't seem to get ... training in classroom management. The philosophical underpinning of [their teacher preparation programs] is you have these really fabulous lessons, and if you have all these wonderful lessons and you do all these really creative and innovative things ...then you won't have

> any problems. Well, that's not true. There are children who bring with them so many of their own problems that for you to bring together that kid and that lesson is a major task... [The new teachers] really only know two things. They know their subject area, if you are lucky. And they know how to make theoretical lessons. But they don't [know] what to do in the classroom [for example] when a kid says 'no, I don't want to do the work'."

Teacher preparation programs, according to the PACE-assembled teachers, do not sufficiently prepare new teachers for the variety of students they are likely to encounter, the range of learning styles students have, and the personal issues students bring with them to the classroom that can affect not only that student's readiness to learn, but the whole class's ability to do so. New teachers are not taught how to adapt to unexpected situations, both positive and negative, or to assess students' needs and abilities and appropriately adapt instructional lessons and materials.

The teachers acknowledge readily that the ability to adapt comes with experience. Nonetheless, all agree that, at a minimum, new teachers need a clearer sense of classroom dynamics "beyond the perfect lesson plan." They suggested that a longer period of induction as well as more intense supervision by experienced colleagues might contribute to rectifying this problem.

The PACE teachers also lamented that teacher preparation programs do not assist individuals new to the field to learn, over the course of their careers, what they describe as "the art of teaching." To these experienced teachers, teaching is not a simple, or a simply learned, technology. It is a craft which is honed over time as teachers seek continuously to improve their practice. New teachers, they said, enter the profession often believing they understand the technology of teaching (even if they do not), and not realizing that the process of teaching is far more complex than they ever imagined, that learning to teach is a task that never is fully accomplished.

"Refreshing" Experienced Teachers

This led to a conversation about professional development. What kinds of opportunities do these teachers have for ongoing staff development? Do they wish they had more or fewer of them? Do they consider staff development "useful," or do they believe



what is generally available does not contribute to their professional growth?

The teachers were unanimous on two points: 1) They have insufficient opportunities for professional development, and 2) what is offered (usually through their school districts) is not what they need to improve their classroom instruction.

All of the teachers reported that staff development offerings principally are determined by individuals at their school district's central headquarters. Teachers are rarely consulted on their staff development needs.

The teachers were uniformly derisive of the "experts" who often are brought in by districts to instruct in a particular strategy or promote a particular educational program or philosophy. One teacher described a workshop required by the district for all teachers whose classes contained limited- or non-English speaking students:

> "This expert was really off the mark when it came to teaching bilingual kids, or any kids. She had never spent time in a classroom, and her whole approach focused on needed support and instruction for a few students who were part of a much larger class. We asked her at one point, since there is only one teacher in a classroom and no aide, what do we do with the other 32 students while we are working with the six non-English speaking students? She replied, 'I'm not here to explain that. I'm just here to teach you how to work with the six'."

The teacher telling the story said that this kind of "expert" assistance was all but useless. What she really needed was a set of suggestions and strategies that would assist her simultaneously to pay instructional attention to all the students in her classroom. "But," as she said, "no on ever asked me what I wanted or needed."

The other teachers in the group related similar experiences. They said that the experts from whom they had received staff development typically were theoretical rather than practical, and had little if any classroom experience on which they could rely to translate theory into practice. This discussion was somewhat akin to the portion of the conversation about new teachers and the "perfect lesson plan." The PACE teachers implied that all too often experts employed for district staff development purposes bring with them the "perfect strategy" for a particular problem or a particular type of student. But they are unable to understand the

multiple factors that can make any "perfect strategy" go awry in a large and active classroom.

All of the teachers agreed that the most useful staff development for them, with few exceptions, is staff development run by teachers for teachers. "We learn a lot more from each other than we do from the 'experts'," they said. And all agreed that opportunities for such collegial learning are rare.

On the issue of time, the teachers agreed that there just is not enough of it for staff development. "We were finally able to wring a day out of the district for inservice," said one of the teachers, while the others nodded in agreement. There was general consensus that staff development is not a priority in their districts. The teachers acknowledged that part of the difficulty stems from the public's, and often their school board's, perception that, "If we [teachers] are not in the classroom with students, then we're not on the job."

State Policy and Classroom Implementation—Mismatches

Finally, the conversation turned to an exploration of the connection between state education policy and classroom implementation of those policies. On this issue, too, the teachers assembled by PACE were clear. Those who make rules, regulations, and policies, they said, do not have a clear sense or sufficient understanding of the intricate complexities of the daily classroom environment. Policies enacted in Sacramento "often just don't make sense for kids," said the teachers. Moreover, the teachers asserted, even when educationally sound policies are promulgated, teachers too often are expected to implement them without adequate support or preparation. Multiple examples followed.

The issue that raised the liveliest policy debate was the discussion of "full inclusion" of handicapped children in regular education classrooms. All of the teachers are in the midst of their first year of implementation of the full inclusion policy. Four of the six teachers related cases involving their own classroom or school in which full inclusion students had been placed in regular classrooms with little support provided for the handicapped students and no preparation or assistance provided to the teacher.

The teachers have the sense that full inclusion, as a policy exemplar, "is something that must have sounded really good to [elected leaders], but [as currently structured], it is a nightmare for classroom teachers." One of the teachers was even more blunt in her assessment of the motive behind full inclusion policies:



> "I have this really ... cynical instinct about this [full inclusion] which is that it is really ... about money and that as we have seen with so many other things [there may be] an aide or an outreach person or a physical therapist at first, but six months from now, all that will vanish and [the students] will still be there. And they are going to be [in the classroom] with the other 33 or 35 students and [the teacher] will be left holding the bag."

The teachers related incidents of students with severe behavioral and emotional problems being assigned to regular classrooms with little or no support. These students, said the teachers, are, at best, disruptive to the rest of the class. Teachers are often at a loss as to how to deal appropriately with these children, and rarely is money provided for staff training and support.

The issue for these teachers in the matter of full inclusion is one of support. If handicapped students can benefit from participation in the regular education classroom, fine, they said. But along with a policy on inclusion must come special training for the classroom teacher and adequate support to insure that the handicapped student does, indeed, benefit and does not create a situation in which the other students are disadvantaged. In short, teachers said they would not be opposed to a policy of full inclusion if they were convinced it was in the best interests of students (they currently are not convinced this is a policy for all students) and if they were equipped with the knowledge, skill, and resources successfully to execute the teaching of a class which includes "special needs" students.

State Policy and Classroom Implementation—Political Missteps

We touched previously in this chapter on the issue of the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), the state's performance-based student assessment program which now has been suspended. CLAS was a policy about which the teachers were uniformly enthusiastic and expressed repeated disappointment that the state had elected to discontinue it.

According to the teachers, CLAS was a useful tool which gave them the opportunity to think differently not only about issues of student assessment, but more importantly about structures and strategies for enhancing teaching and learning. They described the

state's abandonment of CLAS as a "missed [policy] opportunity," a chance to effect real, important, and lasting changes in classroom practice.

One teacher described how, as part of her school's own staff development efforts, she administered the fifth grade science component of CLAS to her teacher colleagues. Even teachers whose students would not experience CLAS that year became excited by the test's prospects and began to think about ways in which techniques embedded in CLAS could shape their own professional practice.

The teachers acknowledged that prior to being exposed to CLAS, they were apprehensive about the new assessment. Once they had a bit of experience with the exam, however, they were pleasantly surprised. At first, they said, they and their colleagues "hated the test because it was so hard." Could their students succeed at it? Then they decided they liked the assessment for precisely the same reason they had been apprehensive about it, namely, it was difficult. It challenged both them and their students.

When the state announced the suspension of CLAS, said the teachers, they considered it an example of "playing politics with education." "It was not an educationally sound move," they said, and they expressed a certain bitterness that Sacramento would abandon, without even consulting them, a strategy teachers found so useful.

The teachers wonder now, when another assessment is developed and implemented, how long that one will last. They were unanimous in their view that a return to a standard multiple choice exam format would do little to promote continued education reform. "Students don't even take that kind of test seriously," they said.

A continuing state policy with which the teachers found considerable favor (though one said, rather nervously, "Perhaps we shouldn't mention it or Sacramento will take it away, too") is the Program Quality Review, or PQR. Each of the teachers at the PACE meeting had been involved in the PQR process at his or her school, and all praised it. They found that the PQR's emphasis on internal assessment gave them a framework for thinking about their schools, the instructional program they offer, and areas for needed improvement.

In essence, the PQR process embodies many of the elements of good professional development. The school which is the subject of the review is required to reach consensus regarding the school's goals and achievements, colleagues must work together to achieve this end, and outside consultants are brought in only for final

review purposes. All of the teachers reported that the results of each of their school's PQR shaped their school's internal professional development priorities in important and useful ways.

We turned the discussion then away from specific policy examples and toward a brief exploration of opinions and information which inform policy development at the state level. All of the teachers said, "The right people are not consulted" about policies which are good for education. Who are the right people? One set of such individuals is the teachers themselves, of course. They have the sense that education policy is "created in a vacuum," in the absence of teacher views at least being expressed, even if that expression does always find its way into the final policy.

Additionally, the teachers believe there is another key constituency whose views too often are ignored, or not sought, as education policy is in its developmental stages. That group is parents. Said one teacher, as his colleagues around the table nodded in agreement,

> "If somebody asked me who [I] would like most to influence policy, I would say the parents and the children coming into the classroom. And I often wonder..., do the people who are making these policies in Sacramento really know what the parents of these children are thinking or want? Has anybody ever asked them?"

Focusing on Students

In this portion of the conversation, as in previous ones, the teachers always turned the focus of the discussion to "what is best for students." They did not complain about policies, or the conditions they believe policies create or do little to ameliorate. Rather, they were critically and constructively analytical about their profession and their work, continually assessing state-promulgated policies and programs in relation to the degree to which these efforts help or hinder good classroom practice.

It was not until this point in the discussion, when our four hours had almost elapsed, that the issue of money was raised. At no previous point in the discussion had teachers suggested that "More money alone will solve education's problems." To the contrary, they were painfully aware of the state's dire fiscal straits. If anything, they were critical of ways in which their districts chose to appropriate resources. The criticism directed toward the state in this realm was the degree to which resources seem to have strings

attached, program strings which often make it difficult or even impossible for schools to tailor instructional efforts to their students' educational needs.

Teachers understand that resources are finite. They would like to "have more," but they are not sanguine about the prospects of seeing additional revenue anytime soon. They understand, too, that deploying limited resources—by the state or individual school districts—always requires "tradeoffs." They would like to be consulted about which tradeoffs are appropriate and which do more educational harm than good.

PROFESSIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS

We concluded the conversation with the six teachers with a question about "victories." What gives teachers the most personal satisfaction in a job well done? The answers echo teachers' historical responses to this question.

One teacher said her greatest thrill came at the end of the last school year when a student with whom she had "struggled" all year gave her a hug and a "thank you" at graduation. Another teacher said professional satisfaction comes when students "have an 'aha'." When a student who has been agonizing over a problem or concept or assignment suddenly understands, "the light goes on [for the student] and it gives you [the teacher] the incentive to keep going."

The social studies teacher related his experience with an ornery eighth grade class which started the year by resisting the eighth grade. They simply did not want to be there and he had to use all of his professional skills to get them engaged in the work and the school year. At the end of the year, said the teacher, "They all wanted to come back to eighth grade next year."

Yet another teacher said she experiences the greatest sense of achievement "when good things happen in the classroom and I am not much involved." She structures her classroom so that students help and consult with one another on multiple projects and activities. "I know I'm being successful," she says, "when they [the students] start humming and singing [as they do their work] and I can just stand back and watch."



CONCLUSION—LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS

The views expressed by the urban teachers reveal a set of issues for policy makers to ponder and on which policymakers might act. The issues can be reduced to three words: expectations, support, and control.

Teachers are not, despite what conventional wisdom sometimes would have us believe, unwilling to accept new professional challenges. The comments of the urban teachers indicate that teachers are, and do, meet challenges head on. But sometimes they must do so with one professional hand tied behind their backs.

Teachers are willing to meet expectations and rigorous standards for themselves and their students. But those expectations must be consistent and unambiguous. Teachers need a clear sense of what it is that the state expects students to know and be able to do. Moreover, teachers believe they must know how their students' achievement will be assessed, and must be assured that that assessment system conforms to the curriculum the state is promoting.

Teachers also believe they should be assessed on their own professional performance. They are leery of reliance for teacher evaluation on student test scores, but they are eager to find a teacher assessment system to replace the one currently in operation in their districts. Teachers also want to be involved in establishing the standards for professional performance.

Support is another issue. Teachers believe that too many state programs and policies carry with them too little support, making the prospects for an effective program shaky at best.

"Support" here is both broadly and narrowly defined. Some kinds of support include the added personnel required, for example, to implement a full inclusion program for handicapped students, or expanded Healthy Start-type integrated social service programs. There are other kinds of supports teachers view as crucial as well.

Restructuring teacher preparation programs so that new teachers enter the profession with a more realistic understanding of classroom dynamics and a wider arsenal of educational strategies is important. So, too, is providing the time and resources to enable new teachers to be "mentored" by more experienced colleagues.

The need for support also manifests itself in the teachers' discussion of professional development opportunities. These teachers are eager for more time to interact with colleagues and to develop new professional skills. But they are disdainful of most of the inser-

vice opportunities currently afforded them, in large measure because they do not believe these programs support teachers' efforts in the classroom.

Control is also a key issue. Teachers do not want to run schools. But they do want their voices to be heard as policies which affect classroom practice are developed. They also want freedom from bureaucratic strictures so that they are able to craft educational programs to meet their students' needs. Teachers are not reluctant to be held accountable for results, but they are willing to be held accountable only for that over which they can exercise some reasonable degree of discretion and control.

Teachers issue a challenge to policymakers, and to themselves. It is a challenge that says, in effect, "We will be held accountable for results. Our continued goal will be improved student outcomes. But if we are to meet this challenge, policymakers must establish a clear set of expectations, must provide us with needed supports, and must cede to us the decision making discretion that enables us to produce the desired results."

NEXT STEPS

PACE approached the teacher focus group as the first step in building a larger teacher research agenda. Clearly, similar small group conversations need to be conducted with rural and suburban teachers. In addition, PACE plans to conduct a poll among a representative sample of California teachers in an effort to gain a broader and more comprehensive perspective on teachers' perceptions of their professional lives.

Finally, PACE will be involved with and make use of the policy research of the newly created National Commission on Teacher and America's Future in a continuing effort to assist state policymakers to improve teaching and thereby enhance student learning.

Endnote

1 Although we began with urban teachers, PACE intends to expand this effort to include rural and suburban teachers.

CHAPTER 5:

INTEGRATED CHILDREN'S SERVICES

HIGHLIGHTS:

- More than 8 million (8.5 million) children live in California.
- One-quarter of the state's children live in poverty.
- Increasing numbers of California's children are hungry, rarely see a physician, and are prone to or victims of violence.
- PACE reported in 1989 in Conditions of Children in California that the state's social service system was plagued by a set of fundamental problems—underservice, limited focus on prevention, service fragmentation, and insufficient accountability.
- The service system situation PACE detailed a half decade ago persists, although the state has taken, according to a recently released evaluation, some impressive steps forward with the Healthy Start initiative.
- Integrated services and education reform remain separate state policy thrusts. As long as this condition prevails, fundamental improvement in the life conditions of large numbers of California's children will remain an unfulfilled promise.

CHAPTER 5:

INTEGRATED CHILDREN'S SERVICES

More than a decade ago, in 1983, California—and the nation—started down the road toward education reform. Galvanized by fear of waning international economic competitiveness, local, state, and national leaders set in motion a series of reforms which included the introduction of academically more rigorous student course offerings, enhanced teacher certification standards, improved curriculum, higher quality textbooks, and state-of-the-art performance assessments. Educational reform efforts were in full swing when Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE) published *Conditions of Children in California* in 1989.

Conditions of Children reported that the majority of Californians were healthier and financially better off than at virtually anytime in our history. The report, however, also detailed a depressing array of statistics which framed the unhappy life situations for too many of California's children. Among the conditions PACE described were unacceptably high levels of childhood poverty, inadequate health care, high incidence rates for child abuse, large numbers of hungry children, children with insufficient adult supervision, and young people who were virtual wards of the juvenile justice system.

In *Conditions of Children,* PACE argued that improving children's conditions required rethinking children's problems and reconceptualizing social services. We called on policymakers, and others concerned about the state's children, to develop a system of integrated, coordinated social services. We further suggested that these services be connected, through a series of agency linkages, to the schools.

This chapter revisits some of the issues PACE detailed in *Conditions of Children,* and reviews some of the policy responses to those issues. In addition, the chapter briefly examines in tandem two major state policy foci—changes directed at schools and those targeted at social service agencies.

The argument advanced here is a simple one: These two system change efforts, education reform and the development of integrated children's services, have proceeded, and continue to move, on separate, parallel, rarely intersecting tracks. PACE believes that as long as integrated social services and education reform efforts fail to meet, fundamental improvement in the life conditions of large numbers of California's children will remain an unfulfilled promise.

DEMOGRAPHICS REVISITED AND UPDATED

Multiple factors shape children's lives. That reality—that children's chances for happy, successful, productive adulthoods are enhanced or inhibited by a range of situations, including family income, status of physical and mental health, existence (or lack) of family support systems, and access to and quality of education—provided the impetus for the *Conditions of Children* report. How have circumstances for California's children changed in the last half decade?

PACE reported in 1989 that 7.5 million children, ages 0-18, made their homes in California. According to California's Current Population Survey, by 1993, that number had risen to 8.5 million children. More than five million of these young people are in the state's public school classrooms.

Figure 5.1: 1993–94 Actual Enrollments by Ethnic Group.



Source: California Department of Education, CBEDS, Winter, 1995.

California, long known for its diverse population makeup, has continued, in the last half-decade, to become more heterogeneous. And that heterogeneity, of course, is reflected in California's child population. In 1993-94, more than half (57.6 percent) of the children enrolled in schools were nonwhite. In the next ten years, Asian and Hispanic students will increase in their percentage of the population dramatically, while the growth in African-American students will be slower. Between 1993 and 2003, the California

Department of Finance projects a 10 percent decrease in white students. This diversity manifests itself in part in the vast numbers of California residents for whom English is not the native language. Figure 5.1 illustrates the current ethnic makeup of our student body.

Large numbers of California children come from homes in which English is not spoken. Currently, more than a third of the state's children (35 percent) do not speak English as their first, or home, language. As a point of comparison, the national average of children coming from non-English-speaking homes is 13 percent. In 1993, about 22 percent of enrolled students were of limited-english proficiency (LEP). Figure 5.2 shows the enormous range of languages represented in California's classrooms today.

Figure 5.2: Number of Limited English Proficient (LEP) Students by Language in 1993

Language	# of Speakers	Language	# of Speakers
Arabic	4,748	Lao	11,926
Armenian	15,156	Mandarin	9,123
Assyrian	815	Marshallese	60
Burmese	269	Mien	4,691
Cambodian	21,040	Mixteco	222
Cantonese	22,772	Native American	117
Croatian	108	Pashto	462
Dutch	86	Polish	529
Farsi	5,874	Portuguese	2,870
Filipino	20,755	Punjabi	3,880
French	548	Rumanian	1,415
German	596	Russian	5,586
Greek	239	Samoan	1,840
Guamanian	44	Serbian	88
Gujarati	1,089	Spanish	887,757
Hebrew	976	Taiwanese	807
Hindi	2,972	Thai	1,641
Hmong	26,219	Tongan	1,355
Hungarian	208	Turkish	101
Ilocano	1,634	Urdu	1,291
Indonesian	875	Vietnamese	48,890
Italian	275	Visayan	338
Japanese	5,499	Other Chinese	5,513
Khmu	332	Other Filipino	1,259
Korean	16,496	All other	9,993
Lahu	440	State Total	1,141,826

LEP Students as a Percentage of Total 1993-94 K-12 Enrollment 21.9%

Source: California Department of Education Fact Book, 1994-95, page 39.

POVERTY

California witnessed a dramatic increase in the percent of children in poverty during the 1980s and this trend seems not to be abating in the 1990s. As of 1989, approximately one-fifth (21 percent) of the state's children were poor. That number has continued steadily to inch upward. By 1992 slightly more than a quarter of California's children (25.2 percent) lived in poverty. More than half of these (52 percent) are Hispanic. Meanwhile, the median income for Hispanic and African-American families is just half that of white families.

This situation is even more stark than the numbers would indicate. Because the federal government does not adjust for regional differences in the cost of living, California's rate of child poverty—in a state where the cost of living uniformly is high—is underestimated.

As another indicator of increasing childhood poverty, the number of California children whose families receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments rose 37 percent (from 1.23 million children to 1.68 million) between 1989 and 1993. At the same time, the maximum monthly AFDC grant decreased, from $694 to $556 (in constant 1989 dollars), a decline of 20 percent.

HEALTH

There is both encouraging and discouraging news on the child health care front.

Between 1985 and 1991, California's infant mortality rate fell faster than the national average per 1,000 live births, from 9.5 in 1985 to 8.6 in 1988 to 7.5 in 1991. The percentage of low birth weight babies born in California also fell per 1,000 live births from 6.0 in 1985 to 5.8 in 1990, even as the national average was rising. These welcome declines may in part be attributable to the fact that the percentage of births to mothers who receive late or no prenatal care seems to have stabilized.

There is also a bit of good news on the immunization front. By age three, nearly two-thirds of California children (62.4 percent) have completed the full battery of immunizations for diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, polio, measles, mumps, and rubeola. However, immunization rates for minority children continue to lag far behind rates for white children. Fewer than half of South East Asian youngsters have had the full battery of immunizations by the time they reach their third birthdays; barely half of African-

American and Hispanic children in California are fully immunized by age three.

Other data are not so encouraging. Ever larger numbers of California children are without health insurance, for example. When *Conditions of Children* was published, more than one-fifth of the state's children (23 percent) were not covered by a health insurance plan. That number has risen, so that now in excess of one-quarter of California young people (27.4 percent) have no health insurance. Inadequate, or nonexistent, health insurance means children are likely to see a physician only irregularly, and probably only in the case of relatively serious illness. This situation is particularly troubling given California's increasing minority child population. White children, on average, visit a doctor one-and-a-half times more frequently than do minority children.

There are no certain figures for the number of California children who require mental health services or for the total number of the state's children currently served by existing programs. However, the State Department of Mental Health estimates that just 7 percent of the children who need mental health services actually receive these services. Moreover, at the same time that poverty levels and rates of violence, two of the factors which contribute significantly to children's needs for mental health services, are on the rise, state funding for mental health is declining.

HUNGER

The number of California children (and pregnant mothers) who are at nutritional risk continues to climb. As of 1988, 388,000 mothers and children were receiving nutritional supplements through the Women Infants and Children (WIC) Program. That number had increased to 627,000 mothers and children by 1992. The Community Childhood Hunger Identification Project estimates that the number of hungry California children on any given day in 1992 stood at 819,000, an increase of 8 percent over four years earlier.

Hungry children do not always receive even the supplemental food to which they are entitled. The number of California children eligible for and receiving free and reduced price school meals grew by nearly 10 percent between 1991 and 1992. During the same time period, however, two out of three low income California schoolchildren did not receive the free or reduced-price breakfasts for which they were eligible.

Drug and Alcohol Use

Some statistics on drug and alcohol use point to marginally hopeful trends. The number of 11th graders who reported drinking a beer once a week declined slightly, from 20 percent in 1985 to 17 percent by 1991. Weekly marijuana use among 11th graders (self-reported) dropped from 13 percent in 1985 to 8 percent in 1991. Weekly cocaine use among high school juniors decreased from 6 percent in 1985 to just 0.6 percent in 1991.

However, the number of California high school juniors who reported smoking a cigarette "a few times" a month climbed from 11.3 percent in 1989 to an alarming 19 percent in 1992.

Safety and Violence

California has experienced a precipitous increase in homicide rates among children and teens since *Conditions of Children* was published a half decade ago. Nearly 500 Californians (480) under the age of 20 were homicide victims in 1988. Four years later, in 1992, the number of youth homicides had jumped 63 percent, to 781, making California's teen murder rate a full 75 percent above the national average.

While juvenile felony arrests for property offenses, drug offenses and sex offenses remained steady or declined between 1988 and 1992, the figures for two categories of arrests—violent offenses and weapons offenses—increased markedly. California law enforcement officials made just under 14,000 felony arrests of juveniles in 1988, but made 21,549 such arrests in 1992. Arrests of juveniles on weapons charges grew even more dramatically during this same period, more than doubling, from 2,704 in 1988 to 6,002 in 1992.

As jobs and public support flowing to California's cities continues to decline, the rate of youth violence in urban areas soars. Los Angeles County in 1991, for example, accounted for nearly two-thirds (61 percent) of all teen homicides in California, even though that county is home to less than one-third of the state's 15- to 19-year-old population. Currently, three-quarters of California's children live in communities in which the violent crime rate is greater than the national average.

As violent crime has increased, so, too, have the number of incarcerated youth. California continues to incarcerate a significantly larger proportion of its juveniles—and an appreciably larger proportion of its minority juveniles—than do other states, even those states with heterogeneous youth populations. The life



prospects for most of these children is grim, particularly given that the average level of educational attainment of individuals in youth authority wards is eighth grade.

Increases in the reported incidents of child abuse have mirrored, and often outpaced, the increase in violent juvenile crime in California. Reports of child abuse and neglect increased between 1988 and 1992, so that by 1992, 57 of California's 58 counties had child abuse rates worse than the national average. Between 1988 and 1992, the number of child abuse and neglect reports per 1000 California children rose from 63 to 75 as California child welfare workers in 1992 handled 615,000 cases of child abuse, up from 571,000 in 1991.

Teen Years and Beyond

Attempts to stem the tide of youth violence have not been aided by California's anemic economy. In 1993, more than a quarter (26 percent) of 16- to 19-year-olds in the state were actively looking for work, but not finding it. That figure is double the comparable statistic from 1989.

The numbers of unemployed youth are even higher for Hispanics and African-Americans. The unemployment rate for African-American teenagers in 1993 stood at 44 percent, for Hispanic teens at 28 percent.

Violence and unemployment are not the only troubling teen statistics. Teenaged mothers gave birth to nearly 12 percent of the babies born in California in 1991. This figure is particularly alarming given that children born to teen mothers are three times more likely to live in poverty than are children born to mothers who first give birth at age 20 or later. In 1990, more than half (51.2 percent) of all babies born in California were born to mothers who were either unmarried, under the age of 20, or had less than 12 years of schooling. Each of these indicators is a reasonable predictor of childhood poverty.

STATE POLICY AND INTEGRATED SERVICES

Conditions of Children alerted the policy community to the fundamental structural problems in the state's social service system:

Underservice—Too many of the state's needy children "slip through the cracks" in the social service system. Many receive little or no assistance. Problems go undiagnosed or are diagnosed too late. While some children and families are able to avail themselves of service offerings, too many others are barely aware assistance is possible.

Limited Focus on Prevention—State social service agencies, because of policy preference, fiscal constraints, or long-standing tradition employ the triage approach to children's problems. They focus on acute cases rather than on prevention, and view children's problems as episodic rather than continuous. Service providers treat the most severe and the most manifest of children's problems, but find themselves in a system which is structured to pay little attention to preventing these conditions from developing in the first place. To compound this problem, once the child's initial symptoms have been treated, providers rarely have the opportunity for followup to insure that the same situation does not recur.

Service Fragmentation—The social service system is composed of a series of targeted, categorically funded programs scattered throughout various agencies. Each of these programs maintains its own sets of eligibility requirements and its own complicated web of rules and regulations. Regulations and requirements are centrally determined, often in Sacramento, and offer little opportunity for service providers to tailor programs to the needs of individual children and families.

The result of this fragmented system is that professionals who deal with the same children and families rarely talk with one another, rarely have the opportunity and even more rarely are encouraged, to shape a comprehensive service program that fits the needs of individual children and their families. Services and service providers, in other words, operate as if each service is an independent action responding to an independent need.

Insufficient Accountability—Social service agencies typically focus on inputs rather than outcomes. The guiding principle is what has been provided to children and their fam-

ilies, rather than what is the result of the treatment or service. Agencies are structured to pay only scant attention to the ways in which the social service system impacts the "big picture," namely the life prospects for children and their families.

Following the 1989 publication of the PACE report *Conditions of Children in California,* Governor Wilson and members of his staff, along with leaders of the state's legislative branch, devoted time, money, and policy attention to beginning to grapple with the problems endemic to California's complex social service bureaucracy.

In particular, state policy makers began to focus on mechanisms designed to create systems of integrated services in which social service providers would collaborate to develop a single, continuous system of assistance for children and their families. More particularly, state efforts centered on means for developing school-based or school-linked services for California children and their families.

In a system of school-based or school-linked services, the school serves as the "hub" or the focal point of a broad range of child- and family-oriented social services. The functional theory here is that the school provides the most sustained organizational context for contact with children.

The school does not, in a system of school-based or school-linked services, assume primary responsibility for providing non-educational services. Rather, the school acts as the organizational touchpoint to make appropriate services available and accessible to those who are eligible. This is accomplished either by housing on the school site a case manager whose primary responsibility is assisting children and families to access services in their community, or by actually co-locating a range of social services on school grounds.

HEALTHY START

California's most ambitious statewide effort to promote systems of school-based or school-linked integrated services was launched in 1991 when the state enacted the Healthy Start initiative. Healthy Start provides money and a set of policy incentives for local communities to establish systems of school-linked integrated services which can encompass a range of social service functions such as health care, immunization, vision and hearing testing, family support and counseling, and prenatal care.

Healthy Start is administered through the California Department of Education, and is designed to target those children assumed to be in greatest need of service, namely families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), students who are limited- or non-English-speaking, and children who are eligible for free or reduced-price school meals.

Figure 5.3: Characteristics of Healthy Start Schools.

	Percentage of Healthy Start Schools
School Level	
Elementary	75
Intermediate	8
High	14
Other (special education school, juvenile hall, countywide/districtwide program, public alternative/opportunity program)	3
Enrollment	
Small (fewer than 250 students)	21
Medium (250 to 499 students)	21
Large (500 to 999 students)	36
Very large (1,000 or more students)	22
Metropolitan Status	
Urban	29
Suburban	42
Rural	29

Source: A Healthy Start for California's Children and Families: Early Findings from a Statewide Evaluation of School-linked Services, Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, June 1994, page 2-2.

Figures 5.3 and 5.4 display the characteristics of Healthy Start schools by level, enrollment, metropolitan status, and grant eligibility criteria. As can be seen, the majority of Healthy Start initiatives are focused at the elementary school level.

Since its inception, Healthy Start efforts have involved hundreds of local organizations, adapting community-relevant programs to serve needy children and families. The state has invested more than $50 million in this effort.

Healthy Start programs attempt to meet multiple goals. An examination of Figure 5.5 reveals that the key outcomes sought for this integrated services program include improving educational performance (89 percent), improving levels of parent involvement and parenting skills (87 percent), increasing the use of preventive services (87 percent), and increasing the number of services available to children and families (84 percent).



The first year of a multi-year evaluation of Healthy Start by SRI International has recently been completed and the results released. On some dimensions, SRI's findings are quite encouraging.

Proportion of student body:	Percentage of Healthy Start Schools
Receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children	
0% to 24%	64
25% to 49%	27
50% to 74%	7
75% to 100%	2
Greater than 90%	2
With limited English proficiency	
0% to 24%	48
25% to 49%	24
50% to 74%	19
75% to 100%	9
Greater than 90%	2
Eligible for free or reduced-price meals	
0% to 24%	16
25% to 49%	15
50% to 74%	43
75% to 100%	27
Greater than 90%	9

Source: A Healthy Start for California's Children and Families: Early Findings from a Statewide Evaluation of School-linked Services, Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, June 1994, page 2-4.

Figure 5.4: Characteristics of Healthy Start Schools Relative to Grant Eligibility Criteria.

This preliminary evaluation reveals that:

- 600 local organizations are members of Healthy Start school-linked services collaboratives.
- Collaborative groups have shared leadership. In other words, a single agency does not dominate the school-linked services effort.
- Services provided by collaboratives tend to focus on families and on preventive measures.
- Positive outcomes are beginning to be demonstrated. For example, as a result of Healthy Start support, there were significant reductions among Healthy Start families' needs for food, clothing, transportation, and child care.

Families also gained better access to medical and dental care.

- Students' grades and classroom behavior improved to a small but statistically significant degree.

Not surprisingly, among the most difficult challenges faced by Healthy Start collaboratives are overcoming issues of institutional and professional "turf" and insufficient staff time for needed col-

Figure 5.5: Goals of School-Linked Programs.

	Percentage of All Programs
Improve child/family outcomes	100.0
Improve educational performance	83.8
Improve parenting skills/involvement	81.1
Provide for basic needs	67.6
Better family functioning	54.1
Less substance abuse	44.9
Improve mental health	45.9
Reduce violence	29.7
Increase adult education/employment skills	21.6
Increase employment	18.9
Less teen pregnancy and unprotected intercourse	18.9
Improve birth outcomes	13.5
Reduce legal system involvement	13.5
Other family/student outcomes	70.3
Increase use of preventive services	86.5
Increase quality of services	83.8
Provide case management services	64.9
Increase mental health services	56.8
More child care/early education services	43.2
Increase legal/advocacy services	10.8
Systems change	70.3
Improve content of services	67.6
Improve access to services	62.2
Improve school climate	54.1

Source: A Healthy Start for California's Children and Families: Early Findings from a Statewide Evaluation of School-linked Services, Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, June 1994, page 3-13.

laborative work.

One of the SRI findings that relates specifically to education, however, is disturbing. Healthy Start efforts are designed to be school-linked. In fact, the most common model of a Healthy Start program is the school site family resource center at which services are provided to children and families on the school grounds.

Moreover, nearly all of the Healthy Start programs, even those not located on school sites, include a school staff member as part of their Healthy Start team. However, teachers and other school staff members whose schools are part of the Healthy Start effort, according to the SRI assessment, have little involvement with the program and are generally unaware of the effort. This finding points to a dilemma and a policy challenge, namely forging a link between integrated services and education reform.

THE LINK TO EDUCATION REFORM

At the same time as integrated services has been a state policy thrust, California, like much of the rest of the nation, has been engaged in a set of efforts aimed at education reform. In many respects, California has been a leader in the education reform arena, particularly with regard to curriculum issues. The state's charter school statute, which allows schools to decouple from the conventional school bureaucracy, also is being closely watched by the rest of the nation.

To be sure, California has some rather large gaps to fill on the education reform dimension. There are no statewide goals which indicate what it is students are expected to know and be able to do by the time they matriculate from California's schools. Attention needs to be given to a student assessment system, to the preservice and inservice preparation of teachers, and to the state's school finance system. Nonetheless, as a state, California has made considerable progress on a number of education reform fronts.

It remains the case, however, that a substantial segment of the student population is not benefiting sufficiently from school or from education reform efforts. Large numbers of students remain at risk of academic failure. Many of these are students whose lives are in such turmoil because of poverty, physical or emotional health problems, substance abuse, or teen parenthood, that the task of staying in, and succeeding in, school does not take first priority. These are the students who clearly need, and who could benefit most from the interventions offered by a system of school-linked integrated services. In fact, without a strong and coordinated system of service support, the likelihood that these children, despite teachers' best efforts, will succeed academically is greatly reduced, and in some cases, is probably eliminated altogether.

Yet few state policy linkages have been established between integrated services efforts and education reform. As the preliminary SRI evaluation of Healthy Start points out, even in those schools which explicitly are part of an integrated school-linked ser-

vices program, teachers have little knowledge of or involvement with the effort.

While California has made some progress on the integrated services and the education reform fronts, state policy currently envisions institutional change as moving down two parallel and separate tracks. Education reform, in other words, remains largely something that is done inside the classroom; integrated services is done outside of it.

Yet it is not sufficient to focus a set of policies on integrated social services, and education reform. These institutional and systemic reform thrusts must be considered as a policy whole, as different branches of a single improvement network for children.

The challenge for policymakers is to reach across conventional policy categories. Integrated services must be viewed as an essential component of education reform. (Highlight as a Statement)

Currently there is little incentive to change. Policies continue to be generated and implemented within longstanding institutional and program categories. Funding continues to be categorical in nature as well.

Policies should be developed which offer additional incentives for collaborative governance which spans education and social service agencies. This might entail, for example, local school boards cooperating with the governing bodies of other social service agencies to develop comprehensive, locally-based policies for children. Funding should be decategorized in a manner sufficient to enable the "pooling" of funds for comprehensive programs. State policy should make possible, in other words, "blended" funding streams which combine dollars from multiple sources and allow programs to be tailored to children and families. A set of common, measurable goals across agencies which focus on outcomes for children should be encouraged and rewarded. Such goals should encompass, for example, benchmarks of academic achievement as well as indicators regarding children's general physical health and emotional well-being.

And attention must be paid to the preparation and training of those professionals who will work with children. Currently, teachers are trained in schools of education, social workers in schools of social welfare, and so on. Rarely is the training collaborative. Only infrequently do education professionals know much about the work of school social workers. Yet both groups of professionals will ultimately be serving the same client. Policies must encourage professional preparation which is integrated, which provides a broader understanding and greater appreciation for the range of child needs, possible treatment options, and opportunities for on-the-job collaboration.



In short the challenges confronting California's children cannot be separated into those which are the province of educators and those of social service providers. Children's needs are interconnected and intertwined. State policies must reflect this reality.

CHAPTER 6:

CHILD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

HIGHLIGHTS:

- California is experiencing an increasing need for child care services.
- Laws, funding sources, requirements, program rules, and operational policies adopted over the years to make child care responsive to changing circumstances of families have also made it more difficult for the system to serve the children and families for whom it was created.
- Child care programs administrated by the California Department of Social Services (CDSS) are designed to promote families' economic self-sufficiency; those operated by the California Department of Education (CDE) have developmental school readiness as their principal mission. These two different program purposes have resulted in a bifurcated, inconsistent child care system.
- California is in the process of attempting to create a "seamless," coordinated child care system.
- The dilemma for policymakers is to assess and make judgments about the "tradeoffs" implicit in simultaneous considerations of the cost of state-supported child care efforts, the quality standards programs should meet, and numbers of children who should have access to publicly funded child care.

CHAPTER 6:

CHILD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES

Child care and development services for young children are of increasing importance and concern to our nation and state. This is especially true for the poorest among our population. Without child care, parents are unable to work, and without early childhood education, impoverished children may not be successful in school. The cost of these services exceeds the resources available to many low income families. For some, these needs are met through a system of federally and state supported child care and development services. This system has been the subject of research and analysis by PACE for the past year.

The study and reform of California's publicly supported child care and development system presents a unique challenge, due both to the extraordinary size and diversity of the population to be served as well as to the scope and complexity of the system of programs and services currently provided to families. Matching the needs of low income families with the available supply of services in an optimal fashion requires an understanding of both issues.

THE CHANGING POPULATION

California shares with other states factors that have resulted in a growing need for child care and development programs. Nationwide there has been a dramatic increase in the number of mothers employed outside the home. In addition, families are changing, the result being an increase in single-parent households. At the same time, there has been a growth in the child population as well as soaring child poverty rates. Moreover, the nation is steadily becoming more diverse ethnically and linguistically.

Nowhere are these effects more dramatic than in the state of California. The sheer size of the child population age thirteen and under is remarkable: according to the 1990 Census this group numbers more than six million. Moreover, California's children form the most diverse group in the nation. Figure 6.1 displays the ethnic distribution of California children ages 0–14, revealing no majority group. This is in contrast to the total population for the state (which is 57 percent white), highlighting the trend toward increased diversity among the population.



Figure 6.1: Percent Distribution of Californians Aged 0 to 14 by Ethnic Group, 1990 Census.

Even when compared with the other most ethnically diverse states in the country (Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas), California emerges as the only state with no clear ethnic majority among children aged 0–14. Not only is the population of children in this age range increasing in size and becoming more diverse, children are also, along with their parents, becoming increasingly poor. From 1980 to 1991 the number of AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients in California rose dramatically, from 1,498,000 to 2,258,000, a 51 percent increase. During this same time period, the United States as a whole showed only a 22 percent increase. Indeed, by 1991, California's share of AFDC recipients had reached 17 percent of the nation's total, and the number of California recipients of AFDC in 1991 almost equaled the combined number of AFDC recipients for Florida (546,000), New York (1,108,000) and Texas (753,000).

The number of children living in poverty in the state of California is alarming. Overall, 19 percent of children under age 6, and 17 percent of children ages 6–17 are living below the poverty level. If these figures are broken down by ethnic group, the numbers are even more striking: as shown in Figure 6.2, nearly 34 percent of Black, 31 percent of Native American, 28 percent of Hispanic, 19 percent of Asian and Pacific Islander, and 13 percent of white children under age 6 are living below the poverty level.

While poverty strikes both married and single parents in California households (nearly 10 percent of married couples with children under age 5 are living in poverty), the effects are greatest



Figure 6.2: Percent of Children Under Six in California in Families Below the Poverty Level by Ethnic Group, 1989.

on single mothers. Fully half of all female householders with children under five are living below the poverty level. At the same time, mothers of young children are entering the workforce at an unprecedented rate. Fifty eight percent of California mothers with young children (under age 6) are employed.

The changing nature of California families highlights the importance of an adequate and reliable system of child day care and development programs. In fact, California is known to be a leader in this area, having contributed to federal attempts to meet these needs long before most other states and by continuing this commitment with significant financial investment. The system that has developed over the years, usually in response to specific identified needs, however, is complex and not well coordinated.

The Child Care and Development System

Over the past 80 years, state child care policy has been driven by efforts to serve families and children in a variety of personal and economic circumstances shaped by the growing exigencies of modern life. The system has, in fact, responded exceedingly well to that

unprecedented challenge.

Complexity, however, often breeds complexity. The laws, funding sources and requirements, program rules and operational policies that have been adopted over the years to make child care responsive to the changing circumstances of families also have made it more difficult for the system to serve the children and families for which it was created.

California currently provides child care and child development programs authorized under dozens of statutory authorities. These programs vary in their client eligibility rules, funding levels, and provider regulations. In addition, three different executive branch agencies (the Department of Education, Department of Social Services, and the Office of Child Development and Education in the Governor's Office) have major oversight or administrative responsibilities for these programs.

California's child care and development programs have, in fact, emerged in response to two distinct needs. Programs administered by the California Department of Education were created to meet the developmental and educational needs of children. Programs administered by the Department of Social Services, on the other hand, were initiated for the purpose of assisting families in becoming economically self-sufficient; child care, then, is viewed as a support service which allows parents to be employable.

The California Department of Education (CDE), the agency with the longest relationship to child care, administers 10 categories of programs that provide direct services in centers or voucher certificates which parents can use to "buy" other child care. The programs are contracted out to local or regional agencies and served about 136,000 children in 1992–93.

CDE operates a broad mixture of state-funded programs, which share common administrative standards, and federally-funded programs, which have a different set of requirements. All the programs are designed essentially to serve children of low-income parents, but lack of coordination precludes the blend of services that would serve families with greater consistency and effectiveness. Staffing ratios, payment rates for providers, and required fees paid by parents also vary among programs.

The California Department of Social Services (CDSS) administers seven voucher certificate and supplemental child care programs in conjunction with AFDC, and served about 64,000 children in 1992–93. These programs, which also serve children of a wide age span, provide child care for families receiving, relinquishing, at risk of needing or eligible for but not receiving AFDC. Unlike California Department of Education programs, CDSS programs are operated by counties, which are responsible for deter-



mining family eligibility, calculating fees and issuing payments to providers under state and federal regulations. Eligibility is based on family income and AFDC status, and most programs do not require parents to pay a fee.

The system, then, is a bifurcated one which lacks consistency and coordination. All together, it serves children and families in more than 20 major programs at a total cost of approximately one billion dollars per year. Not only is this system of child care and development administratively awkward, it also disadvantages parents and children by its conflicting and overlapping set of regulations and provisions. Moreover, program provisions and regulations are sometimes discontinuous and lack rationality. The result is that families frequently lose services as the result of minor changes in their incomes or circumstances.

CHILD CARE REFORM

Recognizing that the proliferation of statutes and funding arrangements over the years could be hindering the delivery of subsidized child care, the California Legislature adopted Assembly Bill 2184 in 1991. Among other features, the legislation called for an investigation into the feasibility of consolidating all such programs and services in order to streamline and eliminate overlapping and conflicting requirements.

The task was assigned to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Secretary of Health and Welfare and the Secretary of the Office of Child Development and Education, who were asked to undertake a comprehensive review of child care services. A task force was formed in 1992 to carry out the legislative charge, and representatives from the three agencies and from child care associations began to meet regularly.

The task force sought to envision the kind of system that would carry out its twin goals of assisting families in achieving economic self-sufficiency and preparing children for success in school. It searched for a framework encompassing the multitude of federal, state and local requirements that would best serve the 250,000 children in state and federally supported child care programs throughout the California.

In particular, the task force focused on the need to create a more coordinated, or "seamless," system. A seamless system was defined as one that "promotes continuity of services between programs as families' income and employment status, aid status and other relevant characteristics change." More specifically, the task force identified seven principles which define a seamless child care

and development system. Those principles are displayed below.

PACE was invited in 1994 by the AB 2184 Task Force to contribute to this effort. The purpose of PACE's work is to construct and analyze policy alternatives which will improve California's publicly funded child care and child development activities. The long term objective is to create a seamless set of programs which facilitates the development of California's children and the achievement of economic self sufficiency of their parents.

In constructing these policy alternatives, four key factors related to the provision of child care and development services are being considered. They are the quality of programs and services, client access to those services, the cost of providing them, and the governance, or administration, of the system.

While the evaluation of each factor alone is of interest, the most critical part of PACE's charge is to assess how the four interact, or to put it another way, what the tradeoffs are when one or more is varied. Full and explicit consideration of these tradeoffs should guide any policy decisions made regarding the use of limited child care funds. For this reason, PACE's set of alternative proposals for improving child care will be evaluated in light of these tradeoffs.

While there is an infinite number of combinations of ways these four factors may be varied, several key tradeoff issues will be considered. Among these are:

- If we were to hold cost constant, that is, assume no more or less in the way of child care funding, what would be the effects on access and governance if, for example, more stringent quality standards were imposed?
- Similarly, again if cost is held constant, what effects on the quality and gover-

Principles of a Seamless Child Care and Development System

A seamless system:

1. ***Treats those eligible for child care equitably by promoting access to programs among families and individuals in similar circumstances.***
2. ***Supports a variety of programs that (a) reflect locally-determined needs and (b) offer a high degree of informed parental choice among available child care options.***
3. ***Minimizes, to the extent possible, discontinuities between programs, with special emphasis on key components of service delivery, such as service availability, affordability, eligibility standards, parent fee schedules and quality of care.***
4. ***Promotes a healthy, safe environment and developmentally-appropriate experiences consistent with service settings.***
5. ***Uses a simple, efficient administrative system at all levels that seeks to minimize administrative costs.***
6. ***Promotes the expansion of public/private partnerships in order to maximize resources for target populations.***
7. ***Encourages access to appropriate training services and materials for service providers and interested parents which is consistent with service settings.***



nance of child care would result if the goal were simply to increase the number of children served?

- Alternatively, if a decision were made to improve the quality of child care in the state, say by requiring more highly trained staff, what would be the associated cost?
- What if the governance of programs moved toward a more centralized (state controlled) or decentralized (greater local control) model? How might this affect the quality of programs and clients' access to them?
- If funding for child care and development programs was reduced, what might the alternatives be relative to quality, access, and governance for applying those reductions?

These critical, but difficult tradeoffs, will be evaluated within the greater context of state policies that are targeted toward children. As discussed in Chapter 5, Integrated Children's Services, the approaches that best suit families and children link multiple services together with an efficient delivery system. Child care and development policies need to be developed along similar lines, remembering that school readiness, preventive health care, proper nutrition, and family support services are critical components in comprehensive service designs for child care and development. The cooperation among CDE, CDSS, and the Governor's Office of Child Development and Education will be essential in implementing child care and development services to meet the multiple needs of California's children. PACE's report and recommendations will be available in the summer of 1995.

CHAPTER 7:

SCHOOL-TO-WORK

HIGHLIGHTS:

- Renewed educational emphasis across the nation on school-to-career programs is prompted largely by the expressed concerns of employers about the quality of employee preparation and the projected demand for a high skilled workforce.
- The major themes of school-to-career programs revolve around integrating academic and vocational education, cooperation among K-12 and higher education in preparing students to enter the workforce, and establishing links between school and work.
- California has been slow to respond to national concern about workforce preparation.
- Despite the state's slow start, the plan adopted by the Governor's School-to-Career task force shows great promise, particularly in light of the unprecedented level of interagency cooperation among the entities chiefly responsible for workforce preparation in the state—the state Department of Education, the Community College Chancellor's Office, and the Employment Development Department.
- California has a number of exemplary vocational education and training programs. But the lack of adequate leadership and coordination result in state efforts which often are fragmented and duplicative.

CHAPTER 7:

SCHOOL-TO-WORK

INTRODUCTION

Vocational education policy in the United States historically has been dominated by the policies of the federal government.[1] Although education in the United States is highly decentralized, vocational education policies have, since the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act in 1917, played a role in funding and leadership. It is important, therefore, before launching a discussion of California School-to-Work initiatives, to lay the groundwork by detailing the recent, significant federal vocational education efforts.

The publication of *A Nation at Risk* in 1983 by the National Commission on Excellence in Education provided the focal point for much of the school reform efforts of the 80's. The Commission noted that: "More and more young people emerge from high school ready neither for college nor for work." Although the Commission noted further that "this predicament becomes more acute as the knowledge base continues its rapid expansion, the number of traditional jobs shrinks and new jobs demand greater sophistication and preparation,"[2] its recommendations focused on improving the quality of that portion of the curriculum normally associated with preparing young people for college. In spite of its lofty rhetoric, the Commission's suggested approaches to the problem paid scant attention to noncollege-bound youth as a target audience or vocational education as a viable part of a school reform strategy.

Responding to this pressure for reform, states (including California) increasingly focused on the college preparatory curriculum with special attention to strengthening graduation requirements, adopting statewide testing programs and increasing teacher standards. At the local level, schools increased attendance standards, increased requirements for graduation beyond the state requirements, demanded more homework, and required longer school days and years. Fortunately, there have been improvements in SAT and Advanced Placement scores over the past decade (see Chapter 2).

Vocational Education was not seen as part of the solution and not surprisingly, school districts engaged in very little vocational education reform. This was due to the lack of attention paid to the school-to-work transition in national and most state reform efforts, the notion in some quarters that strong academic preparation was the best preparation for work, and the generally low esteem in which many vocational education programs were held.

Throughout the 1980's, school districts experienced significant declines in vocational education programs, due in some extent to the increased graduation requirements which pushed elective vocational education courses from the curriculum.[3]

CONFLUENCE OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND WORKFORCE PREPARATION

The new and heightened emphasis on improving workforce preparation was given a strong impetus by the timely confluence of the educational concerns, especially for non-college bound youth, and the concern, expressed by employers and researchers, about the quality of workforce preparation and the projected demand for a high skilled workforce.

In part, the pursuit of this initiative is an outgrowth of education, government, and business leaders reacting to significant economic, technological, and social changes of the 1980's including structural changes in the economy. These changes have been linked to fewer industrial production jobs, more service industry jobs, a demand for trained technicians, and the need to improve the quality of education for all students, not just the college bound.

These new changes in policy were generated by several concerns. There is in the United States a strong concern that its firms are losing their competitive edge in world markets. Although there are multiple explanations for such a perceived decline, there is a strong tendency to place the blame on one factor—a labor force with analytical skills that are insufficiently developed for a high performance work environment. If we assume that the United States is in economic decline and that the cause can be found in the work force, improving the cognitive skills of the U. S. worker offers the only hope for the preservation of the United States as a high skill, high wage economy.

In response to these concerns the Congress, in enacting the 1990 amendments to the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Applied Technology Education Act (Perkins II), set the stage for a three-pronged approach to better preparing a high skilled work force. the legislation emphasizes:

(1) the integration of academic and vocational education,
(2) articulation between segments of education engaged in work force preparation, and
(3) closer linkages between school and work.



These three themes also lie at the heart of the Clinton Administration's new school-to-work initiative embodied in the School-to-Work Opportunities Act, passed early in 1994. With an historic degree of cooperation rarely seen in Washington, the Departments of Education and Labor, the two agencies most responsible for job preparation and training, set aside years of often counterproductive bickering to decide on a new course of action for the federal government. The new initiative emphasizes the same three themes: the integration of academic and vocational education; the integration of secondary and post-secondary education; and the integration of school and work.

There are, however, important differences in emphasis on at least three dimensions from the Congressional reform. First the School-to-Work Opportunities Act proposes to strengthen the school-to-work connection by encouraging paid work experiences for every student. Although schools and businesses are nowhere near able to implement this provision, it is a high priority with the Administration and very good faith efforts to increase the amount of paid work experience may prove be the *sine qua non* of programs which will be successful in getting additional federal resources.*

The second major distinction is the emphasis the Administration places on including all students in the school-to-work program. No longer is vocational education seen as a program solely for those students not eligible for college. The Administration believes that if the new vocationalism is seen as a program for noncollege bound youth, it will be viewed as just another vocational education program for students who cannot succeed in a rigorous college preparatory program and will fail. The third distinction is that the Administration's proposals envision a radically different high school than the one which now exists in which the entire high school and its curriculum are reformed to provide a high school education which emphasizes school-to-work for every student. At the heart of both initiatives lie the three integration themes.

Integration of Academic and Vocational Education

Perkins II requires that "funds made available...shall be used to provide vocational education in programs that...integrate academic and vocational education through coherent sequences of courses so that students achieve both academic and occupational

competencies." The Act also demands that state plans describe how they will provide a vocational program that "integrates academic and vocational disciplines." This is an extraordinary departure from past Congressional practice, which allocated funds for "program improvement," but left to states and local school districts the determination of the appropriate strategies.

There were two interdependent reasons the act called for integration of academic and vocational studies. First, the community of employers suggested to congressional education committees that their newly-hired workers were deficient in academic skills. This was by no means a point of strong consensus among employers; however, those who professed it represented "high performance workplaces," upon which the future competitiveness of the American economy is thought to rest. This argument alone might suggest that secondary vocational programs should be eliminated in American secondary schools and that the only concern should be in enhancing the academic skills of all students.

The second argument in favor of integration held that the majority of secondary students failed to acquire transferable academic skills because of the lack of appropriate pedagogical practice. The assumption was made, supported to a reasonable degree by findings from cognitive science, that the majority of students would better acquire those kinds of academic skills useful in the high performance workplace if pedagogical practice emphasized "contextual learning," e.g., relating theoretical concepts to the solution of practical problems.

The policy position became one not of dropping vocational studies from the curriculum but of incorporating academic content into the programs of applied instruction and using applied instruction techniques to impart academic content. Although the Congressional charge to integrate is explicit, there is little agreement on what the concept entails. In fact, the most comprehensive examination of integration practices identifies eight models, ranging from marginal alterations to existing programs to an entire restructuring of the secondary school curriculum.[4]

TECH PREP

The second major thrust of Perkins II involved an emphasis on more closely linking secondary and post-secondary (community college) programs which prepare students for work. Interest in the development of articulated curricula between secondary and post-secondary institutions has been evident for more than 60 years. Recent interest, however, reflects the pursuit of a relatively new



concept—the development of articulated vocational-technical education programs that provide preparation for technical careers, i.e., Tech Prep programs.

Tech Prep is an emerging concept whose meaning changes as experience grows. Tech Prep was broadly defined as "a carefully designed curriculum that engages a high school student in a four-year (two secondary plus two post-secondary) or six-year (four secondary plus two post-secondary) plan to gain the competencies (knowledge, skills, and values) required for technical careers."[5] Tech Prep models include a common core of course work for all students in the first two years of high school leading to a student decision in the junior year to enroll either in a college prep or tech prep program. The barriers between the two programs are semi-permeable, allowing students to change programs later (but not without some cost in time and effort). The tech prep option includes high school course work designed to prepare the student for advanced technical specialization in the community college leading to an associate degree (a two year post-secondary degree). The high school portion of the program places a heavy emphasis on building a strong foundation (both academic and vocational), leaving much of the advanced technical course work for the community colleges.[6]

Congress further refined the concept by defining, in its Tech Prep Act of 1990, Tech Prep education as a "...combined secondary and post-secondary program which:

(A) leads to a two-year associate degree or a two year certificate;
(B) provides technical preparation in at least one field of engineering technology, applied science, mechanical, industrial, or practical art or trade, or agriculture, health, or business;
(C) builds student competence in mathematics, science, and communications through a sequential course of study; and
(D) leads to placement in employment."

Although the Congress specifically limited funds to include only those activities conducted in the last two years of high school, most experienced community colleges and school districts have moved away from these restrictive grade designations and have expanded articulated programs into junior high and even elementary schools.

The Tech Prep Act marks a significant departure from past practice which was characterized by battles between community colleges and high schools over the appropriate division of federal

funds between the two segments. By adopting the provisions of Tech Prep Act, the Congress opted for a strategy which emphasized the importance of closely aligning secondary and post-secondary programs which prepare students for productive work as technicians.

Prior to the coinage of "Tech Prep" the phrase "2 + 2" was used to connote high school/post-secondary articulated vocational education programs. They most frequently took one of two forms:

(1) time-shortened programs, in which the primary result of articulation is to shorten the time it takes to complete a specified curriculum, and
(2) advanced skills programs, in which the primary result is greater technical expertise.

Concurrent enrollment and advanced placement in community college courses are two frequently employed methods of reducing the time it takes to complete a given sequence of courses. The more sophisticated, and rarer, model of tech prep is a "skill-enhanced" model which provides that in an equivalent time period, as a result of the elimination of duplication of course work, a more advanced curriculum can be offered.

The term articulation, as it has been applied to high school and community college coordination, has referred to the coordination of courses between institutions. An important distinguishing characteristic of new tech prep programs is that tech prep articulation refers to articulated curricula or sequences of courses. Results from recent investigations indicate the implication of that distinction is lost on many school officials.[7] Schools tend to apply the phrase "articulated curricula" to all articulation agreements whether they refer to individual courses or a sequence of courses. In addition, many schools and colleges refer to virtually any articulated vocational programs as "tech prep" as long as the curriculum is associated with vocational or technical programs areas (e.g., business, health occupation, engineering).

Connecting School and Work

The third major message from Perkins II was to strengthen the transition from school to work. Two major issues now dominate discussions in the U. S. about workforce quality and workforce preparation. The first revolves around the question of how to make more appropriate connections between education and work. There appears to be general agreement that entry-level workers need higher levels of competence in academic subjects, especially

mathematics, the sciences, and language and that a high percentage of secondary students currently are being prepared inadequately.

The text of Perkins II emphasizes the importance of "...strong experience in an understanding of all aspects of the industry the students are preparing to enter, including planning, management, finances, technical, labor and community issues, and health, safety and environment issues." This approach appears to make at least three valuable contributions. First, it offers a thorough kind of education for entrepreneurship. Good knowledge of planning, management, finances, and underlying principles of technology, as well as knowledge of health and safety issues, seem to be crucial in the launching of new firms. Given the lack of job opportunities in many central city areas, job creation through the start up of new, locally owned businesses appear to be a key element of urban revival. Second, instruction in all aspects of the industry helps students understand the social significance of their future occupations and the contributions they, as future workers, will make to the welfare of the nation. Third, education in all aspects of the industry would allow American employers to benefit from responsible worker-initiated proposals for productivity gains.

This holistic approach is but one example of the renewed interest and emphasis on improving the connection between school and work. Youth-based apprenticeships, structured work experience, cooperative education, partnership academies and school-based enterprises are all programs which emphasize closer connections between school and work.[8]

Congress has thus provided a template for the vocational technical education portion of the emerging strategy for preparing the workforce of the future. Its three core approaches mark a significant departure for past vocational technical education acts by emphasizing not the separation and segregation of vocational technical education but its integration—with academic instruction, between secondary and post-secondary institutions and with business and labor. Two final components of the new Act, both marking serious departures from past practice, are the provisions related to funds distribution and accountability to which we will now turn.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Perkins II is not the first effort on the part of the federal government to hold school districts and post-secondary education accountable for vocational education. The 1963 act required states

to adopt state plans and to conduct program evaluations. Even earlier the federal government encouraged using various labor market outcomes—such as placement rates or employer satisfaction—in evaluating the relative success or failure of vocational education programs. These earlier efforts concentrated on whether the process was in place or not. Evidence was used to determine compliance with federal law and not with the utility of evaluation and planning as an integral part of program improvement. The new Act attempts to change all that by emphasizing a broader array of student outcomes. The focus is no longer on those outcomes that are related solely to the labor market (e.g., job placement) but expands to include student learning outcomes as a device to assess program effectiveness. Importantly, and consisting with the new emphasis on the integration of academic and vocational education, the scope is also enlarged to encompass measures of academic achievement.

The Act explicitly requires states to develop systems of performance measures and standards for secondary and post-secondary vocational education. These systems are to include at least two measures of performance. One must be a measure of student gains, including academic achievement. The second may be any one of the following four: 1) occupational competencies, 2) employment skills, 3) retention in school, or 4) placement in further education, the military or employment. It is important to note that these measures must include "appropriate adjustments and incentives for encouraging services to students with special needs." State and local agencies are given a great deal of flexibility in moving beyond these minimal requirements and to modify measures and standards to reflect local conditions.

Next Steps

Although Perkins II and the School-to-Work Opportunities Act represent the most dramatic change in federal vocational-technical education policy since the inception of federal aid to secondary education, it still leaves the United States far from having the necessary characteristics of a coherent system to prepare the country's youth for future employment. Little about the Act changes the basic underlying structure of education in the United States. It remains the province of a highly decentralized, locally autonomous set of institutions. The federal government's policies cannot in the short run hope to overcome the decades of powerful segregating, separationist policies which ran counter to the current policies.



In addition, the current small level of federal funding may not be enough of a lure to entice states to change long-standing, entrenched behaviors. Since many of the new initiatives require a high degree of participation beyond the traditional boundaries of vocational-technical education, the next round of federal strategies must include incentives for others to become full partners in the reform effort outlined in Perkins II. It is unrealistic to assume that the rest of the high school enterprise will be moved very far if the initiative is seen solely as vocational-technical education reform.

Incentives must be established to encourage the involvement of whole schools, not just the vocational education instructors and staff. Adding provisions to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which support the notion of integrating academic and vocational education is one way of adding support to the this powerful concept. Another is to add provisions to the Higher Education Act to entice schools of higher education to focus attention on preparing future teachers, both academic and vocational, to be able to provide instruction in an integrated mode.

Allowing consortia which establish Tech Prep programs to expend funds for 9th and 10th graders, and even earlier, would be another helpful policy initiative. Tech Prep programs which expect that students will spring fully prepared into Tech Prep programs in their junior year of high school, absent early counseling and academic preparation, will disappoint.

The prospects for success of these reforms increasingly will become evident when the accountability questions are asked. If the policy is similar to past policies in which the accountability mechanisms could be ignored with little risk, the programs will not improve. If, on the other hand, the new accountability strategies are governed by devices which distinguish between programs doing a good job from those which do not, and real consequences (e.g., loss of funds for unsuccessful programs) result from their application, real improvement is a possibility.

California's Workforce Training Programs

California has been slow to respond to the national concern about workforce preparation; it simply has not been a state educational priority. Among the reasons for California's molasses-like approach was that until the 1990's California had undergone an unprecedented stint of economic prosperity—having a skilled workforce in an economy that was always growing and performing

well was not seen as an urgent priority. In addition, part of the "California dream" was easy and inexpensive access to higher education, preparing young people for the world of work was not seen as a major priority, particularly among California's parents who viewed vocational education as "education for other people's children."

Also, California, under the leadership of State Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill Honig, adopted the strategy that strong academic preparation was the best preparation for the workforce and until well into his third term, workforce preparation was not a priority for the Superintendent nor the State Board of Education. Finally, a severe constriction in course offerings first made manifest shortly after the passage of Proposition 13 and an increase in mandated academic courses reduced the numbers of vocational course offerings in high schools throughout the state.[9]

That is not to say that there are not many superb workforce preparation programs in California's public schools and colleges. There are enough wonderful examples of quality programs in California to warrant optimism about their feasibility. The problem is, as it is with most reform efforts, to get the programs to "scale," that is, to have sufficient quality programs turning out sufficiently qualified workers to make an impact on the qualification levels of the California workforce. That goal is still quite lofty.

In the 1990's California's interest in school-to-work gradually heightened, partially in response to the federal initiatives described above, but also because the economic conditions of the state so concerned business leaders that they began to sound the alarm regarding the paucity of skilled workers and the very real fear that California faced a dismal future without a significant change in the way we prepared our young people for a productive work life. Superintendent Honig directed his high school reform task force substantively to address school to work.

The report of that task force, "Second to None: A Vision of the New California High School" called for a total restructuring of the typical California High School to create higher level learning opportunities that lead to post-secondary and career goals. Leadership from the business community was probably best exemplified by the work of the California Business Roundtable. Its report, "Mobilizing for Competitiveness, Linking Education and Training to Jobs," provided a template for a broad-based education and training program consistent with the federal initiatives and with "Second to None."

Key concepts include setting world class standards, performance based accountability, integrating academic and vocational education, integrating secondary and post-secondary education



and critically, integrating school and work. Again, the Roundtable's recommendations comport with both federal and state initiatives. Most importantly, the Roundtable called for the development of a coherent system so that "K–12 education, community colleges, the four-year education institutions, employment services, and job training programs operate under a common policy framework and provide clear pathways and transitions to high skill careers for all Californians." Assembly Speaker Willie Brown convened two major Summits, one on the economy—the other on education. In both instances, strong workforce preparation programs were touted as the key to California's economic future. California was beginning to establish the required level of policy consensus to lay the groundwork for an improved workforce preparation program.

Federal assistance to help individual state initiatives in workforce preparation was further reinforced in May 1994 with the passage of the federal School-to-Work Opportunities Act. The Act proposed two series of grants: the first were a small number of large competitive grants for states with strong track records, ready to implement key provisions of the initiative. Eight states were awarded grants in 1994. The second set of grant awards were planning grants available to all states which were not ready to implement the new federal initiatives. These states can apply for implementation grants later. Current estimates are that 15 additional states will be selected for funding in 1995.

California neglected to even file an application for the competitive grants but is currently considering the adoption of a statewide plan which would make it possible (if the new Congress maintains a commitment to school to work) to attain the much larger implementation grants. This plan, "California's Preliminary School-to-Career State Plan," was adopted by the Governor's School-to-Career Task Force in late 1994 and is being circulated for comments to the field.

The development of this plan marks an unprecedented level of interagency cooperation among the three state agencies primarily responsible for work force preparation in this state: the State Department of Education, the Community College Chancellor's Office and the Employment Development Department. In addition, the plan enjoys widespread support from the business community, the legislature and the Governor's office.

Although California has come late to the recognition of the importance of school to work, the necessary framework appears to be in place for future implementation. The Governor's Task Force has adopted many of the underlying tenets of the secondary reform plan, Second to None. Two key provisions bear special

mention:

1. *Academic Mastery by About the Tenth Grade.*

   By about the tenth grade, all students will be expected to master the common core of academic thinking and interpersonal skills they will need to lead a full and productive life in the 21st century.

2. *Career/Program Majors.*

   After demonstrating mastery, all students will have the choice of a range of career or program majors that provide a transition from school to either a career-entry position in the world of work or to more advanced education leading to Associate or Bachelor degrees. For many students, these majors will be a continuation of earlier "career pathways" programs which provide effective career guidance and knowledge. These majors or career clusters will eliminate tracking, since they will serve students with a broad range of higher education and career goals and will allow for easy movement and choice between career clusters, majors and programs. For this vision to be realized, it will be necessary to re-examine current course approval procedures for admission to the University of California and California State University systems.[10]

PACE has examined the school to work initiatives to tease out common core components and emphases that appear to be related to successful programs.

a. Integration of Academic and Vocational Education

If California is to succeed in preparing a high quality workforce, the long-standing and artificial barriers between vocational education and academic education must be broken and an integration of the curriculum must take place. This must be done for at least two reasons. The first is that in order to prepare a workforce that will be competitive, workers will need a high level of academic skills and knowledge.

The second and equally important reason is that for a very large number of students enrolled in America's schools, the current method of teaching (too often modeled on the college or university model) is not the most effective pedagogical practice. Cognitive scientists are now telling us what common sense has told us for some time—people learn better by doing. Teaching academic principles in a work-related context is proba-



bly the best and most effective way of learning. Successful programs blur the distinction between academic and vocational education. Academic content is higher than in most traditional vocational programs and applied methods are used to a greater degree than in most academic programs. The key to successful integration efforts lie in effectively getting faculty from across disciplines to work closely together in the development of the new integrated curriculum.

b. Integration of Secondary and Post-secondary

All too frequently, there is little or no connection between what students learn in high school and what they need to know and do to succeed in vocational/technical courses in community colleges. Currently, community colleges spend much time and valuable resources remediating students, who should have come to them better prepared to do college level work.

Community colleges historically have done a very poor job of explaining to high school faculty and students what is expected of students when they get to college. Four year colleges send clearer signals about the kinds of courses students are expected to have and in some instances, some very specific signals about what college freshmen need to know in order to succeed in the post-secondary world. The same kinds of signals need to be sent by community colleges so that high school students will know what it takes to succeed in college level technical preparation programs.

Strong working relationships between high school and community college faculty in the planning of a well articulated program are essential. Successful programs require curriculum modifications at both secondary and post-secondary levels. Community college instructors must view themselves as partners with their high school counterparts. High school teachers will not respond positively if they see curriculum reform being proposed from the top down.

c. Integration of School and Work

Much of the research in this area also tells us what common sense would suggest—the closer the connection between what goes on in school and what goes on in the workplace—the more effective the work experience program will be. At the same time, the closer the

work and what is taught in school are connected, the more effective the program. Students who can actually see how mathematics principles are applied at the work site will be more effective students and more effective workers. Most existing work experience programs aspire to such a closely knit connection, but few succeed. Business needs to send clear signals about what is expected of young people and how work experiences can fulfill those expectations

This is one of the most difficult and elusive concepts associated with school-to-work. The best programs carefully monitor student activities in the work place to make certain there is a connection between the work done in school, at work and vice versa. Students enrolled in schools which work hard on these connecting activities do better in school and at work.

d. Accountability—Consequences

There is one more element that is particularly important in all this and that is cost—can we afford it? The answer is yes, but only if California is really willing to take a hard look at existing programs and curricula. We have a plethora of vocational training and vocational education courses and programs ($3 billion and 23 separate programs)—many do not work.[11] Identifying, modifying or eliminating these programs is not easy, but may be the only way to free up the necessary resources to fund the new programs that show they can work. California doesn't need new models—but it does need to rid itself of obsolete, dead-end programs and refocus its scarce resources.

To that end California does need a new model for accountability, not just for vocational courses but for schools, districts and colleges. There are promising efforts underway at both the federal and state levels to promote such accountability mechanisms.

In addition, it is important that state leaders develop the message to school boards everywhere. "How well you prepare students for the world of work is an important part of your mission and how well you do that is an important indicator of whether your schools are succeeding or not."

Superintendents, principals and teachers ought be held accountable for the success of these programs. Both individuals and programs should be held account-

able for performance. There should be consequences for students who do not try hard in school as well as for programs and institutions which do not try hard enough to teach all their students well. Watered down courses, depleted of academic rigor, ill serve students and institutions.

The new message must be what students do in school at every level has consequences for the next level in his or her education. California can no longer afford unlimited remediation. The programs which succeed have high expectations about student performance, emphasize high standards and have ways of measuring the achievement of program goals.

e. Not one best model

There are many ways to provide quality workforce preparation programs. Each has a slightly different focus, all are consistent with the new federal school-to-work opportunities act and can be appropriate depending on the situation at the school site. The principal programs and their central characteristics are outlined below.

1. Academies

Academies are programs that integrate academic and vocational education by creating vocational theme "schools-within-schools" within comprehensive high schools. In these academies, students are given a strong dose of academics taught within a vocational context (health is a popular example). The course work is career-linked—algebra may be taught in a health academy using algebraic formulas to solve various problems typically faced by a nurse, doctor or hospital administrator. Students are paired with mentors in the community who are successfully engaged in the vocational field of focus.

2. Tech Prep

Tech Prep programs have as their central defining characteristic the connection between high school programs and community college programs. In these programs students spend much of their early high school careers taking courses that would give them the strong academic preparation in English, science and mathematics, often taught in an integrated or applied manner. In the latter part of their high school experience, students begin to focus on career clusters, with the potential of taking some community college courses while still in high school and to get some valuable, high

quality work experience. In the community college portion of the program they focus on the more specific skills they will need to become successful technicians

3. Youth Apprenticeship

Youth Apprenticeship programs feature strong integration of academic and vocational components as well as a paid "apprenticeship" program. Youth apprenticeships are still scarce and there are only a handful in California in four industries: construction, printing, health care and hospitality/tourism. These programs have received a great deal of attention, especially by the Department of Labor, and very well could be the program of choice for the administration in the federal arena.

4. Community Classroom and Co-op Programs

Community Classroom programs are offered by Regional Occupational Centers/Programs. These programs provide unpaid on-the-job training that is directly related to students' instructional programs. High schools and community colleges offer work experience education and cooperative vocational education which provide paid work experience. The very best of these programs effectively relate the learning events which occur in the school with the work events that occur on the job and vice versa. Effective programs require a great deal of work at both the school and the worksite to insure that the linkages between the school and the workplace are meaningful and mutually reinforcing.

CONCLUSION

California has many exemplary vocational education and training programs. There is no lack of successful and proven models. What is lacking is adequate coordination and leadership. The isolated examples of quality exemplars does not constitute a coherent and effective statewide model. As a result, California's efforts continue to be fragmented, duplicative, and hinder California's attempts to build a workforce which will be responsive to tomorrow's economic challenges. The Report of the Governor's School-to-Career Task Force establishes a logical, comprehensive and meaningful framework for the hard work that will be required to build a coordinated workforce education and training system to



Endnotes

1 Much of the discussion regarding federal vocational education policies is drawn from *Vocational-Technical Education: Major Reforms and Debates 1917 - Present*, by Gerald C. Hayward and Charles S. Benson, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., 1993.

2 Gardner, D., et al. *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform*. Report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.

3 Clune, W. H., White, P., and Patterson, J. *The Implementation and Effects of High School Graduation Requirements: First Steps Toward Curricular Reform*, U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Educational Resources Information Center, 1989.

4 Grubb, W. Norton and Plihal, J. *The Cunning Hand, the Cultured Mind: Models for Integrating Vocational and Academic Education*. Berkeley, CA: National Center for Research in Vocational Education, University of California, 1991.

5 Hull, D., and Parnell, D. *Tech Prep Associate Degree: A Win/Win Experience*. Waco, Texas: Center for Occupational Research and Development, 1991.

6 Some programs, after successful completion of the community college portion, add an articulated connection with four year technical baccalaureate programs.

7 Dornsife, C. *Beyond Articulation: The Development of Tech Prep Programs*. Berkeley, CA: National Center for Research in Vocational Education, University of California, 1992.

8 For a full treatment of programs which emphasize the school-to-work connection see the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Vocational and Adult Education March 1991 publication entitled *Combining School and Work: Options in High Schools and Two-Year Colleges*.

9 See PACE paper PP87-7-10 "Vocational Education in Transition," Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Graduate School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, July 1987.

10 *The California School-to-Career Preliminary Plan*, The Governor's School-to-Career Task Force, November, 1994.

11 *The California School-to-Career Preliminary Plan*, The Governor's School-to-Career Task Force, November, 1994.